

Profile:  
F. W. de Klerk

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# IT'S BLACK OR WHITE IN SOUTH AFRICA

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by George Szamuely

The South African problem is often formulated as one of democratic rule versus minority rule. But that is a European and American perspective which has little validity within South Africa. There, the problem seems simpler and cruder: Who will rule, Whites or Blacks?

Unfortunately, this problem is likely to prove insoluble, simply because neither alternative is broadly acceptable to the population of South Africa. Black rule without minority rights for Whites is unacceptable to virtually all White leaders, including the current reform-minded president, F. W. de Klerk. Yet minority rights for Whites are understood by virtually all Black leaders to mean continued protection for the fruits of apartheid, and thus a subtle form of continued White rule.

No one has a solution for this contradiction, certainly not de Klerk, and it is hard to see how there can be one. In the absence of a solution, therefore, the president is doing what his predecessors did, only more of it: he is groping about in the hope that somehow he will eventually muddle through.

## Nationalization — A Red Herring

Meanwhile, many free-market liberals have lost sight of the main issue in South Africa, and take the central question to be: What plans does the African National Congress (ANC) have for South Africa's economy? After all, the ANC's 1955 Freedom Charter states that: "The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people; the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people."<sup>1</sup> In view of the collapse of several socialist regimes of Eastern Europe and the adoption of capitalist innovations in the Soviet Union, liberals wonder how long the ANC will adhere to this long-standing commitment to nationalization. They hope that an ANC renunciation of

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<sup>1</sup> Jeremy Cronin and Raymond Suttner, *Thirty Years of the Freedom Charter* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p. 263.

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**George Szamuely** writes on politics and international affairs for a wide variety of publications, including *Commentary*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The American Spectator*, and *The National Interest*.

socialism would end White fears of economic breakdown and thus White fears generally. Would that it were so.

Since his release from prison on February 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela, the deputy president of the ANC and the organization's most prominent spokesman, has reiterated his enthusiasm for nationalization, saying "The simple answer is that we are not rethinking the question of nationalization."<sup>2</sup> Mandela's recent pronouncements, including his favorable comments about Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and Fidel Castro, would indicate that the ANC leadership has, to say the least, done little to capitalize on the hopes raised by the changes inaugurated in Moscow. But Mandela does promise not to do anything drastic before "consultations" take place with business leaders.

In point of fact, such "consultations" have been taking place since 1985, not with Mandela himself but with his colleagues in Lusaka, Zambia. As a consequence of these talks, Gavin Relly, chairman of a leading gold-mining company, the Anglo-American Corporation, expressed some time ago a measured optimism as to the ANC's intentions towards South African capitalism. And this is not really surprising. Gold mining is a highly intricate, dangerous industry. It is also essential to the economic survival of the country. Therefore, with or without the lesson of Eastern Europe, it was always highly unlikely that the ANC would do anything to provoke the kind of White exodus that proved so devastating for Mozambique in 1975.

If the ANC has yet to renounce socialism formally, there are indications it soon might. In February, Johannesburg's *Business Day* cited a statement of a "senior ANC source" declaring that "Nationalisation of the economy was not ANC policy."<sup>3</sup> More recently, Mandela himself has said that nationalization is a good idea only if it helps the economy.<sup>4</sup> Even Joe Slovo, the secretary-general of the South African Communist Party (a close ally of the ANC) and for many years chief of the ANC's guerrilla wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), has started to make the right sounds. In February 1990, he published a document entitled "Has Socialism Failed?" In it, he made the by-now ritual denunciations of the "crimes and distortions in the history of existing socialism, its economic failures and the divide which developed between socialism and democracy."<sup>5</sup> And he has been quoted as saying "It would be harmful demagoguery and a recipe for chaos to proclaim that the post-apartheid state will be able, at a stroke, to do away completely with the market economy, to eliminate the whole private sector."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, May 24, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> *Business Day*, February 16, 1990.

<sup>4</sup> *The Economist*, May 26, 1990.

<sup>5</sup> Joe Slovo, "Has Socialism Failed?" (leaflet of the South African Communist Party), p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Frances Kendall, "Reading Mandela's Mind," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 12, 1990.

The hope that the ANC will give up its Marxist ideology resonates in Washington as well as South Africa. The day after Mandela's release, President Bush was quoted as saying "it would not make sense for South Africa to adopt socialist policies when 'socialism is folding, folding its hand and going over to the other side all across the world.'" He also asserted that "the nationalization of major industries would not be 'particularly helpful toward democracy.'"<sup>7</sup>

Given the ANC's rapidly moderating economic views, and the political and economic pressures for further moderation, substantial nationalization is not likely to be enacted by a Black government — and Whites know it. The principal fear of Whites, therefore, concerns not socialism but rather the introduction of majority rule, or perhaps more properly (since no one knows what Black rule might look like) the end of minority rule by Afrikaners.

### **The Afrikaners**

Today, something like two-thirds of the White population is Afrikaner — a people possessing a distinct national consciousness that goes back to the mid-seventeenth century.

The Afrikaners, also called Boers (originally, but no longer, a term of contempt meaning "farmers"), are descendants of Dutch settlers who came into conflict with English settlers after an expeditionary force from Great Britain seized the Cape of Good Hope. The settlers from Britain brought with them all kinds of innovations (such as the abolition of Dutch as the language of administration). To distance themselves from the English, thousands of Boers uprooted their families and began the Great Trek in 1834, moving inland to lands depopulated by tribal warfare. In 1852, the Boers north of the Vaal River (the Transvaal) were granted independence by Britain, and in 1864, established the South African Republic. Boers between the Orange River and the Vaal River were given independence in 1854 and established the Boer Republic of the Orange Free State. In the 1880s, however, gold was discovered in the Transvaal, and in the 1890s, rail links were established between British and Boer areas. As British subjects moved into the Transvaal, disputes arose over their rights, leading to a fierce war from 1899 to 1902.

The Afrikaner struggle against British colonial domination in the Boer War, it is worth recalling, was for a time the favorite cause of progressive opinion throughout the civilized world. Though vanquished at the hands of the mighty British Empire after a valiant struggle, Afrikaners came to dominate the country politically but not economically. (This last changed only very recently with the international boycott and disinvestment campaign, which stimulated the growth of a native manu-

<sup>7</sup>*The New York Times*, February 13, 1990.

facturing industry and facilitated the takeover of the subsidiaries of the multinationals by native South Africans.)

In the early days of the Union of South Africa, established after the 1910 South Africa Act, politics was dominated by the South African Party (SAP), led by two former Boer generals, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. Though essentially an Afrikaner party, the SAP was conciliatory in dealing with British interests. This allowed J.B.M. Hertzog — a staunch Afrikaner nationalist, and also a former Boer general, as well as Botha's former minister of native affairs — to form a purely Afrikaner party in 1913, the National Party (NP). By 1929, the National Party was the largest party in Parliament. In 1934, however, Hertzog joined forces with Smuts, leading to the United South African National Party, with Hertzog as prime minister. D.F. Malan and nineteen other dissident members of Parliament continued with the original National Party. After war broke out in 1939, Hertzog wished to pursue a course of neutrality, but Smuts argued that South Africa (as a member of the British Commonwealth) was a British ally. After Hertzog lost the vote on this issue, Smuts returned as wartime prime minister, and most of Hertzog's faction abandoned the United Party, with various elements taking various courses. In 1948, Hertzog's lieutenant N.C. Havenga (Hertzog had died in 1942) allied with Malan against Smuts, who was widely viewed as a traitor to Afrikanerdom for supporting Britain's interests. As a result, following a campaign in which the NP's support for apartheid played a major role, Malan's alliance was able to put together a government, albeit one with a majority of only five seats.

The election of 1948 is usually taken to be the date when South Africa adopted as state policy the system known as "apartheid," which systematically legislated and institutionalized White supremacy. But what actually followed from that year's electoral triumph by the National Party was the political expression of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. The Nationalists promoted Afrikaner interests and ideals at the expense of the English as well as the Blacks, the Asians, those of mixed race (whom Afrikaners call Coloureds). They insisted, for instance, that entrants into the civil service had to be competent in both Afrikaans and English, and they pushed for the adoption of a republican constitution (as opposed to the Commonwealth constitutional monarchy then in place).

Racism was not introduced into South Africa in 1948, but much earlier. Laws prohibiting marriage between Whites and Blacks were introduced in the seventeenth century, as were separate schools for Blacks. The Native Land Act, demarcating how much of the total land area of South Africa could be owned by Blacks, was passed by Louis Botha's Boer government in 1913. The Wages Act of 1925 set minimum wage rates for specific jobs, with the intent to keep them reserved for Whites. The Native Trust and Land Act of 1930 assigned Bantustans (later known as

“homelands”) to Blacks; these, though they do contain agricultural and mineral resources, make up only 13 percent of the land area of South Africa. The Representation of Natives Act of 1936 removed Blacks from the common voter roll of the Cape Province and gave them a separate roll, with the right to elect three White representatives.

What, then, is different about the post-1948 period? First, it has a systematic and doctrinal character. The term apartheid seems to have been introduced only in 1943, in the columns of the Nationalist paper *Die Burger*, and first heard in Parliament the next year. After the National Party’s victory, three race laws were passed in rapid succession: the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), which made illegal marriages between Whites and a person of any other racial group; the Population Registration Act (1950), which sets out the guidelines for deciding a person’s race; and the Group Areas Act (1950), which provides that a certain stretch of land (usually in an urban area) belongs to a certain racial group, thereby forbidding other groups to live, trade, and own land in the area. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) allows for the racial segregation of facilities.

Second, apartheid pretends that the triumphant affirmation of Afrikaner self-determination coincides with the self-determination of the “Bantus,” and that the institutions of apartheid elaborated this joint nationalism. As Conor Cruise O’Brien has noted ironically, “the liberation of the blacks by the Afrikaners would consist in the restoration of their tribal life.”<sup>8</sup> Even today, many Afrikaners argue that both they and the Blacks have always been engaged in the same endeavor to free themselves from British tutelage. As one of their ideologues, G. Conjé, wrote, “The Boer nation can fully understand the sufferings of the Bantu. It is that same imperialism and capitalism, having them believe that the foreign is better than what is their own, which seeks to destroy their tribal life.”<sup>9</sup> Thus was born the famous formula “many nations/many states” — more descriptive than the better-known term “apartheid” — that successive South African governments attempted to implement.

The tragedy of it all, from the Afrikaner point of view, is that their own national survival has thus become inextricably bound up with the continued existence of the apartheid system. So when, from the mid-1970s on, National Party politicians began to lose faith in its workability, their constituents grew alarmed. It was not so much that they feared being pushed into the sea (though that is what they might say in public). They believed, not without justification, that surrendering power to the Black majority would entail the demise of their nationhood. It would mean the abolition of Afrikaans as the national language. (Though only three hundred years old, Afrikaans currently boasts internationally re-

<sup>8</sup> Conor Cruise O’Brien, *Passion and Cunning: Essays on Nationalism, Terrorism, and Revolution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 146.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*

nowned writers and poets such as J. M. Coetzee and P.P. Breytenbach.) It would mean the disestablishment of the Dutch Reformed church; the loss of the Day of the Covenant as Afrikanerdom's national day; and an end to the rest of the usual symbols that define a nation's identity — from the flag, to the anthem, to the history books, to the statues.

### **The Homelands Policy**

H.F. Verwoerd (1901-1966) is the man most closely associated with contemporary apartheid. As minister for native affairs (1950-58) in the governments of D. F. Malan (1948-1954) and J.G. Strijdom (1954-58), and then as prime minister (1958-1966), Verwoerd set about creating homelands to serve as nation-states where the Blacks would live their tribal life (whether they wanted to or not).

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**The creators of apartheid were not wholly wrong in identifying tribal affiliation as having central importance in the lives of South African Blacks. Where they did go seriously wrong was in the cruelty and the arbitrariness with which the policy was pursued.**

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This formula for apartheid — which continued the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 — was given constitutional expression in 1959, when the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act set aside eight homelands for Blacks, which were subsequently granted “self-government”: Transkei (1963), Ciskei (1972), Lebowa (1972), Venda (1972), Bophuthatswana (1972), KwaZulu (1973), Gazankulu (1973), Qwaqwa (1974). Later, two more homelands were given self-government — KwaNdebele (1977), and KaNgwane (1984) — bringing the number to ten. Beginning in the mid-1970s, four of these were proclaimed independent states: Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), Ciskei (1981), although none were recognized by any country except South Africa.

The creators of this system were not wholly wrong in identifying tribal affiliation as having central importance in the lives of South African Blacks. Nor were they wrong to think that powerful links bound Blacks to the tribal homelands, even for those who had lived for many years in the townships. Where the architects of apartheid did go seriously wrong, however, was in the cruelty and the arbitrariness with which the policy was pursued. They routinely relied on such tactics as the uprooting of families, forcible resettlements, expropriation of land, and the whole litany of painfully familiar actions.

More important, these homelands could never have become nation-states because South Africa did not sincerely intend that they should. Had Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, or Venda ever threatened to become genuinely independent African states, the Republic of South Africa would have prevented it. That is to say, like every other government in the world, the one in Pretoria would not voluntarily break up its country, unless it could be fairly sure no diminution of power would result.

Further, the homelands program entailed huge costs for Whites. Massive sums of money were poured into the homelands to help build up the infrastructure, thereby (supposedly) inducing its residents to continue to live there. A recent estimate put the figure at \$3 billion per year.<sup>10</sup> Yet the tax funds were never sufficient to turn the homelands into going concerns, and no wonder. For even while wealth was being transferred into the homelands, restrictions were placed on economic activity there. Rigid laws limited rights to land ownership and regulated trade, ensuring permanent impoverishment. Naturally, the economic opportunities of White cities proved far more attractive to Blacks, and the drift of Blacks to those cities continued, despite rigid controls against it and the strongly held belief of government officials that the tide would soon reverse.

Since 1948, therefore, and particularly since instituting the policy of Black homelands, the government of South Africa has pursued two conflicting policies. On the one hand, it has devoted vast resources to these homelands (although not enough to make them viable). On the other hand, to turn South Africa into a major economic power, it has drawn out of the homelands the enormous human resources available there (all the while hoping not to depopulate them).

### **Muddling About**

Such a policy could not last. Rather suddenly, first under Prime Minister John Vorster (1966-1978), and Prime Minister (later president) P. W. Botha (1978-1989), it became clear that apartheid was at odds with reality. Starting in the early 1970s, this recognition found expression in one piece of legislation after another affecting Black rights. Job reservation laws (prohibiting Blacks from working at certain jobs) began to be scrapped, with the last removed in 1983. In 1979, Black trade unions were officially recognized. In 1978, certain qualified Blacks were given the right to have ninety-nine-year leaseholds outside of the homelands, and in 1986, qualified Blacks were granted freehold rights. That same year, the influx-control laws were scrapped.

Yet it was hard to know what to make of all of this, since four homelands had by 1981 been given "independence" and six more putative candidates were waiting in the wings. South African Blacks were no

<sup>10</sup> *The New York Times*, May 8, 1990.

longer to be regarded as temporary residents or migrant workers. But what exactly were they? P. W. Botha talked of the need for power sharing with Blacks at the level of central government without spelling out a mechanism. He inaugurated the rhetoric of “minority rights,” “participation without dominion,” “co-operative coexistence,” “self-determination,” and “own affairs” — all of which left his Afrikaner listeners somewhat nonplussed.

Clearly, the “many nations/many states” formula had been abandoned. But what was to take its place? “Many nations/one state”? Then why go on paying through the nose to keep the homelands going? And, come to that, if South Africa was to emulate Lebanon, why not have a head-count, decide who belongs to which nation, and then allocate the cabinet seats accordingly?

The point was lucidly put by Denis Worrall, a former ambassador to Great Britain and now a leader of the recently formed Democratic Part. In 1988, he wrote:

The present ruling party has abandoned classic apartheid but failed to put anything in its place, hence the uncertainty that so many Afrikaners (and whites in general) feel, and the growth of right-wing sentiment. The National Party is left pursuing a muddled pragmatism while a substantial number of traditional National Party supporters have returned to classic apartheid — but without the idealism of the earlier model. . . . This right-wing sentiment, and the mobilization of Afrikaner support for the Conservative Party, springs directly . . . from the government’s failure to spell out the various options and constitutional choices that South Africa faces. In the absence of clear choices, whites will be guided by their most immediate experience; and when they look around them at the rest of the continent, they see economic decline, mal-administrations, corruption, and the general failure of democratic politics.<sup>11</sup>

True as this was in 1988, it has become even more strikingly true since then, as the government tries to substitute activity for direction, making the situation even more acute.

### **The Pace Accelerates**

Recent events — the unbanning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, and the release of Nelson Mandela — have taken place without the fulfillment of the condition that the government had for years deemed essential, namely, the renunciation of violence. White opinion is highly agitated, and this has led to a rise in pro-apartheid political parties and vigilantism.

In the general election of September 1989, the Nationalists won 48 percent of the vote and the new Democratic Party won 21 percent — but the Conservative Party (founded in 1982) won 31 percent. Optimisti-

<sup>11</sup> Denis Worrall, “The Real Struggle in South Africa: An Insider’s View,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 2, 1988, p. 121.

cally, de Klerk claims the results prove 70 percent of the voting population favored change. He may be right. But the results might also prove only that the Conservative Party platform did not seem particularly plausible. Its apparently modest message — “The White community’s right to self-determination” — essentially called for a return to Verwoerdian apartheid. Nevertheless, the Conservative Party does attract increasing support from Whites unable to understand where de Klerk’s policies are leading. Should another all-White election take place, the Conservative Party may well overtake the Nationalists as the largest party. If that happens, it is difficult to see how a reform program can continue to be implemented, even if the Conservatives fail to put together a government.

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Indeed, it is not clear what de Klerk’s reforms would amount to even if he could enact them. Four of the most important pieces of legislation enacting apartheid remain on the statute books. These are the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, which demarcates 13 percent of South Africa’s area as “Native Reserves,” and forbids Blacks to buy lands in the White areas (the remaining 87 percent); The Population Registration Act of 1950, which sets out the guidelines for deciding a person’s race; the Group Areas Act of 1950, which provides that a certain area belongs to a certain racial group, thereby forbidding other groups to live, trade, and own land in the area; and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which allows for the racial segregation of facilities.

In the present parliamentary session, de Klerk has introduced a bill that would scrap the Separate Amenities Act. But this is not crucial, for de facto desegregation of most features of South African life has already taken place. [The Separate Amenities Act was repealed on June 19, 1990. — *Ed.*] As part of the introduction of free markets, the Land Act too may go soon. But it is far from clear what the government has in mind to do about the remaining two laws, which constitute the heart of apartheid. On the critical matter of majority rule, de Klerk has called for “a new dispensation in which all South Africans will have a vote, in which there won’t be suppression of minorities and domination.”<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, this fine rhetoric makes it all too easy to overlook the insuperability of the problems involved.

<sup>12</sup> Johannesburg Television Service, February 22, 1990; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, February 23, 1990.

For example, what constitution will follow the present one? The constitution which has been in effect since September 3, 1984, mandates a tricameral legislature, but with no prime minister. Each of the three houses is based on race classification. The House of Assembly is for White legislators, the House of Representatives for Coloureds, and the House of Delegates for Indian representatives. The part of state president is a strong one, for he is both head of state and head of government. The president is elected by an eighty-eight-member electoral college comprising fifty members from the White's Assembly, twenty-five members from the Coloured's House of Representatives, and thirteen members from the Indian's House of Delegates.

For the future, the South African Law Commission is looking at different models — such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada — supposedly weighing the advantages of a cantonal system as against a confederal system. At various times since early 1989, government spokesmen have suggested the need for a federal system, for proportional representation, and for regional governments based on cultural groups or geography. Sometimes, the projected federal parliament is to be made up of chambers allocated to each racial or cultural group; sometimes of regional representatives; sometimes of representatives from Black homelands; sometimes of Black Regional Council representatives, of White Regional Council representatives, of Coloureds, and of Indians. Evidently, a near-infinite variety of permutations is possible and is being suggested.

### **Can de Klerk Muddle Through?**

In the end, therefore, there seems no way around the problem that in South Africa a geographic interpenetration of the races exists, and consequently the only way Whites can avoid being swamped by a Black majority is by continuing to adhere to a political system — however sophisticated its workings — which relies on race as a category of definition. It is difficult to envision how this could be made acceptable to even the most moderate Blacks.

Thus, de Klerk seems to favor power sharing at the level of the central government, but not at the community level. Affairs of the general government might be decided by majorities, but “national” affairs (or racial affairs or ethnic affairs — use what euphemism you like) will be decided exclusively by one's group. One proposal in this regard would eliminate the Group Areas Act but allow local authorities to decide — as part of what is known as the community's “own affairs” — to keep their borough exclusively for the group of their choice. The “many nations/many states” formula would be abandoned *de jure*, but obviously separate voter rolls would still be needed to give political expression to the rights of minorities to run their own affairs. Instead of the Population Registration Act, which classifies everyone at birth to determine of which

nation one is a citizen, there would be something like a “Community Relations Act,” classifying everyone on a voluntary, self-defining basis (by “culture” or “ethnicity,” certainly not by “race”).

Interestingly, when de Klerk was leader of the National Party in the Transvaal in 1986, he argued that such voluntary group association would lead only to chaos and confusion.<sup>13</sup> He was surely right. For instance, as the plan is generally proposed, there is to be a category known as the “open” group, for all those who do not wish to classify themselves. What is to prevent the ANC, say, from urging its followers to list themselves in that category? And if they do, what becomes of the protection of minorities? Moreover, what about all the possibilities of false classification?

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This is not even the end to the problems in such a solution. What exactly are these “local” affairs that pertain so much to race? The leaders of South Africa have only a vague answer to this question: education, housing, “quality of life” issues, and so on. Specifically, what counts as “White” rights? The preservation of school teaching in Afrikaans could easily be covered by a Bill of Rights. But what about retaining the national anthem, the national flag, and control over the armed forces? The government might say that it does not seek apartheid by another name, but does seek to maintain a government of law, an efficient capitalist economy, and a Western, Christian way of life — without racial supremacy playing any part at all.

There is a lot to be said for this last argument. But because of the apartheid policies pursued for so many years, there is no Black leadership around that will accept it. Nelson Mandela has said:

At a time when we want to move away from all forms of racialism, we do not want discussions which have started so well to be determined by any solution which is based on race. And I am going to ask de Klerk that he must not [sic] bring this issue to any conference between the A.N.C. and the Government.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Lawrence Schlemmer, “South Africa’s National Party Government,” in Peter L. Berger and Bobby Godsell, eds., *A Future South Africa: Vision, Strategies, and Realities* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, May 7, 1990.

Even Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha party insists on a geographically unitary state, one sovereign parliament, and a universal franchise on a common voters' roll.<sup>15</sup>

In reality, therefore, the government has not come up with a negotiating agenda. De Klerk simply repeats to all questioners: "What we're concentrating upon now is to get negotiations going, and we sincerely believe that, in the process of negotiation, all parties must be free to put their proposals on the table. . . . We must work for a consensus on a model which is acceptable to all participants or at least to the majority of all participants."<sup>16</sup> No wonder concern is growing among the White electorate.

### Giving Up?

But White concern follows from more than de Klerk's vagueness. Though the people around him bandy about the concepts that became fashionable in the Botha era, there is less and less conviction in their utterances. White voters see this. They see, too, the meager concessions won from the ANC and Nelson Mandela following de Klerk's dramatic gestures in February 1990, and many White voters suspect that a deal is in the offing between the government and the ANC. Most plausibly, the government would win commitments for a federal system of government (without group areas) and a hands-off approach to the economy; in return the ANC would get its "one man/one vote" on a single franchise.

This thinking may result from the paranoia that all embattled peoples are prone to. But the point is that while de Klerk enjoys plaudits abroad, at home his accomplishments are seen to be questionable at best.

Of course, one could argue that de Klerk is a brilliant strategist. Opening the prison doors to Nelson Mandela showed the world not the revolutionary hero of the posters and T-shirts but a dreary, pedantic, uncharismatic bureaucrat. Suddenly it is no longer a White minority ruling over a vast, united, undifferentiated Black people. Mandela's calls for an end to violence in the Natal were ignored; his pleas to Black school-children to end their boycott also fell on deaf ears. Reports are rife of divisions within the ANC between its external and internal wings; between Mandela and the recently released Walter Sisulu, former secretary-general of the ANC; between Mandela and Cyril Ramaphosa, secretary-general of the National Union of Mineworkers. Some rumors even put the ANC at odds with the United Democratic Front — an umbrella group of Black trade unions, Christian church leaders, and anti-apartheid activists set up by Allan Boesak in 1983 — and hitherto always assumed to be closely aligned with the ANC.

<sup>15</sup> Gibson Thula, "A Basis for Constitutional Transformation," in Robert I. Rotberg and John Barrat, eds., *Conflict and Compromise in South Africa* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), pp. 161-169. Thula wrote as a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha.

<sup>16</sup> Interview on *Nightline*, February 13, 1990.

Thanks to de Klerk's actions, these conflicts are appearing in the world media. For the first time, Americans and Europeans are seeing the ferocity of the Black-on-Black violence that has been going on in South Africa for years. The outside world sees meetings take place between Black and White political leaders, but not a joint appearance between Mandela and Buthelezi. Not since the Boer War have the Afrikaners enjoyed so much good publicity.

But what will de Klerk win in return for his gestures? His unbanning of the ANC (and the worldwide applause that greeted this move) obscures our ignorance of the ANC's shadowy inner world. What is its attitude toward terrorism, how close is its alignment with South Africa's Communists, and how important are its links with the Soviet Union? We do not know. We only know that in unbanning the ANC, de Klerk has taken an enormous gamble.

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For instance, there is a substantial question about the ANC's willingness to reach a commitment satisfactory to all the parties. The ANC has been highly skillful in promoting an image of itself as moderate, even somewhat "bourgeois." Yet it is also committed to armed struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe, its guerrilla wing, trained a number of the youngsters who were the leaders of the "spontaneous" violent outbursts that shook the townships in 1984-86. Chris Hani, now Umkhonto we Sizwe's chief of staff, has made no secret of his enthusiasm for "necklacing," the ruthless practice of burning victims by placing petrol-filled tires around their necks, that was used with such efficiency against township councilors, Black policemen, and strike- or boycott-breakers.

Though accounts of the origins of recent violence in the townships are hazy, evidence indicates it was not the product of haphazard gangsterism, but came about at the instigation of the ANC. The return of thousands of exiles and prisoners is now strengthening the ANC's political organization in the townships; such rivals as the Christian political activists are thereby being coerced into submission. Since the ANC has not renounced violence, some of its violent methods of a few years back could return.

Consequently, the talks with the de Klerk government might break down, leading the ANC to resort again to strikes, boycotts of White

businesses, and so on. With the ANC now more firmly entrenched in the townships than ever before, such violence could be a lot nastier. And one may be sure that the moment de Klerk sends in his troops, he will lose whatever standing he has in the West and whatever leverage he may gain from it.

There is a further danger that the violence might be misinterpreted as the work of the Pan African Congress (PAC), the bogeyman of the South African scene. The PAC refuses to work alongside White anti-apartheid activists or even to acknowledge a future role for Whites in "Azania." This refusal to acknowledge the multiracial character of the country dooms it to failure, but a belief that the PAC was gaining ground would make Mandela and the ANC that much more attractive as negotiating partners to a frightened government.

## Conclusion

Lately, a sense of universal relief has been growing that South Africa, against all the odds, might just have a peaceful, prosperous future ahead of it. For example, as Frances Kendall sees it:

Mr. Mandela may find himself at the head of a broad-based, centrist, social-democratic party with supporters from all race groups, whose main competitor is another broad-based democratic party advocating a market economy and "minority rights," also with supporters of all colors, under the leadership of F.W. de Klerk.<sup>17</sup>

De Klerk's benign, professorial air and his unprecedented steps toward change have been critical in creating this sense of relief and hope.

Unfortunately, immense problems still confront the country. Most Afrikaners know that the elaborate constitutions, definitions, formulae, and rhetorical flourishes that they have been coming up with in recent years are hypocritical. The aim of such devices is to preserve the fruits of apartheid, while getting rid of its most odious aspects. What they are doing is not dissimilar to what Gorbachev and his colleagues are up to in Moscow. One may argue that the Afrikaners' attempt to preserve their way of life — democratic, Western, and civilized insofar as it extends to them — is a nobler endeavor than the propping-up of a Marxist-Leninist system. But once people are aware that they are engaged in hypocrisy, it becomes difficult to pretend they are not and to go on acting as if they are not.

<sup>17</sup> Kendall, "Reading Mandela's Mind."

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# Profile

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## **F.W. DE KLERK**

by Colin A. Vale

Frederik Willem de Klerk — known as F.W. (pronounced “eff-veer”)<sup>1</sup> — is a child of the National Party (NP) establishment in South Africa. His great-grandfather was an NP senator in the Union Parliament (before South Africa became a republic). His grandfather twice ran unsuccessfully for parliament. His uncle by marriage, J.G. Strijdom, served as prime minister in the 1950s. F.W.’s father, Jan de Klerk, was a cabinet minister between 1954 and 1968 (of labor and public works, of mines, of the interior, of immigration, and of education, arts and science), and after that held the honorific post of president of the Senate until 1976.

F.W. de Klerk, born on March 18, 1936, was twelve years old when the National Party came to power in 1948. By contrast, his immediate predecessor as state president, P.W. Botha, was born in 1916. Thus, as a profile in *The Observer* pointed out, de Klerk “was among the first generation of White Afrikaners to grow to maturity with apartheid and Afrikaner supremacy as part of the political furniture. Botha’s generation had done the fighting, de Klerk’s enjoyed the spoils.”<sup>2</sup>

De Klerk attended Monument High School in Krugersdorp in the western Transvaal, then one of the best schools in the Afrikaner educational establishment. After finishing high school, F.W. went to nearby Potchefstroom University for Higher Christian Education to study law, and enlisted in the Jeugbond, the NP’s youth organization. Later he joined the Broederbond, the semi-secret Afrikaner society that until recently ran South Africa’s political life. At the university, he became involved in student politics and ended up as an executive member of the Afrikaanse Studentebond, a student movement with strong National Party affiliations.

After graduating cum laude with a law degree in 1958, de Klerk spent six weeks in England on a scholarship. On his return to the Transvaal, he was determined to improve his English, and joined a firm of English-speaking lawyers. (“I’m still not very proud of my English,” he

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<sup>1</sup> De Klerk has been known by his initials since childhood to avoid confusion with his maternal grandfather.

<sup>2</sup> *The Observer* (London), March 12, 1989.

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says, “but I can express myself.”) In 1959, de Klerk married Marike Willemse, by whom he has three children: a son, Jan, now twenty-five, who is a farmer in the Western Transvaal; another son, Willem, twenty-three, who is studying communications at a technical college; and a daughter, Susan, twenty, a student at Stellenbosch University.

The de Klerk family are members of the Gereformeerde Kerk, popularly known as the Doppekerk, the smallest branch of the Afrikaner Reformed church. His older brother, Willem, is an ordained minister of the church and says that the church’s “central theme of stability, order, authority, freedom is very much a part of our heritage. [My brother and I] are both pragmatists, inclined to synthesize things, to find solutions.”<sup>3</sup>

During the eleven years from 1961 to 1972, F.W. de Klerk built a successful law practice in Vereeniging, an industrial town outside Johannesburg. Then, in 1972, the National Party asked him to run for the Vereeniging seat in Parliament, and de Klerk spent the next five years as a backbencher. In 1977, he followed his father’s pattern and moved into a succession of cabinet ministries, including: posts and telecommunications; social welfare and pensions; sports and recreation; mines, energy, and environmental planning; mineral and energy affairs; internal affairs; and national (White) education and planning.

In 1982, de Klerk was selected to replace Andries Treurnicht — now leader of the pro-apartheid Conservative Party — as leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, after the latter was expelled for refusing to support the leadership’s power-sharing proposals for a new constitution. In 1985, Botha appointed de Klerk chairman of the Ministers’ Council of the House of Assembly, a significant recognition of his increasing stature. (Each of the racially divided legislatures has a Ministers’ Council that advises the president on affairs pertaining to that racial group alone. By the constitution, the chairman is supposed to have majority support in the appropriate House.) On February 2, 1989, de Klerk became the leader of the National Party, and on August 15, 1989, he became acting state president.

The editor of Johannesburg’s *Star*, Ken Owen, has said of F.W.: “He’s amiable enough and doesn’t give anybody the feeling that he actually enjoys stomping on people.”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, in many ways, it is obvious that F.W. is a far milder man than his predecessor, P.W. Botha, known as “the Great Crocodile.” To cite but one example: Botha’s favorite recreations were game hunting and horseback riding; de Klerk golfs (with a handicap of eighteen).

## F. W. and Wimpie

Although F.W. had a reputation within the Botha cabinet as a conservative, a good party man, even a hardliner, he was subject to

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Christopher S. Wren, “How Far Will de Klerk Go?” *The New York Times Magazine*, November 19, 1989, p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> *The Star* (Johannesburg), August 17, 1989.

outside influences that may have subtly weakened that attitude over the years. One such influence may well have been his religion (F.W. is said to be a devout man). Unlike its larger cousin, the Dutch Reformed church, the *Dopperkerk* never propagated Biblical justifications for apartheid.

De Klerk's father, no less rigid than F.W. in his day, began to shift his political outlook during the last five years of his life, before his death in 1979. But the key long-term influence has probably been his older brother Willem (known as Wimpie), a political thinker of such standing that, prior to F.W.'s becoming state president, he probably had left the greater mark on South African politics.

As a minister in the Reformed church during the 1960s, he publicly crossed his father, then minister of the interior, by favoring the inclusion of Maoris in a New Zealand rugby tour of South Africa. In 1966, while a professor at the University of Potchefstroom, Wimpie made a crucial contribution to the understanding of Afrikaner politics by formulating the seminal distinction between "verligte" (enlightened) and "verkrampste" (unbending) attitudes amongst Afrikaners. Then, in the Calvinist journal *Woord and Daad*, he argued his own "verligte" viewpoints. So unpopular were his ideas, he had to give up his academic position in the theological department of the University of Potchefstroom (the academic stronghold of apartheid) and seek the relatively more "enlightened" environment of National Party journalism.

He began as an editor of *Die Transvaaler*, a Johannesburg newspaper, where he incurred the wrath of Prime Minister John Vorster and was fired in 1982. He became editor of an Afrikaans weekly, *Rapport*, and then, in 1987, had to resign that position, too, for political reasons. Finally Wimpie took his talents and his ideas to the English press, which welcomed him. By this time he had resigned his position on the executive of the Broederbond, and had left the National Party. In 1988, Wimpie joined with other political liberals to establish the Democratic Party, a coalition of three parties to the left of the government, and it was even rumored that he would lead the new party until a troika of the former parties' heads was chosen instead. Although he remains an advisor to the party, Willem is now employed as a professor of communications at Rand Afrikaans University and a commentator of national stature.

Not much has been made public about the relationship between the two brothers, but the family is still very close. One hears that "Tant Corrie," the mother of F.W. and Wimpie, does not tolerate bad blood in the family. Other reports say the relationship has not always been smooth sailing. For example, Wimpie met with the African National Congress (ANC) leadership in London but, according to a close source, deliberately did not report to F.W. on the discussions. Wimpie is quoted by Peter Younghusband as recalling that the two brothers "clashed frequently, and that F.W. was still locked in the mould that the ANC was

merely another player.”<sup>5</sup> It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the relationship between these two influential and prominent figures. Suffice it to say that in a country which is experiencing the acute agony of political and moral renewal, the de Klerks are not the only brothers with different views of their country’s future.

### The Succession Saga

F.W. de Klerk is said to have begun to think about his destiny in June 1986, the moment when President P.W. Botha announced a nationwide state of emergency, introduced broad censorship, and gave the security forces virtually unlimited authority to act against perceived threats to order. Those closest to de Klerk say he realized Botha had made a mistake that would prove politically fatal in time; he sensed a distinct move toward “enlightened” thinking on the part of Afrikaner businessmen and intellectuals. Politically, being leader of the National Party in the crucial Transvaal gave de Klerk a jump on his rivals. His most important chore over the next two-and-a-half years, therefore, was to build up his image as a leader within the Cabinet, without giving Botha any reason to suspect him of eyeing the presidency.<sup>6</sup>

The succession process actually began on January 18, 1989, when P.W. Botha, aged seventy-three, sustained a mild stroke. Following the stroke, a caretaker president was sworn in and Botha’s retirement appeared imminent. On February 2, 1989, however, Botha surprised the country by relinquishing his position as leader of the National Party but retaining the presidency. The party caucus promptly held an election for National Party leader. After two rounds of voting, de Klerk narrowly (69-61) defeated the popular finance minister, Barend du Plessis, who was widely touted by the English-language media as more “verligte” than de Klerk. (Ironically, had de Klerk lost, he might have gone on to lose his seat in parliament, for he faced a substantial challenge from the Conservative Party. In 1987, he had won by only 1,500 votes.)

At any rate, de Klerk became party leader, but not president, and this placed him in an awkward position, for P.W. Botha made it clear he intended to retain real power, even though this was contrary to the expectation of the 1984 constitution, which had conflated the roles of a parliamentary head of government and a head of state. To emphasize his authority as president, Botha unexpectedly announced on March 12 that he was postponing the elections scheduled for September (and thus his retirement) until March 1990. NP members, including de Klerk, were stunned, for they considered an election essential — to give the NP a new, strong leader and thus forestall the inroads being made by the Conservative Party and by the new Democratic Party founded by his brother and others.

<sup>5</sup>*Leadership* (Cape Town), March 1990; in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, April 27, 1990.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Although Botha initiated this struggle, it led to a hands-down victory for de Klerk. As party leader and chairman of the Ministers' Council for the House of Assembly, de Klerk summoned the party's Federal Council (its highest policy advisory body), which then unanimously approved a resolution backing de Klerk. The resolution held that "at this point in the party's constitutional development, it [is] in the best interest of the country and the party that the leader of the NP hold the office of state president, as it is the majority party in the House of Assembly." De Klerk next summoned a National Party parliamentary caucus, which approved the resolution and then (by a substantial margin) called for de Klerk to be made president. In an interview following these maneuvers, however, de Klerk noted that "there is nothing in this decision which says that he [Botha] must step down."<sup>7</sup>

But Botha knew that as well, and his actions gave no indication that he was ready to go. Only when the party became restive did he meet de Klerk and thrash out an agreement (confirmed in parliament on April 6) that the president would serve out his term, but the election that would precipitate the end of that term would be held in September as scheduled.

There matters rested until mid-June when the president failed to appear at a farewell federal congress held in Pretoria, mainly for the purpose of honoring him. His behavior aroused bitter antagonism in the NP, and the imminent elections compounded the embarrassment for the party. Although de Klerk must have been sorely tried by Botha's ungracious and awkward behavior, he avoided potential missteps in dealing with the crisis.

The drama dragged on. Botha successfully stole back the limelight by arranging a private meeting in mid-July with his prisoner, ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Although the party was stunned, the event was turned to profit by de Klerk. Press reports began appearing that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia wished to meet de Klerk and Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha in Lusaka (home of the most important ANC office abroad and the nerve center of its activities).

On the eve of the two Cabinet ministers' departure, however, President Botha began to complain that he had not been officially informed of the meeting. (The two Cabinet ministers later denied this.) In response, on Friday, August 11, de Klerk asked Botha to meet with a delegation of National Party Cabinet ministers "on an urgent basis." Botha replied that he was "surprised to hear you wish to organize a delegation of ministers," since a Cabinet meeting was being held Monday morning.<sup>8</sup>

At that Cabinet meeting it was suggested to Botha that he plead ill-health and appoint an acting state president until the September

<sup>7</sup> Johannesburg Television Service, March 14, 1989.

<sup>8</sup> South African Press Association, August 14, 1989.

election. Botha stated that he was “not prepared to leave on a lie,” and tendered his resignation effective the next day, leaving the way open for de Klerk to become acting president.<sup>9</sup> In the September elections, de Klerk won the presidency in his own right, and was sworn in on September 20.

The events that brought de Klerk to the presidency were poignant, agonizingly embarrassing, testing — and unprecedented in South African history. Throughout, de Klerk acquitted himself with dignity and distinction. Respect for his unflustered leadership seemed to increase in direct proportion to disgust at Botha’s erratic behavior. Above all, he emerged as a leader, gentle yet firm. The full burden of rescuing the NP fell on his shoulders, and his handling of what was a public relations nightmare earned him widespread admiration.

Whatever else the media might say of de Klerk after the passage of these events — and there has been a great deal of criticism of his beliefs and political instincts — he began his term with a special reputation for sincerity and integrity, a reputation that is serving him in very good stead.

<sup>9</sup> Agence France-Presse, August 14, 1989.

# CAN NATO ASSESS DUES FAIRLY?

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by Stanley K. Ridgley

Before communism began collapsing in Eastern Europe, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were engaged in an intense debate over how to share the alliance's growing military burden.<sup>1</sup> Given the upheavals of 1989, however, and the diminished threat of a Soviet attack in Europe, one might suppose this debate had become irrelevant. In fact, it now appears that the debate will simply be transformed into its mirror image: The question of "Who pays how much?" will become the equally difficult, equally important question of "Who cuts how much?"

Indeed, such a transformation may already be underway. In January, a *New York Times*/CBS News Poll indicated that 84 percent of Americans believed military spending should either decrease or remain the same.<sup>2</sup> In keeping with this sentiment, President Bush made overtures for U.S. troop reductions in Europe and a reduced U.S. military budget only to find that Congress was seeking a still larger "peace dividend." In late April, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), called for the administration to slash the level of American troops in Europe from the present 255,000 to between 75,000 and 100,000 over the next five years. During that same period, Congressional Democrats believe, \$250 billion can be cut from the military budget.

In Europe, the question of German unification has temporarily pushed aside the issue of the "peace dividend." But once the NATO membership of post-unification Germany is firmly established — and I expect it will be — the European race to slash military spending will likely become as fierce as it has in America. Already, in 1989, the West Germans approved a plan to reduce their military forces by one-fifth; the Belgians reduced military spending by 2 percent; and the Dutch passed a three-year budget freezing military spending. This year, both the Belgian

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<sup>1</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iceland does not have armed forces but allows its NATO allies to have air and radar sites on its territory. France has not participated in NATO's integrated military structure since 1967. Greece withdrew from NATO military affairs after the Cyprus crisis in 1974 but rejoined in 1980. Spain entered NATO in 1982.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, January 25, 1990.

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and Dutch governments have suggested that they may reduce the number of their troops in West Germany, and the British have floated the idea of reducing the size of the British Army of the Rhine.

The danger in such cuts comes principally from their euphoric and unilateral character. Instituted to satisfy domestic political pressure, and taken without intra-alliance coordination, they could well lead to the premature demise of NATO. To head off such an eventuality, therefore, alliance members need a comprehensive means of assessing alliance contributions that is acceptable to all parties. This paper offers a step in that direction.

### **Will the Alliance Endure?**

To date, no member of NATO has actually called for dismantling the alliance. Apparently, most Europeans and Americans understand that there are still several reasons to preserve their mutual defense arrangement.

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First, although the freedom and ferment now seen in the Warsaw Pact countries are hopeful signs, it would be highly imprudent to base Western security on the expectation that Soviet liberalism and East European stability will last, especially since neither has existed for very long. The Soviet Union remains a domestically unstable power with thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at the United States; Eastern Europe remains a seething cauldron of nationalism.

Second, while NATO's primary mission has been to defend against an invasion of Warsaw Pact forces, it could also serve as a more general mutual defense pact, facilitating security cooperation among its members. For example, it could do more to ensure the flow of Middle Eastern oil and to coordinate antiterrorism activities.

Third, many West Europeans have expressed interest in preserving NATO as a check on a new, unified Germany. Thus, French foreign minister Roland Dumas explained that France opposes a neutral Germany “because this gives rise to a security problem. . . . Our country is always interested in being surrounded by solid alliance partners. A neutral Germany would be the core of an unstable Europe.”<sup>3</sup> For the

<sup>3</sup> *Die Welt*, February 9, 1990; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Hereafter FBIS, *WEU*), February 12, 1990.

same reason, the new East European governments also have a stake in NATO. As an unnamed senior Pentagon official commented, "Eastern Europeans and the Poles in particular fear German revanchism and see German membership in NATO as a guarantee of good behavior."<sup>4</sup> A similar role for NATO in sublimating old fears and animosities can be seen in the way it has helped to mute the Greek-Turkish quarrel.

In sum, NATO is likely to continue as a viable organization for some time, although it will be changed in many ways.

### Americans versus Europeans

That said, however, the organization's existence depends on the willingness of members to pay for its costs, whether those are increasing or decreasing, and such a willingness does not always come easily. Contention begins with the question of how burdens are presently shared; it then proceeds to the question of whether this is an equitable arrangement, and, if it is not, how the arrangement should be changed. Over the years, two main approaches to these issues have emerged, the American and the European.

*The American argument.* In 1966, Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser hypothesized that larger, wealthier members of a military alliance bear a disproportionately large share of alliance burdens. The authors backed up their hypothesis with 1964 NATO data, and compared each country's military spending with its gross national product (GNP).<sup>5</sup> Ever since, ranking member states according to various expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) has been the crux of the American argument that European members do not bear their proper share of alliance costs.

Americans who take this position concede that the United States had to assume the lion's share of alliance burdens in NATO's early years, until Europe's war-ravaged economies could retool. But now, they say, the West European economy almost equals that of the United States — \$3.93 trillion for Western Europe against \$4.15 trillion for the United States. Thus, for some time, these prosperous West European states have been able to defend themselves, but (with the conspicuous exception of France) have preferred to rely on the umbrella of America's nuclear and conventional forces.

Josef Joffe, foreign editor of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, calls this "Europe's American Pacifier," and writes that

West Europeans are inherently free riders when it comes to the common Atlantic defense — and in a more profound sense than revealed by the ratios of defense spending to gross national product or manpower to population. Living under the umbrella of the American

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, February 18, 1990.

<sup>5</sup> Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, August 1966, p. 267.

security guarantee, they enjoy a collective good they cannot produce themselves, or if they could, only at vastly higher prices than currently borne by the United States.<sup>6</sup>

Many Americans agree. In the 1960s, this argument led Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat of Montana) to call for decreased American forces in Europe. In 1977, NATO states pledged to increase their military budgets by no less than 3 percent a year, and in 1984 (when European states failed to live up to that pledge), Senator Nunn introduced a Senate motion that called for yearly withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe unless other members of NATO increased their military spending as promised.

In June 1989, Senator John McCain (Republican of Arizona) introduced a bill (still in committee) that would reduce U.S. troops should the NATO allies unilaterally reduce theirs. McCain portrayed this provision as a response to Mikhail Gorbachev's public relations blitz. "We think it is important to send a message to them [our allies] that if they want to do that [reduce troop commitments and the size of their military establishments] it is their decision as sovereign nations, but the United States simply cannot do nothing. It would be appropriate if we cut our forces if they cut theirs."<sup>7</sup>

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## **A majority of Americans believe that the West Europeans are not contributing enough to their own defense.**

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Congressional pressure culminated in November 1989 with a requirement that the Department of Defense (DOD) issue an annual report to Congress on its efforts to press U.S. allies to "assume a larger share of the common defense burden." A special "Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing" was appointed whose job would be "raising the consciousness among allies" concerning burden sharing.<sup>8</sup> Although the current jargon of alliance burden sharing is that of sharing "roles, risks, and responsibilities," the United States understands this to mean increased European military spending.

Equally harsh appraisals of the European contribution to NATO appear even in NATO's own official publications. Alton G. Keel, Jr., the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, unequivocally put forward the U.S. position in *NATO Review* :

<sup>6</sup> Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1984, p. 81.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in *Defense News*, October 2, 1989.

<sup>8</sup> Richard B. Cheney, *Report to the United States Congress, Report on Allies Assuming a Greater Share of the Common Defense Burden* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 15, 1990), pp. 1-3.

Should a group of countries, as rich and productive as Europe has become, remain so heavily dependent upon the United States for its security? . . . Clearly the ability of our Allies to shoulder more of the economic burden of the collective defence is unquestionable.<sup>9</sup>

Public opinion polls suggest that a majority of Americans agree with Keel. In a Gallup poll of April 1989, only 23 percent of those interviewed saw the European contribution as sufficient; 58 percent believed West Europeans are not contributing enough to their own defense. A still greater number, 73 percent, believed the United States should ask the European allies (and Japan) to take more responsibility for their defense.<sup>10</sup> Some Americans (such as economist Melvyn Krauss) even call for an end to America's NATO commitment on this basis: "Americans had the wisdom to create NATO when it could do good," Krauss argues, "We should have the wisdom to dismantle it now that it does harm."<sup>11</sup> Such calls for a decoupling of America from Europe will undoubtedly increase as Americans seek a share of the post-cold war peace dividend.

*The European response.* Europeans argue that their contribution to NATO cannot be measured simply in terms of dollars spent, and that by other criteria, they are carrying their share. In response to U.S. criticism over burden sharing, the Europeans created the Eurogroup in November 1968 with the intent of publicizing their contributions to the alliance. The Eurogroup contends that a single quantitative and economically-based yardstick, such as military-spending-as-a-percentage-of-GNP, does not adequately portray the European contribution. Willem F. Van Eekelen made this point in 1988, upon retiring as chairman of the Eurogroup:

In the American discussion, the figures for defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product are often used to show that Europe does not pull its weight in NATO. . . . Adding up the GNPs of fourteen European countries and comparing the total amount with the American GNP is a misrepresentation of the political situation in Western Europe.<sup>12</sup>

A 1985 Eurogroup study argues that "there are no universally agreed measures of what constitutes a fair contribution to the burdens of the Alliance. By some criteria Europe does better than the United States, by others it does less well." In the end, the study asserts, what counts "is not input but output. . . . In output terms, one can see most clearly the extent of the European contribution."<sup>13</sup>

The point is a good one: weaponry and manpower fight wars, not gross national product. The Eurogroup emphasizes tangible military

<sup>9</sup> Alton G. Keel, Jr., "Sharing the Collective Defence Burden," *NATO Review*, October 1988, pp. 8,6.

<sup>10</sup> George Gallup, Jr., "Public Calls for Greater Protectionism, Allies to Share More of Defense Burden," *The Gallup Poll*, April 27, 1989.

<sup>11</sup> Melvyn B. Krauss, *How NATO Weakens the West* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 238.

<sup>12</sup> Willem F. Van Eekelen, "The Eurogroup and the US-European Dialogue," *NATO Review*, August 1988, pp. 9-10.

<sup>13</sup> Eurogroup, *Western Defense: The European Role in NATO* (Brussels: Eurogroup, 1985), pp. 12-13.

outputs — for example, the numbers of troops and materiel a country has stationed in Europe — and such thinking can be seen in a 1988 NATO Planning Committee report entitled *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security*.<sup>14</sup> In evaluating the relative performance of NATO members, the committee proposed the following indicators:

#### INPUTS

- The percentage of gross domestic product devoted to the military
- The annual percentage of change in military spending
- Military and civilian personnel employed in the military, as a percentage of the labor force
- Military and civilian personnel employed in the military, plus reserves, as a percentage of the labor force
- Percentage of force-goal implementation<sup>15</sup>

#### OUTPUTS

- Nuclear forces
- Conventional forces (a subjective assessment of how well forces can be maintained in the field; logistics, ammunition, and troop support are all taken into account); plus, the number of standing NATO forces
- Equipment expenditures, as a percentage of military spending
- Percentage of common funding
- Host nation support
- Other (conscription, environmental costs, geographic location, assistance to those countries (Greece, Turkey, Portugal) with less developed defense industries (LDDI), provision of training areas, out-of-area contributions)<sup>16</sup>

In this way, the Eurogroup brought to attention such hidden European contributions as the implicit tax on the citizenry imposed by conscription, the risk of bordering potential enemy countries, the

<sup>14</sup> NATO Defence Planning Committee Executive Working Group, *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks, and Responsibilities in the Alliance* (Brussels: NATO, December 1988).

<sup>15</sup> "Percentage of force-goal implementation" refers to the Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program begun in 1985, under which NATO has set goals and standards for improvements in conventional military forces. Ostensibly, each member's performance in achieving these goals can be quantitatively assessed. However, NATO's Planning Committee report admits that "representative and realistic quantification is difficult to achieve in view of the wide differences in the substance and aim of the goals themselves." (Eurogroup, *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security*, p. 23.) In plain English, the assessments are soft.

<sup>16</sup> Eurogroup, *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security*, pp. 10-36

TABLE 1  
INTANGIBLE COSTS

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | BE | CA | DE | FR | GE | GR | IT | LU | NL | NO | PO | SP | TU | UK | US |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Conscription                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | *  |    | *  | *  | *  | *  | *  |    | *  | *  | *  | *  | *  |    |    |
| Threat Borders                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |    |    |    |    | *  | *  |    |    |    | *  |    |    |    | *  |    |
| Training Areas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |    | *  |    |    | *  | *  | *  |    |    |    | *  | *  | *  | *  | *  |
| Exercise Areas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |    | *  | *  |    | *  |    |    |    |    | *  |    | *  | *  |    |    |
| <p>BE: Belgium<br/> CA: Canada<br/> DE: Denmark<br/> FR: France<br/> GE: Germany<br/> GR: Greece<br/> IT: Italy<br/> LU: Luxembourg</p> <p>NL: Netherlands<br/> NO: Norway<br/> PO: Portugal<br/> SP: Spain<br/> TU: Turkey<br/> UK: United Kingdom<br/> US: United States</p> |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

provision of training areas, the maintenance of military installations, and the environmental costs and loss of potential income that go with hosting NATO troops and exercises. Other factors the Eurogroup maintains ought to be considered are training costs and the provision of support facilities. Though these intangible costs are difficult to quantify, they have been borne almost exclusively by the European countries (as Table 1 illustrates).

When one looks at such outputs, the Eurogroup finds, European countries provide 70 percent of the fighting ships in European and Atlantic waters, 80 percent of the combat aircraft, 85 percent of the tanks, 90 percent of the manpower (not including reserves), 95 percent of the divisions, and 95 percent of the artillery.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, according to a more recent statement by the Eurogroup ministers, the European members of NATO provide 65 percent of the major warships, 80 percent of the tanks and combat aircraft, 90 percent of the artillery and the manpower, and 95 percent of the divisions.<sup>18</sup> Subsequently, a December 1988 Planning Committee report changed some of those percentages as follows: "more than half" of the major warships, 70 percent of the tanks, and 80 percent

<sup>17</sup> Eurogroup, *Western Defense*, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup> *NATO Review*, June 1988, p. 33.

of the artillery.<sup>19</sup> Whatever the exact proportions, the European contribution to NATO's standing forces is clearly impressive.

Moreover, the shorter the notice of attack in Europe, the more important such standing forces become. If a war begins tomorrow, the Europeans say, NATO must fight with what is on hand, not with what is promised. This remains a consideration, even in an era of Soviet weakness. As Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz noted in December 1989, despite the apparently receding Soviet threat, "There still remain Soviet options for a limited attack [with] limited preparation, for which we must also plan."<sup>20</sup> To be sure, some Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, but the Soviets continue to maintain large forward-based stockpiles of fuel and ammunition, and this has led Robert McGeehan to note that "NATO cannot yet assume a surprise attack of some sort is completely out of the question."<sup>21</sup> Consequently, in any burden-sharing arrangement, greater weight ought to be given to the forces in place that would go to meet such a short-notice attack.

The quality of alliance forces is a touchy subject, and rarely addressed by the alliance. LDDI countries are recognized as requiring assistance with equipment from the other states. Aside from those countries, however, the equipment provided by other European NATO members (depending on the weapon system evaluated) is of roughly comparable quality to that of the United States. This is particularly true of the equipment provided by West Germany and the United Kingdom. For example, the West German Leopard II is considered one of the finest main battle tanks in Europe. Both Belgium and the Netherlands are totally equipped with Leopard Is, upgraded Leopard Is, or Leopard IIs. Both countries are equipped with the U.S.-made Hawk surface-to-air missile system as well as some Patriot SAM units and U.S.-made antitank weapons. They both have large numbers of F-16 fighters, and, in fact, the Dutch are presently converting to an all-F-16 fighter force. With respect to the quality of personnel, the Europeans are comparable to the Americans.

*The American rejoinder.* The European critique of burden sharing has compelled the American assessments to become more complex. A 1988 Defense Department/State Department report to the United States Congress notes that, regardless of the method used, determining equity is a problem that "defies any one particular solution. A variety of perspectives are involved, each with its own parochial characteristics within the context of broader national, regional and global security interests."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Eurogroup, *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security*, p. ii.

<sup>20</sup> Pat Towell, "Waxing, Waning of Threat Shapes NATO Force Debate," *Congressional Quarterly*, December 16, 1989, p. 3439.

<sup>21</sup> Robert McGeehan, "The United States and NATO after the Cold War," *NATO Review*, February 1990, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Report to the United States Congress, Sharing the Roles, Risks and Responsibilities for the Common Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Department/State Department, December 1988), p. 2.

"Indeed," notes RAND Corporation analyst Kevin N. Lewis, "it is the policy of the U.S. Department of Defense that measurement of the NATO-related burden is not possible at all."<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, the DOD/State report did make an effort to assuage European concerns by preparing a detailed "report card" on each NATO country's performance against a battery of indicators, using data from the 1988 NATO Defense Planning Committee Report, other NATO documents, and Department of Defense analyses. (See Table 2 on the following page). Specifically, this assessment used a matrix assessing NATO members' performance in ten areas. In each category it assigned a plus, zero, or minus based on each country's performance as measured against the NATO median.

This report was not a direct response to the Eurogroup (and, in turn, the European members appear not to have replied to it directly). Rather, the DOD/State report addressed the burden-sharing issue with an eye both to getting the Europeans to increase their contributions and to getting Congress not to cut the American contribution. Thus, because the Europeans appear to be improving somewhat, the report urges Congress to "avoid undercutting efforts of the Executive branch to fulfill U.S. commitments." The report argues that "positive incentives, rather than punitive legislation, are the most productive way to encourage our Allies to increase their military spending."<sup>24</sup>

As this comment shows, Washington still focuses on military spending rather than military outputs. Moreover, the American report assumes European military spending is inadequate. In contrast, a November 1989 NATO progress report does not mention military spending at all, but deals instead with such concerns as "force declarations," "force goals," and "sustainability."<sup>25</sup>

In the final analysis, therefore, differences remain, even if the lines are less sharply drawn than they were a few years back.

## A New Method of Assessment

When it comes to determining equitable military burdens within NATO, the Europeans are right: Rather than evaluate contributions by economic input, the stress should be on military output. The American method does not take into account basic differences among countries, nor does it admit the possibility that NATO contributions may differ qualitatively from country to country.

<sup>23</sup> Kevin N. Lewis, *Measuring the U.S. Financial Contribution to NATO's Defense*, RAND Note P-7609, The RAND Corporation, October 1989, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> *Sharing the Roles*, pp. i-ii.

<sup>25</sup> NATO Defence Planning Committee Executive Working Group, *Shared Roles, Risks, and Responsibilities in the Alliance: A Progress Report* (Brussels: NATO's Defence Planning Committee, 1989), pp. 6-8.

TABLE 2  
MATRIX "REPORT CARD" ON NATO PERFORMANCE\*

|                                          | BE | CA | DE | FR | GE | GR | IT | LU | NL | NO | PO | SP | TU | UK | US |
|------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Percentage of GDP for Defense            | 0  | -  | -  | +  | 0  | +  | -  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | -  | +  | +  | +  |
| Percentage of Population on Active Duty  | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | +  | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | +  | 0  | 0  |
| All Military as Percentage of Population | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | +  | 0  | -  | 0  | +  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| Nuclear Contributions                    | 0  | 0  | -  | +  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | -  | 0  | NA | 0  | +  | +  |
| Force Goal Performance                   | -  | 0  | -  | NA | +  | -  | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | -  | NA | -  | +  | +  |
| CDI Force Goals                          | -  | -  | -  | NA | +  | 0  | +  | -  | 0  | 0  | 0  | NA | 0  | +  | +  |
| Munitions Sustainability                 | -  | +  | -  | NA | 0  | -  | 0  | -  | 0  | 0  | -  | NA | -  | +  | +  |
| Host Nation Support                      | 0  | NA | 0  | NA | +  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | NA | 0  | 0  | NA |
| Military Assistance to LDDI              | -  | -  | -  | NA | +  | NA | -  | -  | 0  | -  | NA | NA | NA | -  | +  |
| Out of Area Contributions                | +  | -  | -  | +  | +  | -  | +  | 0  | +  | -  | NA | -  | -  | +  | +  |

\* Reprinted from *Sharing the Roles*, p. 6.

If NATO were an alliance of similar-sized countries at the same level of development, with similar-sized populations, and located in the same general area, then the American method might have some validity. But as it is, at least some provision must be made for the considerable differences in these characteristics.

Geography is perhaps the most salient characteristic ignored by the American method. Some countries have strategic importance that derives from location rather than economic or military might. Turkey, for instance, guards the Dardanelles on NATO's southern flank; West Germany's eastern border constitutes NATO's military frontier in

Central Europe; and Norway guards NATO's northern flank, including the southern Arctic Ocean and North Norwegian Sea.

Like geography, military establishments differ markedly from country to country. Some NATO members, such as Norway, maintain relatively small active-duty armed forces, but can quickly mobilize reserves constituting a significant percentage of the population. Countries with conscription spend less on personnel and more on military hardware.

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**The Europeans are right. Rather than evaluate NATO contributions by economic input, the stress should be on military output.**

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As a step toward improving evaluations of NATO contributions, at least nine categories should be put on the report card from the start:

- 1: Geographic area
- 2: Population
- 3: Population density
- 4: Gross domestic product
- 5: Military spending as percentage of GDP
- 6: Percentage annual change in military spending
- 7: Equipment expenditures as a percentage of military spending
- 8: Per capita military spending
- 9: Percentage of the labor force on active duty

Tables for the fifteen NATO countries show rankings for the years 1978, 1984, and 1987. (See Tables 3, 4, and 5.) The numbers within the tables list the rankings of members, with "1" the highest rank and "15" the lowest. In three categories, the ranking goes only to 14 due to missing data. Note that some countries have the same rank. France, Spain, and Greece have been included in all tables for the sake of continuity and comprehensiveness.

Categories 1 to 3 (area, population, population density) differentiate among countries based on characteristics other than GDP, for although gross domestic product is an important characteristic of countries, states are more than aggregations of capital. Category 4 gives GDP for the purposes of comparison. The other five categories offer various perspectives on the military resources of NATO members.

It is worth noting that several American strengths are not considered in this appraisal (although they were in the DOD/State report): nuclear forces and certain categories developed under NATO's Conventional Defense Improvement program, such as force goals, force-goal performance, munitions sustainability, and out-of-area contributions.

TABLE 3  
NATO RANKING TABLE, 1978

|                                                            | BE | CA | DE | FR | GE | GR | IT | LU | NL | NO | PO | SP | TU | UK | US |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Area                                                       | 14 | 1  | 12 | 4  | 8  | 10 | 7  | 15 | 13 | 6  | 11 | 5  | 3  | 9  | 2  |
| Population                                                 | 10 | 8  | 13 | 5  | 2  | 11 | 4  | 15 | 9  | 14 | 12 | 7  | 6  | 3  | 1  |
| Population<br>Density                                      | 2  | 15 | 6  | 8  | 3  | 11 | 5  | 7  | 1  | 14 | 9  | 10 | 12 | 4  | 13 |
| GDP                                                        | 9  | 6  | 10 | 3  | 2  | 13 | 5  | 15 | 8  | 12 | 14 | 7  | 11 | 4  | 1  |
| Percentage of<br>GDP for Defense                           | 7  | 14 | 11 | 5  | 8  | 1  | 12 | 15 | 9  | 10 | 6  | 13 | 4  | 3  | 2  |
| Percentage of<br>Change in An-<br>nual Defense<br>Spending | 3  | 12 | 4  | —  | 5  | 8  | 10 | 1  | 14 | 2  | 7  | 6  | 11 | 13 | 9  |
| Percentage of<br>Expenditures<br>on Equipment              | 10 | 12 | 7  | —  | 11 | 5  | 8  | 14 | 3  | 4  | 13 | 9  | 2  | 1  | 6  |
| Per Capita<br>Military<br>Spending                         | 5  | 9  | 7  | 4  | 2  | 12 | 11 | 10 | 3  | 6  | 13 | —  | 14 | 8  | 1  |
| Percentage of<br>Labor Force<br>on Active Duty             | 6  | 14 | 13 | 4  | 10 | 1  | 9  | 15 | 7  | 8  | 11 | 3  | 2  | 11 | 5  |

Deleting the American nuclear umbrella is justified because NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine in 1976 has cast doubt on America's actual willingness to use its strategic arsenal to defend Europe. As General Bernard W. Rogers, former NATO supreme allied commander, has said: "This smacks of the old, defunct massive retaliation strategy of the 1950s that NATO discarded because it was no longer credible by the late 1960s."<sup>26</sup> The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement and the apparent ending of the cold war have only exacerbated these concerns. For consistency's sake, the nuclear arsenals of all NATO members have likewise been excluded.

Excluding U.S. troops not stationed in Europe is a stickier matter. Europeans typically question whether troops in Korea and

<sup>26</sup> Bernard W. Rogers, "Arms Control and NATO Deterrence," *Global Affairs*, winter 1988, p. 36.

TABLE 4  
NATO RANKING TABLE, 1984

|                                                 | BE | CA | DE | FR | GE | GR | IT | LU | NL | NO | PO | SP | TU | UK | US |
|-------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Area                                            | 14 | 1  | 12 | 4  | 8  | 10 | 7  | 15 | 13 | 6  | 11 | 5  | 3  | 9  | 2  |
| Population                                      | 11 | 8  | 13 | 5  | 2  | 10 | 3  | 15 | 9  | 14 | 12 | 7  | 6  | 4  | 1  |
| Population Density                              | 2  | 15 | 7  | 9  | 3  | 11 | 5  | 6  | 1  | 14 | 8  | 10 | 12 | 4  | 13 |
| GDP                                             | 9  | 6  | 12 | 3  | 2  | 13 | 5  | 15 | 8  | 10 | 14 | 7  | 11 | 4  | 1  |
| Percentage of GDP for Defense                   | 8  | 13 | 11 | 5  | 7  | 1  | 13 | 15 | 8  | 10 | 6  | 11 | 4  | 3  | 2  |
| Percentage of Change in Annual Defense Spending | 11 | 2  | 10 | —  | 8  | 1  | 6  | 7  | 5  | 14 | 13 | 9  | 12 | 4  | 3  |
| Percentage of Expenditures on Equipment         | 11 | 5  | 9  | —  | 8  | 10 | 7  | 14 | 4  | 6  | 13 | 1  | 12 | 2  | 3  |
| Per Capita Military Spending                    | 9  | 6  | 8  | 5  | 3  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 7  | 4  | 14 | 13 | 15 | 2  | 1  |
| Percentage of Labor Force on Active Duty        | 6  | 14 | 13 | 3  | 10 | 1  | 9  | 15 | 11 | 7  | 8  | 5  | 2  | 12 | 4  |

other areas remote from Europe can be logically considered as contributions to NATO. The Eurogroup counts about half of the U.S. military as having a European role, both before and after mobilization.<sup>27</sup> They contend that the task of resisting a surprise or short-notice attack will fall largely on in-place allied forces in Europe; that mobilization and transport of reinforcements from North America will take time; and that there is no guarantee such reinforcements will reach the battlefield in time to influence the course of a short-war scenario.

A cursory look at the tables indicates substantial deviations from the Olson/Zeckhauser thesis that larger, wealthier alliance members bear a disproportionate share of the alliance burden. The 1987 table shows, for instance, that Greece and Turkey rank very low

<sup>27</sup> Eurogroup, *Western Defense*, p. 6.

TABLE 5  
NATO RANKING TABLE, 1987

|                                                 | BE | CA | DE | FR | GE | GR | IT | LU | NL | NO | PO | SP | TU | UK | US |
|-------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Area                                            | 14 | 1  | 12 | 4  | 8  | 10 | 7  | 15 | 13 | 6  | 11 | 5  | 3  | 9  | 2  |
| Population                                      | 11 | 8  | 13 | 5  | 2  | 10 | 3  | 15 | 9  | 14 | 12 | 7  | 6  | 4  | 1  |
| Population Density                              | 2  | 15 | 7  | 9  | 3  | 11 | 5  | 6  | 1  | 14 | 8  | 10 | 12 | 4  | 13 |
| GDP                                             | 9  | 6  | 10 | 3  | 2  | 13 | 4  | 15 | 8  | 11 | 14 | 7  | 12 | 5  | 1  |
| Percentage of GDP for Defense                   | 7  | 14 | 13 | 4  | 10 | 1  | 12 | 15 | 6  | 8  | 8  | 11 | 5  | 3  | 2  |
| Percentage of Change in Annual Defense Spending | 9  | 6  | 5  | —  | 12 | 10 | 4  | 1  | 7  | 3  | 8  | 2  | 12 | 14 | 11 |
| Percentage of Expenditures on Equipment         | 12 | 4  | 11 | —  | 10 | 9  | 6  | 14 | 8  | 7  | 13 | 3  | 5  | 2  | 1  |
| Per Capita Military Spending                    | 7  | 9  | 8  | 3  | 5  | 11 | 10 | 12 | 6  | 2  | 14 | 13 | 15 | 4  | 1  |
| Percentage of Labor Force on Active Duty        | 5  | 14 | 13 | 3  | 9  | 1  | 8  | 15 | 11 | 10 | 6  | 7  | 2  | 12 | 4  |

in GDP yet maintain relatively high ranks in Defense Spending Percentage. (Of course, Greece and Turkey bear a traditional hostility towards each other, which partially explains their high military expenditures.) Conversely, Canada, Germany, and Italy all rank high in GDP yet very low in military spending percentage.

But the central question is: what about the United States? The tables reveal that America does not consistently rank high in most militarily relevant categories. In fact, looking at output categories such as military expenditures on equipment and percentage of the population on active duty, shows that the United States has, until recently, ranked in the middle range of NATO.

Through the application of statistical techniques to the tables, one may also make many comparisons and interpretations concerning the alliance. One technique is Spearman Rank Order Correlation,

which, when applied to our ranking tables, can give us the precise extent of agreement between any two of our categories for any year evaluated. General tendencies within the alliance as a whole can be discerned based on population, area, GDP or any other baseline one chooses.

For example, one can compare the overall rankings of GDP and defense spending percentage and see how well they correlate. If wealthier countries do indeed tend to spend more on defense, then we would expect the correlation between the rankings to approach 1. In fact, the correlation between the GDP and defense spending percentage for the years 1978, 1984, and 1987 is insignificant (0.18, 0.22, 0.18, respectively). This means that countries with relatively high GDPs did not necessarily rank high in the percentage of their budgets spent on defense.

## Conclusion

Although our categories are limited in number and weighted equally, the report card offered here has several advantages over previous ones. It provides more information; it allows for comparisons between economic input, baselines, and military output; and it takes into account the very different attributes of NATO members. If desirable, the matrix could be expanded to encompass strategic location, political risk, social costs, environmental costs, and military teeth-to-tail ratios, all of which would further improve the assessment of alliance contributions.

No less important, the matrix approach can easily be modified according to changing circumstances. For example, the emergence of a new European order in the 1990s would mean that NATO strategy no longer remains focused on war in Central Europe; accordingly, intangible European costs would decline quickly. Too, as troops are withdrawn from front-line states, the costs associated with housing them will decline. Fewer troops will mean less extensive maneuvers and less damage; fewer planes will mean fewer low-level flights. Perceived border risk is changing. The length of service for conscripts is decreasing; in some states conscription may be abolished. Adjustments to the matrix can be made at any time.

Germany's burdens are most likely to be affected. Situated in the middle of the potential European battlefield, it has suffered the lion's share of intangible costs. For example, the U.S., British, and French governments pay German individuals nearly \$70 million annually for damage to property incurred during military maneuvers. The Germans also endure a highly militarized environment: their territory hosts eight soldiers per square mile (compared with 0.4 per square mile in the United States) and many of these are foreign troops. In addition, it suffers from 80,000 low-level military flights conducted yearly. Besides the awful noise, such flights are dangerous – seventy-five civilians were killed by military air crashes in 1988. No wonder that recent polls show that 50

percent of those polled indicated that they have negative attitudes about some aspect of the American military presence.<sup>28</sup>

Yet Germans have also accrued benefits from the U.S. military presence, especially economic ones. In some cases, entire German towns are organized economically around American military bases. For example, Grafenwoehr, about forty kilometers east of Nuremburg near the German-Czech border, is the site of an enormous U.S.-run training area which is the single largest employer of Germans in the area; Germans not employed directly by the American army depend on indirect American spending. Reduced U.S. troop levels would be especially unwelcome there, particularly at a moment when West Germany will have to absorb an economically weak East Germany.

All of these changes can be accommodated in the matrix approach, and that is why it offers a sound first step towards establishing a system for comparing member states' contributions to NATO. Were all members to agree to some such system for assessing their contributions to the common defense, they would be more likely to agree on what constitutes balanced and equitable reductions, thereby helping to assure the continued health of NATO.

<sup>28</sup> Jack Beatty, "The Exorbitant Anachronism," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1989, p. 44.

## HOW NOT TO PICK A WEAPON

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by James J. Wirtz

Although American and Soviet strategic forces reached approximate parity nearly two decades ago, this rough equality has created a troubling legacy that still confronts the U.S. government.

The Soviet procurement of vast strategic forces was accompanied by improvements in the accuracy of its missile systems and by a substantial increase in the quantity of warheads in its strategic inventory — developments made possible by the introduction of MIRV technology.<sup>1</sup> The Soviets have for some time possessed the ability to destroy between 70 and 90 percent of America's Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in their silos.<sup>2</sup>

Debate about this threat to the land-based leg of the American strategic triad has waxed and waned over the years. Solutions to the problem of ICBM vulnerability have been proposed, such as superhardening missile silos or deploying ICBMs in a "densepack" configuration, but no program has been fully implemented. Consequently, the percentage of the ICBM force that would escape destruction in a nuclear strike has not significantly increased.

Many now believe that, because of the events in Eastern Europe last fall, the need for protecting American missiles from a Soviet strike is no longer pressing. Yet, the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and Soviet conventional retrenchment in the region has not been accompanied by significant changes in Soviet strategic capabilities. Glasnost and perestroika have not had any discernible impact on the Soviet ability to place the American ICBM force at risk.

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<sup>1</sup> MIRVs are Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; each missile carries multiple warheads, and each warhead is carried to a different target.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-77, pp. 195-210; idem, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 207-232; Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 771-789; Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternate View," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 462-481; Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security*, Summer 1984, pp. 147-186; and Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity," *International Security*, Fall 1981, pp. 49-79.

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## What To Do?

In September 1979, the Carter administration announced its intention to deploy two hundred MX missiles in multiple protective shelters. Each MX missile would be shuttled by a “transporter” along a “racetrack” lined with 23 shelters. ICBM survivability would improve because the Soviets lacked the resources to target the 4,600 shelters that were to be constructed across forty thousand square miles of the southwestern United States.<sup>3</sup>

But when Ronald Reagan assumed office, his administration shrank from paying the enormous political and environmental costs entailed in Carter’s solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability. In their search for an alternative solution, administration officials advanced and rejected several programs.

Initially, they considered placing MX missiles in Minuteman missile silos that had been “superhardened.” This idea was then abandoned in favor of deploying the MXs in a “densepack” configuration, which would complicate attempts to destroy the MX force by causing incoming missiles to interfere with each other. But densepack was soon abandoned owing to concerns about Soviet countermeasures. Finally, the search led President Reagan to appoint a blue-ribbon panel, headed by Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft.

The Scowcroft Commission report, released in April 1983, recommended that the administration adopt three initiatives: (1) design a single-warhead small ICBM (SICBM or Midgetman) that could be deployed on a mobile launcher; (2) pursue arms control agreements that would enhance strategic stability; and (3) immediately deploy one hundred MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos without superhardening. Some members of Congress were dissatisfied with this report. They noted that the commission’s recommendations did little to address the problem of ICBM vulnerability in the short term. Congress used its budgetary authority to pressure both the administration and the Air Force to devise a more survivable deployment for the MX. Specifically, the 1986 Defense Authorization Act permitted the deployment of only fifty MX missiles in existing silos.

Under these circumstances, Reagan announced his administration’s decision about ICBM modernization in December 1986. SICBMs, loaded on Hard Mobile Launchers, would be developed and eventually deployed at existing, not superhardened, Minuteman bases and “random-movement complexes” (large tracts of government-owned land that would be used as operating areas for SICBMs) in the Southwest. To reduce ICBM vulnerability quickly, however, the administra-

<sup>3</sup> On the Carter administration’s plans for MX deployment, see Herbert Scoville, Jr., *MX: Prescription for Disaster* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982). For a discussion of the Carter administration’s decision to deploy the MX in multiple protective shelters, see Lauren H. Holland and Robert A. Hoover, *The MX Decision* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

tion called for the deployment of fifty MX missiles on railroad cars that, in peacetime, would be garrisoned at Air Force bases. In times of international crisis, these missile trains would disperse and move at random along the civilian railroad network. This second program became known as the MX rail garrison, and it remains at the center of the current American military debate.

### The MX Rail Garrison

Technologically, there is little that is new in the plan to deploy fifty missiles on twenty-five trains. The missile itself requires only minor modifications before it can be carried and launched from a railroad car, although the computer software that controls the targeting, flight trajectory, and ground operation of the MX requires significant modification.

As for the cars that make up the MX train, little in outward appearance distinguishes them from those that are currently used on the country's railroads, except that MX trains will employ eight-axle freight cars. Civilian operators use these only on relatively uncommon specialty trains carrying the heaviest loads. The trains will be hardened against electromagnetic pulses (EMP) but not against blast. They will contain one engine and six cars: one car for launch control; one for maintenance; two to carry the missiles (the eight-axle cars); and two cars to house a security team.<sup>4</sup>

Groups of three or four MX trains, operated by members of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), will spend most of their time under protective shelters located at seven existing Air Force bases (AFB): Barksdale in Louisiana, Dyess in Texas, Fairchild in Washington, Grand Forks in North Dakota, Little Rock in Arkansas, and Wurtsmith in Michigan. Additionally, Warren AFB in Wyoming has been designated as a missile assembly area and the main operating base for the system, and Vandenberg AFB in California will also serve as a missile assembly area and as a testing ground for the rail-garrison system once it becomes operational.

According to Air Force plans, the missiles will be shuttled in peacetime from their assembly areas to their home bases without warheads. Once the missiles are in garrison, warheads will be placed on them. One or two trains, equipped with inert missiles and no warheads, will be used for training crews and for testing the system as it operates along the civilian railroad network.<sup>5</sup>

Upon alert, at least one train per garrison would be capable of leaving its base in under thirty minutes, followed by the other trains within several hours. Once dispersed, the trains would move around the nation's railroads, blending in with civilian traffic. After they had trav-

<sup>4</sup> See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *MX Rail Garrison and Small ICBM: A Program Review*, Committee Print, No. 18, pp. 11-12.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

eled a considerable distance from their bases, the trains would spend most of their time on secluded sidings and would probably move only a few hours per day. Dispersed trains could remain away from their bases for at least several weeks — longer if cars were added to carry more supplies, or if supplies such as food, water, and fuel could be drawn directly from the civilian economy.

Because secure land-lines can reach the command cars while they are parked on SAC bases, the trains would face minimal command, control, and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) problems while in garrison. Once dispersed, C<sup>3</sup> problems could be overcome through ultra-high and super-high frequency satellite links, plus high-frequency and very-high frequency radio. Backup launch control could be provided by an airborne launch control center.<sup>6</sup> In garrison, two trains would have to issue a positive “vote” to fire, but once dispersed, each train would probably control the firing of its own missiles.

As MX rail garrison appears in declassified materials, it possesses at least three attributes that make it an attractive option to reduce ICBM vulnerability quickly. First, at a projected cost of \$15 billion, the system is relatively inexpensive, in large part because it uses an existing weapon.<sup>7</sup> Placing missiles in rail garrisons requires little construction. Also, the missile trains spend most of the time under their protective shelters, so operating costs and wear-and-tear costs are low. Such cost considerations have become an especially important factor given the current inclinations to cut military spending.

Second, the system can reduce what the military calls the “public interface” problem that is created by mobile missiles. Previously, concerns about the release of radioactivity (following physical damage to a warhead) and the accidental detonation of thousands of pounds of rocket fuel in a populated area curtailed plans to deploy ICBMs outside military bases. The military also has been concerned about the difficulty of protecting mobile missiles once they leave the safety of government property; antinuclear protesters could create unpleasant incidents, possibly even curtailing the movement of missiles. The rail-garrison plan calls for very limited movements in noncrisis situations, so this issue raises few problems.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On the characteristics of the communications systems that would be used to maintain contact with the MX trains once they left their garrison, see Ashton B. Carter, “Communications Technologies and Vulnerabilities,” in Ashton B. Carter, et al., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 217-257.

<sup>7</sup> Donald A. Hicks, “ICBM Modernization: Consider the Alternatives,” *International Security*, Fall 1987, pp. 178-179; and Cindy Williams, “Strategic Spending Choices,” *International Security*, Spring 1989, pp. 25-35.

<sup>8</sup> Robert C. Gray, “The Bush Administration and Mobile ICBM: A Framework for Evaluation,” *Survival*, September/October 1989, pp. 422-423; and Russell E. Dougherty, “The Value of ICBM Modernization,” *International Security*, Fall 1987, p. 167.

Third, the survivability of the system is not tied to further progress in arms control or to restraint in Soviet procurement policies. In other words, although the amount of track that can be used is not unlimited, the MX trains can employ more miles of track than the Soviets can target, and more than they could target following a significant build-up of their strategic forces. According to Air Force calculations, twelve hours after the trains leave their garrisons, the Soviets would have to launch over one thousand SS-18s (or their equivalents) to destroy the MX trains. If the Soviets started a crash procurement program to put dispersed missile trains at risk, operating areas could be expanded to include areas east of the Mississippi River, or even (with permission) Canadian territory bordering on the western United States.<sup>9</sup>

### Objections and Rejoinders

Despite these advantages, the MX rail garrison has been subjected to considerable criticism, especially following the Bush administration's announcement, in April 1989, that it would continue with the program. Three principal questions have been raised: Will missile trains be able to move along the civilian railroad network during a crisis? Can they remain undetected by the Soviets? And does the system contribute to crisis stability, or does it give the Soviets greater incentives to attempt a first strike?

*Mobility.* The ability of the MX trains to move about the rail network is partly a technical question and partly a strategic one. On the technical side, it has been pointed out by Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey that the EMP produced by nuclear explosions might well shut down the civilian rail network — by damaging locomotives, switching equipment, and communications gear.<sup>10</sup> Of course, the MX trains themselves would be specially hardened against EMP and therefore could still operate. But if the civilian rail system were crippled, it is said, the MX trains could not move as planned.

This point is accurate as it stands, but it is based on an unrealistic strategic scenario. On the one hand, if the railroad network is paralyzed before the MX trains leave garrison, it is likely the trains would have been destroyed at their bases in the same opening salvo that crippled the national rail system. On the other hand, if the Soviets attack after the MX trains have been dispersed, the trains would not need to go any further, for it would be time for them to perform their mission.

Specifically, after a Soviet strike, the rail-mobile MXs would be the only weapon capable of “killing” hardened targets (assuming the destruction of 70 to 90 percent of the Minuteman force). Thus, they

<sup>9</sup> House Committee on Armed Services, *MX Rail Garrison and Small ICBM*, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, “On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing,” *International Security*, Winter 1988-89, p. 135.

would probably be used at once to attack remaining Soviet strategic systems and C<sup>3</sup> centers, in an effort to blunt additional Soviet strikes. It is unlikely that the MX rail-mobile missiles would be held as a strategic reserve; they therefore would not have to continue eluding detection by moving about.

*Tracking and detection.* A more realistic problem concerns the possibility that the Soviets may be able to follow the MX trains as they leave the garrisons. Indeed, a variety of rather exotic solutions to the problem of monitoring the whereabouts of the MX trains has already been identified by such critics as Fridling and Harvey. Electronic “tags” could be placed surreptitiously on the cars, or remote sensors could be scattered around the railroad network, enabling satellites to monitor with ease the location of the trains. Computers, increasingly used in railroad dispatching, could also be tapped in order to monitor the movement of the trains. Soviet agents, working as railroad employees, could also attempt to locate the trains in a time of crisis, passing critical targeting data to their superiors. Yet, it would be wrong to underestimate the difficulty that the Soviets would encounter in attempting to keep tabs on the movements of the missile trains. As Desmond Ball and Robert Toth have noted, even the United States lacks the ability to track Soviet mobile missiles in “real time.”<sup>11</sup>

Beyond such exotic difficulties, one mundane weakness may pose the greatest threat to the ability of the trains to avoid detection by the Soviets. As currently envisioned, the MX trains are apparently assembled in an extremely rare configuration that would facilitate Soviet efforts to monitor their movements. As noted above, eight-axle cars are not an unknown sight on America’s railroad tracks, for they are used to carry the heaviest loads (in this case MX missiles). Usually, however, they make up the entire train. Thus, a train combining eight-axle cars and four-axle cars is a rare sight, and this rare combination would be readily identifiable to photographic satellites, railroad enthusiasts, or Soviet agents. Fortunately, the solution to this mundane difficulty also is straightforward: only eight-axle cars should be employed in the MX train.<sup>12</sup>

*The need for warning.* The third criticism arises because the MX rail-garrison system fails to meet two related criteria that in the past have guided American decisions about ICBM procurement and deployment: (1) systems must not depend on advance indications of a planned Soviet attack; and (2) systems must be able to survive an attack. The reason for demanding such invulnerability for America’s ICBMs was to give intelligence analysts and policy makers the luxury of ignoring, mis-

<sup>11</sup> Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, “Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes,” *International Security*, Spring 1990, pp. 89-90.

<sup>12</sup> I am indebted to Jeremy Plant for informing me about the standard procedures followed in the operation of eight-axle cars on the nation’s railroads, and to Edward Rhodes for offering this logical solution.

perceiving, or failing to react to evidence of a deteriorating political or military situation, without increasing the vulnerability of the U.S. missile force. Such a tolerance for error was considered necessary for the calm and prudent handling of crises.

Thus, when initially deployed, Minuteman survivability was not dependent on a prompt response to strategic warning (a warning, some days or even weeks in advance, that an opponent was seriously contemplating or preparing an attack). In fact, the survivability of the ICBM force was generally judged not to be dependent on a timely response even to tactical warning (evidence that a nuclear attack was actually underway). Policy makers enjoyed (or at least believed they enjoyed) the luxury of being able to wait for the ultimate indication of an attack — nuclear detonations on American soil — before they took action in response to a strategic strike.

By contrast, the rail-garrison system needs not only tactical, but strategic warning, and this is a revolutionary departure in American deployment policy. It raises the ugly specter of a Soviet surprise attack. For this reason, many analysts believe the rail-garrison option to be unsuitable in the effort to modernize the land-based leg of the triad.<sup>13</sup> Other theorists worry that the need to disperse the trains increases the possibility of miscalculated escalation: actions taken to improve defenses (in this case moving the trains from their garrisons) could lead an opponent to launch a preemptive attack during a crisis that otherwise could have been solved peacefully.<sup>14</sup> Alternatively, the possibility exists that policy makers might become preoccupied by fears of miscalculated escalation during a crisis, reducing the likelihood that the trains will be dispersed properly in a deteriorating situation.

In defense of the rail-garrison system, a “bolt out of the blue” is highly unlikely. According to Richard K. Betts, a specialist on surprise attacks, “There are no significant cases of bolts from the blue in the twentieth century. All major sudden attacks occurred in situations of prolonged tension, during which the victim state’s leaders recognized that war might be on the horizon.”<sup>15</sup> Rail garrison offers a significant improvement over the existing state of affairs. To survive, Minuteman

<sup>13</sup> John C. Toomay, “Strategic Forces Rationale — A Lost Discipline,” *International Security*, Fall 1987, pp. 193-202.

<sup>14</sup> Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology & Deterrence* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 62; and Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 104-153. However, Richard K. Betts holds that “there are few major cases where precautionary counteractions to military warning indicators did indeed provoke preemption by an opponent who otherwise might have refrained from war. An important exception is World War I.” See Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 148.

<sup>15</sup> Betts, *Surprise Attack*, p. 18. For the view that countries fall victim to surprise attack because of a lack of strategic warning, see Ariel Levite, *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 27.

missiles currently must be launched preemptively, on tactical warning of an attack, or while under attack. In contrast, once they are dispersed, the MX trains could ride out a Soviet attack and survive, thereby reducing the overall vulnerability of the ICBM force and increasing crisis stability.

Given the system's mobility, a prudent opponent cannot assume that even a surprise attack will catch the missiles at their bases. By thus reducing the probability that the missiles can be destroyed, rail garrison reduces Soviet confidence about the outcome of an attack, and this would strengthen deterrence. In the words of Alexander George and Richard Smoke: "the initiator's belief that the risks of options available to him are not calculable or controllable is usually a sufficient condition for deterrence success, with respect to those options."<sup>16</sup>

### Upheaval in Eastern Europe

Such, it seemed, were the arguments that would determine the fate of the MX rail-garrison plan. By the summer of 1989, it appeared that these arguments would feature prominently in a broader debate that was developing over the future of the land-based leg of the triad. Nuclear theorists would have been asked about the desirability of procuring an ICBM that relied on strategic warning. The president and his senior officials would have been forced to think about how their behavior could influence the course of events during a crisis. Questions concerning the ability of the intelligence community to provide the requisite warning would have emerged. Policy makers would have learned that the traditional quantitative approach to arms control had failed to stop qualitative changes in weaponry — such as improvements in MIRV accuracy and the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of depressed trajectory flight-paths — and that these improvements threatened the survivability of all land-based systems.

Obviously, the resolution of these issues might have either helped or hindered rail garrison's prospects for deployment. But the strategic debate itself would have clarified questions about the future of the U.S. ICBM force.

This debate, however, was preempted by the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe. As the cold war wound down, so too did reasoned discussion about strategic modernization. Of course, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is an overwhelmingly positive development. But changes in Eastern Europe have created a harmful attitude towards strategic modernization. A head-long rush to slash the U.S. military budget has overtaken debate about the merits of particular weapons systems. "Budget brinkmanship" is perhaps the best way to characterize the bizarre maneuvering that now will decide the fate of rail garrison.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 529.

Even supporters of rail garrison no longer seem concerned about the issue of ICBM vulnerability that initially spurred development of the system. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has nominally continued to favor the procurement of rail garrison and other strategic weapons. But Cheney's apparent unwillingness to set priorities among competing strategic systems — rail garrison, Midgetman, and the B-2 — invites the charge that the administration is not responding to developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. By failing to make hard decisions, the administration appears willing to settle for whatever strategic systems somehow manage to survive Congress's new intent to impose military austerity. This attitude is mirrored by the Republican leadership in both houses of Congress. They, too, appear more interested in setting a floor for reductions in military expenditures than in determining the fate of particular weapons systems.

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**Will MX rail garrison ever be deployed? On balance, the battle over military expenditures that has emerged this year makes it appear unlikely.**

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Even the staunchest supporters of rail garrison have failed to provide memorable justifications for the deployment of the system. General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an embattled General John Chain, commanding general of the SAC, have strongly endorsed strategic modernization. Yet, in a move that could draw attention away from the merits of their arguments, Chain has noted that he and the Joint Chiefs might withdraw their support for the administration's START proposals if rail garrison and the B-2 are abandoned.

Moreover, during talks held in September 1989 with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of State James Baker dropped an American proposal to ban mobile ICBMs. Baker tied this shift in policy to Congressional approval of rail garrison. In other words, Baker offered to eliminate a possible stumbling block in the START negotiations — an American demand that would have had a unilateral effect on the Soviets by forcing them to eliminate their existing mobile missile, the SS-24 — only if Congress funded MX rail garrison, the American weapon that is roughly equivalent to the SS-24. Yet, by linking a ban on mobile missiles to a current funding decision, which in any event would not constrain future Congresses, the administration tied both its arms control proposals and its strategic modernization program to this year's budget debate.

In short, Baker's proposal threatens to turn rail garrison into just another bargaining chip in the START process. Given the current political climate, this is not likely to boost rail garrison's prospects. As Repre-

sentative Les Aspin (Democrat of Wisconsin) has remarked: "Do we really need to build weapons to get the Russians to the negotiating table?"<sup>17</sup>

Although Aspin has reserved most of his criticism for the administration's support for the B-2 bomber, while retaining a lukewarm attitude towards rail garrison, Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia) leads the majority of Congressional Democrats in the fight against the administration's entire strategic modernization program. Early in 1990, Nunn gave rail garrison only a 50-50 chance of obtaining Congressional approval, an estimate deemed overly optimistic by some observers.<sup>18</sup> In opposing rail garrison, however, Nunn has offered a creative, if overly ambitious, alternative: a two-stage START negotiating strategy. Nunn would first ban all land-mobile MIRVed missiles, eliminating rail garrison and the Soviet's rail-mobile SS-24, which has already been deployed in limited numbers, and then would move to ban all MIRVed ICBMs.

Of course, the Soviets might object to Nunn's proposal because they would be forced to make more extensive changes than the Americans — ICBMs make up the bulk of Soviet strategic forces. Nunn's proposal also increases the incentives to improve SLBM accuracy and depressed-trajectory capabilities, a development that would be extremely harmful, especially if the second stage of his strategy fails to bear fruit. Additionally, no consideration seems to have been given to the role or impact of strategic defenses in a world without MIRVs.

Ironically, Brent Scowcroft, now Bush's national security affairs advisor, no longer champions the system he espoused as head of a commission in 1983. Following Senator Nunn's lead, he has suggested that the administration work to ban all MIRVed mobile missiles in the ongoing START negotiations, swapping rail garrison for Soviet agreement to eliminate the SS-24. This stand undermines Baker's negotiating position, not to mention Scowcroft's own earlier proposals to rectify the problem of ICBM vulnerability, and appears to be an attempt to salvage deployment of Midgetman. Like Nunn's, Scowcroft's suggestion also appears to be the first step towards the de-MIRVing of the ICBM forces of the United States and the USSR, and therefore suffers from the same drawbacks. Both the Nunn and Scowcroft proposals would benefit from a clearer articulation of the strategic future they envision, especially in terms of the future of the SLBM force in a world without MIRVed ICBMs.

And finally, where does President Bush stand on the rail garrison? It is difficult to tell. He remained aloof during the debate over the military budget. If Bush follows Scowcroft's lead, he might simply be waiting for the opportune political moment to back away from rail garrison.

<sup>17</sup> *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1990.

<sup>18</sup> *The Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 1990; Sam Nunn, "Ban Mobile MIRVs," *The Washington Post*, September 19, 1989, p. 27; *The Baltimore Sun*, March 7, 1990; and, *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1990, p. 25.

Will MX rail garrison ever be deployed? On balance, the battle over military expenditures that has emerged this year makes it appear unlikely. Still, advocates of the system have two advantages. First, the B-2 has served as a lightning rod: given its enormous cost, a money-conscious Congress would mark it as the obvious candidate for the budgetary ax. In contrast, rail garrison is the least expensive system in the administration's strategic modernization program. The administration, however, has attempted to use the START negotiations to protect the bomber from its critics. The counting rules in the proposed START treaty favor penetrating bombers: even though the B-2 could carry up to sixteen warheads, it would be counted as carrying only one warhead of the six thousand warheads allowed to each side by the treaty. Of course, Congress could react negatively to this treaty provision. Congressional opponents of the B-2 might consider the proposed counting rule to be a veiled attempt to force their approval of the bomber.

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**Without a consensus about how recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have changed American foreign and military priorities, cost has become the criterion for making decisions about strategic forces.**

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Second, if given the choice between rail garrison and Midgetman, supporters of strategic modernization (especially the Air Force) would probably choose rail garrison. They would base this decision not on any strategic rationale, but on the principle that a missile in hand is better than a missile on a drawing board. Given the uncertain budgetary future, few gamblers remain among supporters of strategic modernization.

## **Conclusion**

Whether or not the rail-garrison system is ever deployed, it is apparent that the current debate over the military budget has failed to highlight the issues that should govern America's strategic procurement policy. Not only are the procurement and arms control cycles out of synchrony, as Senator Nunn has remarked,<sup>19</sup> but Congress, the White House, the Department of Defense, the Air Force, and strategic analysts are overwhelmed by events. Without a consensus about how recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have changed American

<sup>19</sup> *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1990.

foreign and military priorities, cost has become the criterion for making decisions about strategic forces. As a result, those who favor deep cuts in the military budget are opposed only by those who favor moderate reductions. The opportunity created by recent changes in Soviet behavior — the chance to plan the procurement and arms control programs that will maintain a stable strategic environment during the next century — is being squandered. Questions about how the United States will deal with impending operational and technical improvements in strategic forces have not been raised.

Worst of all, amidst the turmoil and rancor produced by the debate over the size of the military budget, one important issue has been forgotten. In Eastern Europe, a change in Soviet intentions has been matched by a change in Soviet military capabilities; in the USSR, it has not. Theoretically, the USSR remains as able to destroy 90 percent of the American ICBM force as it was a decade ago. In the meantime, the effort to reduce the vulnerability of the American ICBM force, which appeared so promising just a year ago, has ground to a halt.

## UNNECESSARY AND UNAMERICAN

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by Doug Bandow

The U.S. government inaugurated an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, despite the skepticism of the Pentagon and many in Congress. After almost two decades, it has proven its success by providing an above-average group of young Americans to fill the military's ranks. In fact, despite some problems in the late 1970s, the AVF is now delivering a higher quality force than ever was acquired through conscription.

Nevertheless, opponents of the AVF still abound, offering a wide range of arguments in favor of mandatory service. During the Reagan administration's military build-up, pro-draft pundits proclaimed that the desire to strengthen America necessarily entailed conscription. In late 1981, the *National Journal* headlined one article "If Reagan Wants to Expand the Military, He May Also Have to Revive the Draft." Columnist Richard Reeves boldly predicted in late 1983 that "President Reagan will try to reinstitute the draft in early 1985. It will not matter whether or not he has been re-elected. By then the United States military will simply need more bodies than it has to implement new policies mandated by the Reagan administration's view of the world."<sup>1</sup>

In addition to those who put forward arguments based on the alleged military need for conscription, there are those such as journalist Timothy Noah who seek a draft in order to reshape the sociological characteristics of the military;<sup>2</sup> those such as Terrence Cullinan who want to carry out various labor-intensive projects;<sup>3</sup> those such as Margaret Mead who want a chance to indoctrinate America's youth in their own values of "public service";<sup>4</sup> and those such as former Representative Paul

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Gordon, "If Reagan Wants to Expand the Military, He May Also Have to Revive the Draft," *National Journal*, August 22, 1981; Richard Reeves, "Onward Draft Soldiers, Marching Everywhere," *San Jose Mercury News*, October 30, 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Timothy Noah, "We Need You: National Service, An Idea Whose Time Has Come," *The Washington Monthly*, November 1986, pp. 35-41.

<sup>3</sup> Terrence Cullinan, "The Courage to Compel," in Martin Anderson, ed., *The Military Draft* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 445-460.

<sup>4</sup> Margaret Mead, "A National Service System as a Solution to a Variety of National Problems," in Anderson, *The Military Draft*, pp. 429-443.

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“Pete” McCloskey (Republican of California) who simply demand conscription as a moral imperative.<sup>5</sup>

Today, however, most Americans believe the only acceptable basis for conscription is military need. As a result, no serious political plans for a draft now exist. Even Senator Steve Symms (Republican of Idaho) and the persistent Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (Democrat of South Carolina), who together in 1987 introduced legislation to restart conscription, have not reintroduced the bill in the current session.

Still, proponents of conscription have not given up. Rather, they have taken to propounding various programs that would, by preparing the American people politically, psychologically, and morally for a return to conscription, serve as the thin edge of the wedge for the draft. Most of these proposals take the form of a “national service” program, which would involve civilian work as well as military service.

The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a conservative group of elected Democratic officials whose goal is to move their party more toward the center, has made national service a priority. Sociologist Charles Moskos, one of today’s leading proponents of national service and an advisor to the DLC, has authored a new book, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community*, which advocates a voluntary but government-funded national service program. And Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell has declared that “We will this year enact national service legislation.”<sup>6</sup> Donald Eberly, executive director of the National Service Secretariat, concludes that the national service idea is receiving more attention today than at any other time in the past decade.

### The Precedent for National Service

The concept of “national service” has existed from time immemorial. Throughout history, governments have forced men of varying ages into military service, and conquering armies regularly turned captives into slaves. Ancient empires compelled civilians to labor en masse on huge projects, such as the pyramids. Indeed, so routine was the practice of coerced service that in ancient Israel the prophet Samuel warned against creating a king, because “he will take your sons and make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will run in front of his chariots. Some he will assign . . . to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war and equipment for his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers.”<sup>7</sup> Over time, the military became the principal recipient of mandatory service. The French government under Robespierre and Napoleon alike

<sup>5</sup> Paul McCloskey, “National Youth Service as an Alternative,” *Commonsense*, Fall 1979, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Charles Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988); George Mitchell, Speech to the National Press Club, January 25, 1990.

<sup>7</sup> I Samuel 8: 11-13 (New International Version).

drafted hundreds of thousands of young men for its military. The British authorities impressed sailors for the navy.

In the United States, however, forced service to the state contradicted the country's individualist Enlightenment philosophy. Prior to the War of Independence, the colonies imposed only a weak militia obligation, and even this burden was mitigated by the alternative of hiring a substitute. After the war, the logic of a free society began to prevail, and conscription for the state militias was repealed or left to atrophy.

Conscription returned to America when, as often happens, an emergency gave politicians the excuse to put an end to freedom. During the Civil War, the U.S. government broke with all precedent and declared that young men had a direct obligation to serve in the regular army. Still, the Enrollment Act of 1863 was not a true conscription act, for what it imposed was a tax that could be paid in kind (by serving or by providing a substitute) or by paying a flat fee of \$300. In 1864, when the monetary alternative was repealed, conscription resembled a modern draft. The numbers involved, however, remained small: from 1863 to 1865, the number of conscripts was forty-six thousand, accounting for only 2 percent of the army.<sup>8</sup>

With the decline of classical liberalism in the late nineteenth century came an interest in wider forms of national servitude. Edward Bellamy's utopian novel *Looking Backward, 2000-1887* (1888) suggested forcing young men and women into an "industrial army,"<sup>9</sup> a vision of military-industrial totalitarianism which continues to influence the national service movement. Moskos writes that Bellamy "not only first introduced the concept of civilian service by youth, but . . . presented a military analogy to describe the organization of civilian service, a trademark of much subsequent national-service thought."<sup>10</sup> William James, the philosopher, picked up Bellamy's theme, arguing in 1910 that "the martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war, are absolute and permanent human goods."<sup>11</sup> His program, for men only, would have involved civilian duties ranging from coal mining and fishing to window washing and road building.

By 1917, when the United States entered World War I, the ideals of classical liberalism had declined greatly, and few objections were raised

<sup>8</sup> John Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 62.

<sup>9</sup> The term is used by the narrator, Julian West, after his guide to the future, Dr. Leete, says: "The people were already accustomed to the idea that the obligation of every citizen, not physically disabled, to contribute his military services to the defense of the nation was equal and absolute. That it was equally the duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of industrial or intellectual services to the maintenance of the nation was equally evident, though it was not until the nation became the employer of labor that citizens were able to render this sort of service with any pretense either of universality or equity." Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward, 2000-1887* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), p. 69.

<sup>10</sup> Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service*, p. 30.

<sup>11</sup> William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Memories and Studies* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), p. 288.

to America's first truly universal military draft. And opponents were too few to stop President Franklin Roosevelt from instituting the first peacetime conscription in 1940. Although World War II's conscription made no provision for civilian forced-labor, army and business leaders proposed the idea late in the conflict, only to back off when labor insisted such a move be accompanied by new taxes on capital.<sup>12</sup>

After a brief post-World War II respite, from March 1947 to June 1948, peacetime conscription came back under the enthusiastic prodding of President Harry Truman, who hoped it could be a form of social engineering. "I don't like to think of it as a universal military training program," he said. "I want it to be a universal training program."<sup>13</sup> Finally, in 1973, the draft was ended by a combination of political forces ranging from libertarian to radical leftist.

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Since then, many national service advocates have looked abroad for precedents. A decade ago, the Potomac Institute, a Washington think tank that characterizes itself as devoted to civil rights and equal opportunity, reported that:

Millions of young people serve social needs in China as a routine part of growing up, many commanded to leave the crowded cities and to assist in the countryside. Castro fought illiteracy and mosquitoes in Cuba with units of youth. Interesting combinations of education, work, and service to society are a part of the experience of youth in Israel, Jamaica, Nigeria, Tanzania, and other nations. The civic spirit being imbued in youth elsewhere in the world leaves some Americans wondering and worrying about Saturday-night-fever, unemployment, the new narcissism, and other afflictions of American youth.<sup>14</sup>

Programs of forced labor do have a few explicit advocates in the United States today: Senator John McCain (Republican of Arizona) has introduced legislation to phase in a mandatory system of some vague sort. (It would order the president to establish a commission to work out the details.) But most politicians have abandoned that effort, at least temporarily. At an Atlantic Council forum in 1989, Senator Charles Robb (Democrat of Virginia) admitted he did not believe compulsion was politically feasible, while Moskos says he would favor a mandatory na-

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, "National War Service Bill," *Hearings*, 78 Cong., 2nd Sess. Quoted in Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Decline of American Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1980), p. 309.

<sup>13</sup> *The New York Times*, December 21, 1946.

<sup>14</sup> The Potomac Institute, *Youth and the Needs of the Nation* (Washington, D.C.: The Potomac Institute, 1979), p. 28.

tional service program “if I could have a magic wand.”<sup>15</sup> Facing political reality, those who favor mandatory service have turned to voluntary programs to instill the ideals of national service.

### Criticisms of the All-Volunteer Force

Though the idea of freedom has attenuated greatly in America over the past 150 years, a majority of Americans probably still associate national service only with military service. Consequently, military service remains a key selling point of national service proposals, and criticism of the AVF therefore remains a leading basis for proposing national service.

Typically, four charges are levelled against the AVF: that the annual cohort of volunteers is not large enough; not smart enough; not representative of America; and not idealistic. Let us consider each argument in turn.

*Not enough volunteers.* The first criticism says that the AVF cannot withstand the coming of the “baby bust” generation. Since 1979, the pool of eighteen-year-olds has been shrinking and it will continue to do so until 1992. Moreover, the number of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds will decline throughout the 1990s.<sup>16</sup> The DLC and its allies believe that these demographic changes present the United States with a crisis requiring dramatic action.

Demographics, though, are not decisive. The eighteen-year-old cohort peaked in 1979; yet that was the last year the services failed to meet their objectives. By the end of the 1980s, the Pentagon had endured more than two-thirds of the total expected population drop (which will end in 1992), all the while meeting its goals and increasing the quality of its recruits. As for the shrinking eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old pool, the Pentagon estimates that there will be more than 7.3 million males eligible to serve in 1996, of whom the Pentagon will need to recruit only 5 percent.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, these estimates, made barely three years ago, are now out of date. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are almost certain to reduce sharply the size of the military. In November 1989, the services drafted plans to cut overall manpower levels by 250,000, more than one-tenth of the force. The army, the most personnel-intensive service, proposed dropping three of eighteen active-duty divisions and reducing the number of reserve divisions from ten to nine. The result would be to slash 135,000 of 769,000 active duty soldiers, roughly 18 percent of its force. Only two months later, in January 1990, Defense Sec-

<sup>15</sup> *Time*, February 23, 1987.

<sup>16</sup> David Armor, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services (mimeo), March 24, 1987, p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

retary Richard Cheney announced that the Pentagon expected to dismantle not four but five of its twenty-eight active and reserve army divisions.<sup>18</sup>

*Not smart enough.* The AVF, it is said, does not attract enough qualified volunteers to handle the military's increasingly complex weapons. This charge is hard to sustain. Reviewing everything from family background to educational aspirations to SAT scores suggests that the military is attracting high-quality recruits.<sup>19</sup> In fact, the Pentagon's performance has been superlative. In FY 1989, 92 percent of its recruits were high school graduates, compared to 75 percent of the general youth population. While only 69 percent of civilian youth score in the top three (of five) categories of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), 94 percent of new enlistees did so last year. Furthermore, the military has maintained these excellent results throughout the 1980s despite a lengthy economic recovery. (See Table 1.)

That current recruits are smarter than average has led some hawks to conclude that there is no security justification for national service. As Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (Democrat of Mississippi) testified before his colleagues in early 1989: "We're in great shape and should not tamper with the effective tools we've given the military."<sup>20</sup>

*Not sufficiently representative.* The DLC complains in its book on national service that "Americans should be concerned that our armed forces today are not representative of society as a whole," that the poor and minorities are carrying a disproportionate share of the burden of defense. Specifically, what they mean is that not enough white, middle-class youths are serving. The DLC argues that minorities comprise roughly 38 percent of army personnel and 30 percent of all servicemen, compared to just 14 percent of the civilian labor force.<sup>21</sup> The DLC believes that "an unrepresentative army undermines the civic ethic of equal sacrifice."<sup>22</sup>

Obviously, few if any critics of AVF are concerned about unrepresentativeness as such. Few of them are troubled that women make up well under half of America's forces. No one has decried the absence of a proportionate number of handicapped people, nor the services' failure to incorporate a socially typical number of those who score in the lowest category of the AFQT. And, frankly, there would probably be little criticism from national-service advocates were whites overrepresented.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, *The Washington Post*, November 28, 1989; *The New York Times*, January 30, 1990.

<sup>19</sup> For a survey of this issue, see Doug Bandow, "An Involuntary Military: Paying More for Less," in William B. Taylor, Jr., ed., *The Anthrope Factor in Warfare: Conscripits, Volunteers, and Reserves* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 256-262.

<sup>20</sup> G.V. Montgomery, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, March 14, 1989.

<sup>21</sup> Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service*, p. 40.

<sup>22</sup> Democratic Leadership Council, *Citizenship and National Service* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic Leadership Council), p. 25.

TABLE 1  
STATUS OF NEW ENLISTEES IN THE AVF\*

|              | Percentage of<br>Recruitment<br>Objectives | Percentage of<br>High School<br>Graduates | Percentage in<br>AFQT Category<br>I through III |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| <u>1989</u>  |                                            |                                           |                                                 |
| DOD          | 101                                        | 92                                        | 94                                              |
| Army         | 101                                        | 90                                        | 93                                              |
| Navy         | 101                                        | 90                                        | 89                                              |
| Marine Corps | 101                                        | 95                                        | 99 +                                            |
| Air Force    | 100                                        | 99                                        | 99 +                                            |
| <u>1988</u>  |                                            |                                           |                                                 |
| DOD          | 100                                        | 93                                        | 95                                              |
| Army         | 100                                        | 93                                        | 96                                              |
| Navy         | 100                                        | 91                                        | 91                                              |
| Marine Corps | 101                                        | 95                                        | 99                                              |
| Air Force    | 100                                        | 99                                        | 99 +                                            |
| <u>1987</u>  |                                            |                                           |                                                 |
| DOD          | 100                                        | 93                                        | 95                                              |
| Army         | 101                                        | 91                                        | 96                                              |
| Navy         | 100                                        | 91                                        | 90                                              |
| Marine Corps | 101                                        | 98                                        | 99 +                                            |
| Air Force    | 100                                        | 99                                        | 99 +                                            |
| <u>1986</u>  |                                            |                                           |                                                 |
| DOD          | 100                                        | 92                                        | 96                                              |
| Army         | 100                                        | 91                                        | 96                                              |
| Navy         | 100                                        | 85                                        | 90                                              |
| Marine Corps | 100                                        | 98                                        | 99 +                                            |
| Air Force    | 100                                        | 99                                        | 99 +                                            |
| <u>1985</u>  |                                            |                                           |                                                 |
| DOD          | 100                                        | 93                                        | 93                                              |
| Army         | 100                                        | 91                                        | 91                                              |
| Navy         | 100                                        | 89                                        | 90                                              |
| Marine Corps | 100                                        | 97                                        | 96                                              |
| Air Force    | 100                                        | 99                                        | 99                                              |

\* Information derived from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel.

The critics' selectivity points to a conceptual problem: their notion that all civic roles should be shared equally. Wealthy people tend to pay more in taxes. Construction workers are overwhelmingly male. The Irish, for many years, bore a disproportionate "burden" of New York City's policing duties. And nonurban residents are overrepresented in

the military. Should all such roles be shared equally? As long as rich and poor, black and white, men and women, ethnic groups, and regional groups face different situations in life, they are likely to assume certain social roles disproportionately. To think that it should be otherwise is simply to advocate an equality of result that is alien to America.

Anyway, the DLC overstates its case, once again. First, it uses overall Pentagon figures. Minorities reenlist in higher numbers than whites, something that would not be affected by national service. Second, civilian labor force statistics are incorrectly cited. Bruce Chapman of the Hudson Institute points out that when the DLC compares figures for minority eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds, it uses 26.9 percent for the military and 17.8 percent for the civilian population. Yet the latter figure does not include Hispanics, who comprise 9.5 percent of the relevant population.<sup>23</sup> Thus, although blacks are overrepresented in the military, (during FY 1989, 22 percent of new recruits were black, compared to 14 percent of the corresponding youth population), Hispanics, Asians, and other minority groups are underrepresented. As a result, the overall percentage of minorities in the military roughly matches their percentage in the population as a whole.

As for rich whites serving: They always have and always will, although trying to measure their participation is difficult. Using zip codes and average family incomes, a 1977 Rand Corporation report, conducted during a relatively difficult recruiting period, found that while 1.06 percent of all sixteen- to twenty-one-year-olds came from families in the top 1 percent of income, 0.34 percent of those joining the military did. Moreover, while 5.13 percent of all sixteen- to twenty-one-year-olds came from families in the 95 to 99 percentiles of income, 2.67 of those joining the military did. Thus, as one might expect, the wealthy are somewhat less likely to serve; but still many do join. The Rand report concluded that "military service apparently continues to be viewed as an alternative employment option for a very broad cross section of American society, from the wealthiest to the poorest."<sup>24</sup>

*Not idealistic.* Proponents of mandatory service hold that the AVF has, in Moskos's words, moved "from citizen soldier to economic man," placing an undue emphasis on marketplace values.<sup>25</sup> That is, the AVF has fostered an "it's just a job" mentality.<sup>26</sup> Moskos goes so far as to

<sup>23</sup> Bruce Chapman, "'National Service': A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come?" Hudson Institute Briefing Paper No. 106, April 18, 1989, p. 8. For a more detailed analysis of the representativeness issue, see Sue Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Sue Berryman, "National Service and Military Service: Will They Fit One Another," paper presented to the Hoover Institution Conference on National Service, September 9, 1989.

<sup>24</sup> Richard Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 231.

<sup>25</sup> DLC, *Citizenship and National Service*, p. 24.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, eds., *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).

argue that “the most far-reaching consequence of the AVF is that it ultimately reduces recruiting an armed forces to a form of consumerism, even hedonism, which is hardly a basis for the kind of commitment required in a military organization.”<sup>27</sup>

Moskos’s critique deserves to be taken seriously. Although military surveys consistently find that many servicemen joined to serve and to fulfill a sense of duty, much of the armed services’ recruiting certainly seems pitched to the casual job hunter — learn a skill, earn some money, travel the world. That said, however, even Moskos acknowledges that many of the changes we see in the military are tied to social trends. In other words, no job ought to be “just a job,” but any job can be “just a job.” It depends on the individual and the value he places on his performance as a worker. Thus, a particularly serious problem of “ticket-punching” exists among some military officers, who of course would be unaffected by national service.<sup>28</sup>

No doubt, the military would be stronger if it better emphasized its institutional uniqueness and its history as a high calling. But this seems contrary to Moskos’s proposal of flooding the field with “young people who serve short terms in the military at less than market wages.”<sup>29</sup> Anyway, in the late 1980s, there has been an upsurge of idealism and activism on the part of the young without a new federal program.<sup>30</sup> Those trends are likely to affect military recruiting; moreover, the down-sizing of the force will allow the military to choose a larger portion of enlistees who take duty seriously.

In sum, critics of the AVF have failed to make a convincing case. Nonetheless, national service advocates continue to believe that the military has a problem, and that their new national service program is the answer.

## National Service Proposals

Nearly a dozen different pieces of legislation concerning national service are now circulating in Washington. Some mirror the president’s “Thousand Points of Light” initiative, and would simply hand out federal money to promote volunteerism. Others encourage part-time civilian service along the lines of the National Guard, providing financial assistance in return for weekend civilian service. The Citizen Corps program advocated by Nunn, Representative David McCurdy (Democrat of Okla-

<sup>27</sup> Charles Moskos, “The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique,” in William Bowman et al., *The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), p. 17.

<sup>28</sup> A good discussion of the issue is contained in Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, “Institution Building in an Occupational World,” in Moskos and Wood, *The Military*.

<sup>29</sup> Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service*, p. 130.

<sup>30</sup> Doug Bandow, *National Service: The Enduring Panacea*, Cato Policy Analysis #130, March 22, 1990, pp. 6-8.

homa), Moskos, and the DLC, seems to be the only attempt to employ national service in a way that would significantly affect the military.

The Citizen Corps program would create a Corporation for National Service to implement a civilian service program administered through state and local councils. (Military service would be handled by the Pentagon.) Federal financial aid for education would be conditioned on one or two years of service; and completion of the program would be rewarded with a voucher usable for education or a home purchase. In this way, national service advocates say, their program would bring in more recruits and more upper-income white recruits.

Moreover, Moskos predicts that “a citizen soldier option would dramatically lower per capita manpower costs” in two ways. It would attract college-bound youths with lower attrition rates than today’s recruits; and the program would pay “citizen soldiers,” serving only two years, less than “professional soldiers.”<sup>31</sup>

But Moskos and his allies may well be wrong on all counts. National service is likely to raise costs and hurt the services.

First, despite the DLC’s desire to employ inexpensive, semivolunteer “citizen soldiers,” use of an education/housing voucher would result in higher net annual benefits for the two-year enlistees than for longer-term enlistees. As Walter Oi of the University of Rochester points out, the tax-free voucher could easily be “cashed out” through home buy-backs, with the result that a national service participant would end up with pay “63 percent higher than that paid to a regular enlisted man or woman.”<sup>32</sup> Instead of appealing to middle- and upper-class youths on the basis of something other than money, national service would in this way encourage enlistments from all income levels precisely because of the material incentives offered. (Moskos’s version of the voucher, which could not be used to purchase a home, would be less subject to abuse.)

Second, with a plethora of two-year enlistment terms, training and turnover expenses would be much greater. In its official response to the Nunn-McCurdy national service proposal, the Defense Department warned :

Because of the large influx of 2-year enlistments, the training base (and associated costs) would have to expand markedly. In addition, unit training work loads, personnel turbulence, and attrition experienced in active and Reserve operational units would all increase. Minimum overseas tour lengths would need to be cut, sharply increasing permanent change of station costs. The combined effect of these factors would drive sharp accession and end strength increases, disrupt unit cohesion, weaken esprit and morale, reduce individual proficiency and compromise unit readiness.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> DLC, *Citizenship and National Service*, p. 29.

<sup>32</sup> Walter Oi, “National Service: Who Bears the Costs and Who Reaps the Gains,” paper presented to the Hoover Institution Conference on National Service, September 8, 1989, p. 21.

<sup>33</sup> Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Views on S.3/H.R.660, Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989” (mimeo), undated (released in July 1989), p. 3.

TABLE 2  
MILITARY-RELATED COSTS OF NATIONAL SERVICE  
FY 1985 CAREER MIX

| Element                                                                                                                        | Estimated Cost Increases<br>(Millions of Dollars) |                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                | Trained Man-year<br>Method*                       | Productivity-weighted<br>Man-year Method** |
| Savings from Cutting<br>Regular Army Pay                                                                                       | (8316)                                            | (8316)                                     |
| Tax Loss from Cutting<br>Regular Army Pay                                                                                      | 433                                               | 433                                        |
| Citizen Corps Pay<br>(Net Taxes)                                                                                               | 5320                                              | 9314                                       |
| Reenlistment Bonuses                                                                                                           | 382                                               | 382                                        |
| G.I. Bill                                                                                                                      | (1629)                                            | (1629)                                     |
| Citizen Corps<br>Educational Voucher                                                                                           | 4605                                              | 8063                                       |
| Additional Training                                                                                                            | 341                                               | 983                                        |
| Total                                                                                                                          | 1136                                              | 9230                                       |
| * Trained man-year method merely preserves a force with equal years of training.                                               |                                                   |                                            |
| ** Productivity weighting recognizes that an additional year of training is often worth more than an earlier year of training. |                                                   |                                            |

Third, the advantages of the two-year plan would induce many career-minded recruits to take the "citizen" option, further upsetting the balance between short- and long-term enlistments. Pay and benefits for professionals would probably have to rise to encourage reenlistment and to maintain an adequate career force. All told, the research firm Syllogistics estimates, costs could rise between \$1.1 billion and \$9.2 billion annually. (See Table 2.)<sup>34</sup>

Clearly, the impact of the plan on professionals is critical. The DLC appears to view a more experienced force as a detriment, citing as a possible source of savings the "reduction in the number of soldiers in higher pay grades."<sup>35</sup> But not only is that saving illusory, an older force

<sup>34</sup> Syllogistics, Inc., "The Effects of National Service on Military Personnel Programs," September 1988, pp. 6-19. Since the DLC bill had not been introduced at the time, the Syllogistics study was based on a somewhat different national service proposal. Thus, these numbers are only advisory.

<sup>35</sup> DLC, *Citizenship and National Service*, p. 43.

(in addition to being more effective) can actually offer significant savings through efficiency. In fact, a decade ago, manpower experts Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos urged the Pentagon to “take steps to improve retention among certain experienced personnel, thereby reducing the demands for new volunteers and for the resources now devoted to maintaining a relatively large pool of nonproductive employees. These steps not only would allow the nation to field more effective armed forces but could save money as well.”<sup>36</sup>

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**If the decision is made to use education aid to increase the number of young people enlisting in the military, there is a much simpler method. . . . No service, no aid.**

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Fourth, one needs to keep in mind that potential savings from the personnel costs of new recruits are always going to be small, simply because most personnel spending goes for careerists, civilians, and retirees. When the DLC’s book, *Citizenship and National Service*, compares personnel costs in 1964 and 1986 and blames the rise on the termination of conscription, something is clearly wrong. Barely one-tenth of personnel costs is now attributable to soldiers serving in their first two years (the ones who replaced draftees). Any added expense from increasing their pay is more than offset by eliminating the costs of conscription, lowered turnover, and lowered reenlistment incentives. (The rise was in fact due largely to increased costs associated with career soldiers, civilians, and retirees.)

Fifth, the military is today the one large-scale government service program that provides educational benefits; national service is therefore likely to draw people away from the military rather than encourage them to enlist. Thomas Byrne of the (private) Association of the U.S. Army complains, “We don’t want high-caliber people who might otherwise join the Army off planting trees instead.”<sup>37</sup> It makes no sense to create a federal civilian service program to compete with the armed services for young men.

If the decision is made to use education aid to increase the number of young people enlisting in the military, there is a much simpler method. The government need only adopt the principle of “earned benefits” advocated by national service proponents — but apply it more selectively.

<sup>36</sup> Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos, *Youth or Experience? Manning the Modern Military* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 84.

<sup>37</sup> Thomas Byrne, quoted in Jeffrey Sheler et al, “The Push for National Service,” *U.S. News & World Report*, February 13, 1989, p. 22.

That is, federal educational aid could still be conditioned on service, but on military service alone. No service, no aid. Such an approach would implement the sensible philosophical point advanced by Nunn and his colleagues, that educational subsidies are not an entitlement, and would also avoid creating a civilian program to compete with the military.

Lastly, what would national service do for a volunteer military thought to emphasize a “just-a-job” attitude? Moskos has observed that “we must encourage a general attitude, a cast of mind, an outlook.”<sup>38</sup> And that is true — in the military and in every other line of work. But many of today’s servicemen already serve for less than a civilian market wage. Naval personnel who work long hours on aircraft carriers handling multimillion-dollar aircraft make no more than supermarket clerks. They — like many doctors, lawyers, journalists, teachers, entrepreneurs, and other citizens — have chosen their profession for reasons of personal fulfillment.

Would national service pull in more patriots in place of time-servers? No, an educational voucher would tend to attract people who want to go to college. Indeed, because “citizen soldiers” would get greater benefits under the voucher system than career soldiers, the scheme could create an entire class of recruits who joined solely because of the material rewards and who looked forward only to getting out and using their vouchers.

### The Moral Argument

If national service has so little to commend it, why does the specter haunt us still? It seems likely that most of those who advocate national service are driven by something more than practical considerations. Like Edward Bellamy and William James, they appear to possess an intense dislike of America’s individualist, bourgeois political culture.

Former representative Paul McCloskey, who introduced a mandatory national service program in 1979, observed that “the privilege of being an American justifies a duty to serve the country a year or two in one’s youth.”<sup>39</sup> This implies that the government is the grantor, rather than the protector, of rights — fundamentally misconstruing the American view of the relationship between the individual and the state. It is a privilege to be an American only because it is a stroke of luck to live in a society that respects individual rights more than most other societies. But the rights of a free man are not a benefit or privilege bestowed by the government. The contrary views — that the status of freedom is a gift from the king, or the state, or society, and therefore something for which one must pay homage — reflects the view of feudalism, of fascism, and of socialism.

<sup>38</sup> Moskos and Wood, “Institution Building in an Occupational World,” in Moskos and Wood, *The Military*, p. 290.

<sup>39</sup> Paul McCloskey, “National Youth Service as an Alternative,” *Commonsense*, Fall 1979, p. 17.

Of course, free individuals should defend themselves and their communities. But in a free society this decision must be a personal moral choice, not a legal duty imposed from above. Individuals operating within the informal social and community networks that surround them should be the ones to decide how best to fulfill their social obligations. As Daniel Webster asked: "Who will show me any constitutional injunction, which makes it the duty of the American people to surrender everything valuable in life, and even life itself . . . whenever the purposes of an ambitious and mischievous government may require it?"<sup>40</sup>

Today, most advocates of national service say that their schemes are voluntary. But many of these advocates openly admit that they prefer national service to be involuntary. And in a sense, they are right. For if national service is in fact a duty owed to the country, why should it not be enforced, just as contractual obligations are enforced? Indeed, it must be enforced, since those who most need to learn to obey will not volunteer. Once this logic of "duty" takes hold, Washington will not long foot the huge bill for a "public service" army it can employ on the cheap.

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Moreover, why stop the process at national service? Charles Moskos wants young people to act as prison guards, teachers, and in a host of other roles. Why not conscript them? William James wanted to draft men to do everything from wash windows to serve on fishing fleets in December. That may be going a bit far, but surely defense of the local community is not much less compelling than defense of the country. Why not conscript people for a "home guard" in the police and fire departments? Why not compel them to participate in neighborhood watch associations? This would bring in mature adults, otherwise not so easily lured from home and career. And if this sounds absurd, remember the DLC argument that "in a democracy . . . citizenship requires not just sharing burdens, but sharing them equally."<sup>41</sup>

In the end, the DLC gets one part right, asserting that "No obligation is more fundamental to citizenship than that of preserving our free institutions."<sup>42</sup> Just so, and the conclusion is obvious: no obligation is more fundamental than opposing national service.

<sup>40</sup> C.H. Van Tyne, ed., *The Letters of Daniel Webster* (New York: Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., 1969), p. 61..

<sup>41</sup> DLC, *Citizenship and National Service*, p. 24.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

## REBUTTAL: NECESSARY AND AMERICAN

by Charles Moskos

Doug Bandow has done a great service by highlighting key issues in the current debate on national service. He focuses on the national service proposal introduced by Senator Sam Nunn, Representative Dave McCurdy, and other congressional Democrats. This bold legislation, shaped by the Democratic Leadership Council's study, *Citizenship and National Service*,<sup>1</sup> would establish a voluntary national service program aimed primarily at young people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six.

By presenting a program of national service embracing both military and civilian dimensions, the DLC study broke new ground. The military side would include two tracks: one a new lower-paid "citizen-soldier" track, offering short enlistments coupled with generous post-service educational benefits, the other a professional soldier track — basically the system as it presently exists. The civilian side would consist of an entirely new youth service, which would focus on conservation work and social services, and which would be administered mainly through state governments, local agencies, and voluntary associations.

The linchpin of the proposal lies in its extension to civilian service of the GI Bill established after World War II. The basic principle of that original GI Bill was to provide education or job training in return for military service. Under one DLC proposal, young people who perform one or two years of service, either military or civilian, would become the main recipients of federal student aid. This moves away from the present program under which the government gives \$9 billion each year in loan subsidies and grants to college students without asking anything in return — in effect, a GI Bill without the GI. By linking service to student aid, the DLC proposal incurred the wrath of the higher education establishment and its paleo-liberal allies on Capitol Hill.

Libertarians take issue with national service for different reasons, of course. As well articulated by Bandow, these concerns center around three core contentions: (1) A national service plan will hurt (or at least will not significantly improve) the all-volunteer force (AVF); (2) The nonmilitary roles envisioned by national service plans are unneeded, or

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<sup>1</sup> Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), *Citizenship and National Service* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic Leadership Council, 1988). Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, was the primary author of this study. By way of full disclosure: both the DLC proposal and the Nunn-McCurdy legislation incorporated ideas from my book, *A Call to Civic Service* (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

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better met in other ways; (3) The concept of national service is un-American.

### National Service and the AVF

Critics of the marketplace AVF (and I am one) focus their arguments on the army, the largest of the services, the one that formerly relied most on draftees, and the bellwether of the AVF. Of the many practical criticisms that have been lodged against AVF, Bandow presents rebuttals to four of the commonest: its poor quality; its unrepresentativeness; its high costs; and its difficulties in hiring and firing people.

*Not smart enough.* When it comes to the relation between quality and length of service, Bandow echoes an article of faith held by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) — that longer enlistments are nearly always preferable to shorter ones. But this dogma does not stand up to scrutiny. The effectiveness of soldiers is based on ability and training, not on time in a grade. Every study of combat soldiers supports this conclusion.<sup>2</sup> Army data show that two-year soldiers, compared with longer enlistees, are twice as likely to score in the upper aptitude categories and much less likely to be removed from the army for disciplinary causes. The army command structure is quite happy with its two-year enlistees. Why does Bandow want to change a winning formula?

Also, Bandow's use of accession figures to demonstrate the quality of the enlisted force is misleading. Rather than focusing on recruits alone, one ought to look at the total enlisted membership brought into the army under AVF. And here the picture is different. Even in the late 1980s, the best years in AVF history, the percentage of the army's enlisted personnel in the top two mental categories was lower than the percentage of the total population in those categories. The reason for this is that today's noncommissioned officers (NCOs) entered the army in the late 1970s, when the quality of recruits was at rock bottom. Thus, we now have a situation where the aptitude scores of privates are much higher than those of their sergeants. For example, 5 percent of recruits fall into the lowest test level compared with 26 percent of staff sergeants.

*Not sufficiently representative.* To argue, as does the 1977 Rand report Bandow cites, that the military was "viewed as an alternative employment option . . . from the wealthiest to the poorest" is laughable. In 1977, one-third of all army entrants were black and close to half of the white males were high school dropouts. To see this as a representative army takes some leap of imagination. Surely, Bandow recognizes that the representativeness issue does not center on creating a mirror of the

<sup>2</sup> "Soldier Performance Research Project," a report issued by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 31, 1989. For a summary of the literature, see Juri Toomepuu, *Soldier Capability — Army Combat Effectiveness*, vol. 1, Main Report (Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ind.: U.S. Army Support Center, April 1981).

civilian population (i.e., proportionate numbers of handicapped, mentally ill, and so forth). It centers, rather, on unrepresentativeness that affects the fighting capabilities of the armed forces. Is there any level of unrepresentativeness that would disturb Bandow?

*Costs.* When calculating the costs of a national service plan, Bandow displays a faulty comprehension of military manpower, for he ignores the concept of a Total Force — reserves as well active forces. When reserve components are included in military manpower analysis, savings occur in training costs even with short-term enlistments, if these are tied to reserve obligations. This is precisely what the DLC proposal stated. Indeed, in 1989, Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono supported an enlistment option of two years in the active force, two years in the ready reserve, and two years in the standby reserve. That military manpower trends, for both budgetary and strategic reasons, are moving toward greater reliance on reserve components makes the case for the citizen-soldier component of the DLC proposal all the more timely.

In support of his contention that long-term enlistments are less expensive than short-term enlistments, Bandow also perpetuates another OSD myth — that the AVF has proven less expensive than conscription. As presented in Table 3 on the following page, a look at dollar figures (given in constant 1990 values) shows the real changes in military personnel costs since the advent of the AVF. In 1964, the last year of the peacetime draft, average personnel costs for each active-duty soldier were \$22,500; this compares with \$35,600 in 1990. The contrast in total manpower costs is enormous. The total bill in 1964 for the active-duty force was \$55.1 billion, in 1990 it came to \$73.9 billion. In other words, even though there are a half million fewer soldiers on active duty, the AVF costs \$18 billion more! Nor does this include the extra \$10 billion a year now paid to civilians or the skyrocketing retirement costs. Whatever arguments there are against the draft, cost savings is not one of them.<sup>3</sup>

*Hiring and firing.* The contention that the DLC proposal and the Nunn-McCurdy bill would hurt military recruitment by drawing young people into civilian work is foolishness. To require service from college youth who now receive federal education benefits without a service requirement can only create an unparalleled reservoir of potential military recruits. The Syllogistics study cited by Bandow, which suggested that a national service plan might require higher pay to bring in military recruits, never addressed the specifics of the Nunn-McCurdy bill and is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. A 1989 study by Juri Toomepuu, of

<sup>3</sup> Although studies sponsored by the Department of Defense consistently find that a draft would cost more than the volunteer force, studies done outside conclude — with equal consistency — that a draft would result in budgetary savings of over \$7 billion annually. For one example of the latter, see the General Accounting Office, *Military Draft: Potential Impacts and Other Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1988).

TABLE 3  
DEFENSE MANPOWER COSTS FOR 1964 AND 1990\*  
(In Billions of 1990 Constant Dollars)

|                                                                                                                                                                                            | 1964      | 1990      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Direct Active-Duty Manpower Costs (pay and allowances)                                                                                                                                     | 46.7      | 54.7      |
| Personnel Support (e.g., medical, recruitment, schools)                                                                                                                                    | 6.5       | 15.8      |
| Family Housing                                                                                                                                                                             | 1.9       | 3.4       |
| Total Active-Duty Costs                                                                                                                                                                    | 55.1      | 73.9      |
| Reserve Components                                                                                                                                                                         | 2.7       | 9.0       |
| Civilian Pay                                                                                                                                                                               | 28.7      | 39.5      |
| Total Defense Department Manpower Costs                                                                                                                                                    | 86.3      | 122.4     |
| Number of Personnel:                                                                                                                                                                       |           |           |
| Active-Duty Military                                                                                                                                                                       | 2,687,000 | 2,076,000 |
| Selected Reserve                                                                                                                                                                           | 953,000   | 1,155,000 |
| Civilian                                                                                                                                                                                   | 1,175,000 | 1,100,000 |
| Total                                                                                                                                                                                      | 4,815,000 | 4,331,000 |
| Per Capita Costs of Active-Duty Military                                                                                                                                                   | \$22,506  | \$35,597  |
| Inflation Factor                                                                                                                                                                           | 1.0       | 3.8       |
| * Derived from Department of Defense, <i>Manpower Requirements Report FY 1988</i> , pp. VIII, 3-4; and Department of Defense, <i>Manpower Requirements Report FY 1990</i> , pp. VIII, 2-3. |           |           |

the United States Army Recruiting Command, concludes that the Nunn-McCurdy bill would be an unprecedented boon for recruitment.<sup>4</sup> To this date, Toomepuu's analyses have never been publicly rebutted by anyone, including Doug Bandow, and indeed efforts to repress the study were partially successful: the study was not publicly available until reporters acquired copies through the Freedom of Information Act — too late to have an impact on the Nunn-McCurdy bill in Congress.

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**The practical argument for national service is that it can be a means of providing services that the government cannot afford and in which the private sector finds no profit.**

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Obviously, as Bandow rightly points out, we now face a new environment for military manpower. As we enter the post-cold war era, the immediate issue is one of “downsizing,” rather than recruitment. But here again AVF has created problems. Reductions would be demoralizing for the military under any scenario, but a career-heavy force makes them immeasurably worse. The AVF is smaller today, compared to what it would have been with a draft, entirely owing to the paucity of lower-ranking enlisted members and junior officers. In effect, the AVF emptied the military of privates and lieutenants — and this is now making necessary draconian reductions of the career force. Of the army's proposed 200,000-man reduction, 80,000 will be through “involuntary retirement.”<sup>5</sup> Of course, there was nothing inevitable about having an AVF top-heavy with career soldiers. But this was the path favored by OSD with its resistance to the concept of the citizen-soldier.

Finally, let it be said, Bandow is quite right to note the current success of AVF recruitment. But he fails to mention that the OSD fought the two major recruitment initiatives of the 1980s — the army's two-year enlistment and GI Bill educational benefits.

### **National Service and Civilian Needs**

The practical argument for national service is that it can be a means of providing services that the government cannot afford and in which the private sector finds no profit. For example, the most pressing social problem in the United States may be that citizens over the age of eighty-five constitute the fastest growing segment of the population. Already 1.4 million people live in nursing homes; as many as one-third of

<sup>4</sup> Juri Toomepuu, *Effects of a National Service Program on Army Recruiting* (Fort Sheridan, Ill.: U.S. Army Recruiting Command, February 1989).

<sup>5</sup> *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1990.

these people could live at home if someone helped them get outside the house and ran errands for them. In Germany, such services to the elderly are performed by young men in lieu of serving as draftees in the military, and the system operates successfully. Studies show that each youth server in the German system performs labor with a net worth of more than \$21,000 a year.<sup>6</sup>

Such youths in short-term service are an effective and humane way to meet the needs of an aging population. If a young person were attracted to such service under the provisions of the DLC proposal, would Bandow oppose it? Does he favor the present system of federal student aid, which requires no payback of service? Youth servers would also be less expensive than the market or conventional bureaucracy in meeting the needs of the elderly. Or can Bandow think of better and cheaper ways to meet such needs?

There is another consideration. With the cutback in military manpower, a major and honorable avenue for deprived youth to escape a dead-end existence is being cut off. A national service program would be a way to recapitulate the military's record in salvaging impoverished youths through new forms of civilian youth corps.

Proponents of national service must always answer a simple question. Is national service more likely to achieve its purpose, and at less cost, than some other means? If the answer is no, then I will categorically state that national service is not appropriate. If it is yes, will Doug Bandow support national service?

### **National Service and American Ideals**

Only a simplistic reading of American history could ignore recurring connections between citizen duties and rights — the militia system of the colonial and early republican era, the “common defense” and “general welfare” provisions of the Constitution, the mandatory public schools of the Northwest Ordinances, the twentieth-century drafts in both peace and war, the military training requirements of the land grant colleges, the CCC of the New Deal, the alternative service provisions for conscientious objectors, the GI Bill, the Peace Corps and VISTA, the Solomon Amendment requiring draft registration for federal student aid, and the more than twenty local and state youth corps in the contemporary period. The history of the United States shows that notions of civic obligation periodically expand and contract — and that the solutions of one period are as American as those of another.

<sup>6</sup> Juergen Kuhlmann, “National Service Policy and Programs: The Case of West Germany,” in Donald J. Eberly and Michael W. Sherraden, eds., *The Moral Equivalent of War?* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990).

For example, scholars consistently stress the crucial role of the militia in the War of Independence.<sup>7</sup> But because of his unalloyed opposition to the citizen soldier, Bandow seems not to appreciate this or the strong militia tradition that followed. From the origins of the American nation onward, the ideal of the citizen soldier has coexisted with the need for the professional soldier, although the proper balance of these two has been a perennial dilemma. George Washington favored a small regular army *and* a militia of male citizens. Today, Title 10 of the U.S. Code reiterates the tenet that every physically sound and mentally fit male between eighteen and forty-five years of age is part of the unorganized militia of the United States.

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Perhaps most telling, though, is Bandow's perception of the DLC proposal as a stalking horse for a full-scale mandatory program. This is a serious point. But the transition from the comprehensive but nonmandatory system of the Nunn-McCurdy bill to a compulsory program would be a momentous step — one that would require widespread support. Such support would exist only if the comprehensive program were widely viewed as a great success. It seems perverse to argue against a voluntary national service program on the grounds that it might prove too successful.

Political theorists as well as ordinary citizens are showing a growing appreciation of citizens' obligations and the importance of shared values. For example, four out of five Americans favor a volunteer youth corps at the federal level. And support even for mandatory service is high, with 55 percent favoring such a program for young men and 44 percent for young women.<sup>8</sup> This new interest in the duties of citizens results from the inadequacies of Marxism, with its materialistic analysis and collectivist prescriptions, and the inadequacies of libertarianism, which offers a similar materialist analysis but with an insistent stress on the individual.

We may be on the verge of a break-out from those "left versus right" mind-sets. Advocacy of national service is the political center reasserting itself. In this sense, national service is quintessentially American.

<sup>7</sup> For example, John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).

<sup>8</sup> Gallup Poll, January 24, 1988.

## REJOINDER: A BAD DEAL, A FLAWED IDEAL

by Doug Bandow

Charles Moskos deserves credit for persistence and inventiveness. His response provides one of the most well-thought-out national service proposals yet advanced. But he still fails to justify embarking on a multi-billion dollar social engineering scheme involving millions of people. The All-Volunteer Force does not need fixing; we do not need a civilian Citizen Corps; and above all we do not need to flirt with the statist concept of national service.

### National Service and AVF

Proponents of a Citizen Corps recognize that the military is the only traditional large-scale national service program, and that it is, therefore, their best selling point. For that reason, they often try to resuscitate four charges against the volunteer, largely professional military: that it is unrepresentative, of poor quality, costly, and that it has problems hiring and firing people.

*Not sufficiently representative.* Moskos worries about “unrepresentativeness that affects the fighting capabilities of the armed forces.” I, too, would be concerned were the military unable to perform its mission because of “unrepresentativeness.” But Moskos offers no evidence that this is so. He merely belittles the Rand Corporation report that found higher-income young people joining the military even during its worst recruiting years. Yet Sue Berryman, director of the Institute on Education and the Economy, has reached a similar conclusion: “The data show *incontestably* that enlistees between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two in 1979 do *not* come from the more marginal groups on *any* of four dimensions: family socioeconomic status, measured verbal and quantitative abilities, educational achievement, and work orientation.”<sup>1</sup> [Italics in the original]

Moskos’s data show that in 1977 one-third of all army entrants were black, and close to half of the white males were high-school drop-outs. Although the army traditionally has had the toughest recruiting job of any service, as my original article pointed out, 22 percent of new recruits in 1989 were black, while constituting 14 percent of the corresponding youth population — hardly a dramatic overrepresentation. And a look at Table 1 in that article shows that for the years 1985-89, high school graduates have constituted over 90 percent of the army’s new recruits. In short, Moskos appears to have picked one peculiarly disastrous recruiting period for the purposes of argument.

<sup>1</sup> Sue Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 4.

*Not smart enough.* To make his charge of poor quality stick, therefore, Moskos turns from recruiting statistics to statistics on the army's *overall* enlisted force, saying that "the percentage of the army's enlisted personnel in the top two mental categories was lower than the percentage of the total population in those categories." This is true. (See Table 4.) The difference in those categories is about 28 percent for the enlisted force versus 35 percent for the population. But notice the enlisted force has only 0.1 percent in the lowest category (versus 10 percent for the general population) and about 12 percent in the next lowest category (versus 21 percent for the general population). These discrepancies far outweigh those at the top end of the scale, making the total enlisted force above average, just somewhat more bunched toward the middle.

In any case, Moskos's plan would not improve the career force, whose quality he so worries about, because it is designed to bring in two-year "citizen soldiers," who are not expected to make the military a career. In fact, if his program drew smart kids away from longer terms and then reenlistment, it could degrade the quality of the NCO force.

And longer terms, all things being equal, are superior to shorter terms. Of course, as Moskos insists, smart soldiers perform better than dumb ones. And under today's circumstances smarter kids tend to join for shorter terms — hence the results Moskos cites: of shorter-term soldiers seeming to out-perform longer-term ones. But this is not a reason to flood the army with short-termers, as though serving a short term by itself makes one a better soldier. It doesn't. Quite the contrary. Not everyone wants to serve for more than two years, so the military offers two-year enlistments. But the military is strongest of all when it can induce smarter recruits to join for longer terms, which it can do better with a professional army.

*Costs.* First, Moskos is correct to consider the effect of national service on the reserve as well as active forces. Even so, the Department of Defense believes total training costs would rise with the national service plan.

The exact impact of national service on overall training costs depends on several factors: the average length of time short- and long-term enlistees serve — both in the active forces and in the Selected Reserve once they leave active duty; the availability of their particular Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the area where they settle; and the average length of time served by nonprior service (NPS) recruits who join the Selected Reserve directly.

As to length of service: True, two-year enlistees serve on active and Selected Reserve duty combined about three months longer, on average, than do three- and four-year recruits. But the short-termers' advantage disappears if the NPS reservists they displace would have served longer. Also, as David Henderson of the Naval Postgraduate School points

TABLE 4  
AFQT CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION\*  
(Percentages)

| AFQT Category and Score Range | Total Youth Population | FY 1988 Army Accessions | FY 1989 Army Accessions <sup>a</sup> | Army Enlisted Population <sup>b</sup> |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| I, 93-99                      | 7.0                    | 4.5                     | 4.2                                  | 3.6                                   |
| II, 65-92                     | 28.0                   | 34.6                    | 33.3                                 | 24.6                                  |
| (I & II, 65-99)               | (35.0)                 | (39.1)                  | (37.5)                               | (28.2)                                |
| III A, 50-64                  | 15.0                   | 27.4                    | 27.7                                 | 18.5                                  |
| (I-III A, 50-99)              | (50.0)                 | (66.5)                  | (65.2)                               | (46.7)                                |
| III B, 31-49                  | 19.0                   | 29.4                    | 24.3                                 | 25.3                                  |
| (ALL III, 31-64)              | (34.0)                 | (56.8)                  | (52.0)                               | (43.8)                                |
| IV A, 21-30                   | 10.0                   | 4.1                     | 10.5                                 | 8.1                                   |
| IV B, 16-20                   | 5.0                    | 0.0                     | 0.1                                  | 2.3                                   |
| IV C, 10-15                   | 6.0                    | 0.0                     | 0.0                                  | 1.4                                   |
| (ALL IV, 10-30)               | (21.0)                 | (4.1)                   | (10.4)                               | (11.8)                                |
| V, 1- 9                       | 10.0                   | 0.0                     | 0.0                                  | 0.1                                   |
| Unknown                       | 0.0                    | 0.0                     | 0.0                                  | 16.1                                  |
| Total                         | 100.0                  | 100.0                   | 100.0                                | 100.0                                 |
| Mean                          | 50.0                   | 59.2                    | 57.6                                 | 54.4                                  |

<sup>a</sup> These figures represent army accessions as of April 10, 1989.

<sup>b</sup> These figures are based on 549,106 records showing army enlisted population as of the end of December 1988.

\* For youth population, information derived from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserves Affairs, and Logistics), *Profile of American Youth*, March 1982. For army accessions, information derived from the United States Army Recruiting Command (USARC), Minimaster File. For army enlisted population, information derived from the Defense Manpower Data Center. All information prepared by Juri Toomepuu, USAREC, May 5, 1989.

out, a reserve year is not equivalent in value to a year in active duty. Indeed, because of MOS mismatches, many potential reservists must be retrained, while others are never assigned to units at all. Finally, although the military intends to shift more toward a reserve component in the post-cold war world, that component will still shrink in absolute terms, and it will be receiving a recruiting surge from soldiers cut from active duty. In sum, whatever needs the reserve may have are better met by enhancing the reserve obligation of new long-term recruits than by creating a national service program.

Second, however one calculates the cost, "citizen soldiers" would not come cheap. Although Moskos argues that national service would save money by paying two-year enlistees less than professional soldiers, Walter Oi of the University of Rochester estimates that the tax-free voucher plus pay would provide national service participants with

benefits nearly two-thirds *higher* than for regular soldiers. Military costs would rise, not fall, and potential long-term enlistees would be attracted to the more lucrative short-term option.

But even if one sets aside these expensive new lures needed to bring in recruits — even if one looks at outright conscription — the potential savings from tinkering with the pay of new recruits is always going to be small, simply because their benefits are a small fraction of the military's budget. As of 1987, total first-term benefits accounted for about \$6 billion.

Moskos responds to this by saying that, in fact, the costs of going from conscription to AVF have been enormous, whether on the basis of per-active-duty-soldier or overall. Unfortunately, the numbers he uses to demonstrate this are aggregates and thus misleading. As one can see from Moskos's own table (Table 3), civilian pay increased more than twice as fast as active-duty pay between 1964 and 1990 (38 percent versus 17 percent), yet civilians were never drafted. Moreover, the bulk of the increase in active-duty pay went to soldiers other than those in their first two years, that is, to soldiers other than those who would have been replaced by draftees.

Thus, even if the Citizen Corps were conscripted, the relatively small savings from cutting these soldiers' pay with a draft would have to be balanced against the cost of higher turnover and increased reenlistment benefits, since conscripts are far less likely to reenlist. Even the nonpartisan General Accounting Office has concluded that a draft could cost more if the military sought to maintain an equally experienced — and thus effective — force.<sup>2</sup> And this does not consider the "hidden tax" taken from conscripts in the form of forced labor.

*Hiring and firing.* In arguing that the Nunn-McCurdy national service plan would be a boon to military recruiting, Moskos relies heavily on the Toomepuu study, which shows that under a national service plan, half of the eligible men would opt for the military. But as David Henderson points out, there is an inherent uncertainty in the accuracy of polls purporting to tell us what people will do rather than what they are doing. (There is also some dispute as to whether the poll that underlies Toomepuu's study reflects current national service initiatives.)<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, the Toomepuu study itself sees some problems with the national service plans. For example, it warns that the DLC's home purchase voucher could reduce long-term enlistments, which are preferred by the Department of Defense, though not by Moskos. (Downgrading the force will be painful, but national service would do nothing to save cur-

<sup>2</sup> *Military Draft: Potential Impacts and Other Issues* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March 1988), (GAO-NSIAD-88-102), pp. 33-34.

<sup>3</sup> These and other potential problems with Toomepuu's analysis are discussed in Charles McCloskey, "Dissenting . . . Views on the Draft Paper 'Effects of a National Service Program on Force Recruiting'" (mimeo), March 24, 1989. The critics, in turn, have been criticized for their analysis.

rent soldiers' jobs. And, in the future, the military will still have reason to rely on longer rather than shorter enlistments, even if fewer soldiers are able to make the service a career.)

The Toopemuu study also found that bright youths would be less likely to serve in any capacity and more likely to choose civilian service if they did join; they would also probably be less likely to choose the army, since that has usually been the least popular service.<sup>4</sup>

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**There is a simpler method to increase the number of potential enlistees. The government could make educational assistance conditional on military service. Charles Moskos ignores this obvious policy because he actively seeks a large-scale national service program with civilian and military components.**

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But surely, Moskos responds, it is foolishness to deny that if educational aid programs were tightly tied to national service, the military would end up with more recruits, whether short-term or long-term. Maybe so, although Moskos recognizes the post-cold war problem is hardly insufficient recruits. In any case, there is a simpler method to increase greatly the number of potential enlistees. The government could make educational assistance conditional on military service. Charles Moskos ignores this obvious policy because he actively seeks a large-scale national service program with civilian and military components, something America does not need.

### **Civilian Needs, American Ideals**

What would millions of untrained young people do? The DLC has proposed having the kids handle police paperwork and build playgrounds, but we hardly need a huge new federal program for these purposes. Some have suggested weightier tasks — caring for Alzheimer's patients is one — and Moskos asks whether there is a cheaper way to accomplish such tasks. There is. We should encourage part-time volunteerism, which has expanded greatly since the mid-1980s, especially among young people, and concentrate our limited resources on the most pressing social needs, rather than create an omnibus program intended to do everything. National service is not cheap, and its crude attempt to shift social costs onto the young people most dependent on federal educational aid (by pushing

<sup>4</sup> Juri Toopemuu, *Effects of A National Service Program on Army Recruiting* (Fort Sheridan, Ill.: United States Army Recruiting Command, 1989), p. 20.

them to provide low-cost labor for everyone else) is not necessarily in the best interest of the rest of us: we would probably be better off if a premedical student goes on and gets his M.D. than if he spends a year writing up traffic reports.<sup>5</sup>

As for helping impoverished youths, another benefit suggested by Moskos, the Citizen Corps would never equal the Marine Corps. Pushing paper in a local precinct would be just another job, one that could not replicate the effects of an excursion to the Marines' Parris Island, where drill instructors mold recruits into soldiers and comrades.

Finally, Moskos makes a ringing plea for the ideal of the citizen-soldier. Volunteerism need not conflict with long-term citizen involvement in the military, however. Early last century, as the states dropped their militia requirements, the volunteer, or organized/uniformed militia, made up of a cross-section of the community, largely supplanted the mandatory force. Volunteer units then performed competently during the Mexican War and at the start of the Civil War.

Of course, our nation would benefit from a renewed commitment to the community and to national defense. But there is nothing materialistic in suggesting that civic values must be developed from below rather than imposed from above. Indeed, Moskos's million-member Citizen Corps, managed by a Corporation of National Service, fifty state bureaucracies, and innumerable local national service councils, would be more likely to stifle than promote the values he cherishes.

Apparently, the potential threat to freedom in his program doesn't bother Moskos, either, for he says that a move to conscription would merely indicate the program's success. That a majority of voters might be attracted to conscripting eighteen-year-olds for civilian as well as military service; that they might, essentially, use slave labor to save themselves the trouble of paying for the services they want, would be evidence of success only in the most perverse sense.

This, it seems clear, is the disagreement that most fundamentally divides the two of us. I do not believe that national service would be an inexpensive way to meet human needs, nor that it would revive a community ethic grown cold. But whether or not such a program would work in these ways is really secondary. That individuals have responsibilities to one another does not of itself authorize the government to enforce those responsibilities; there are powers the state does not rightly possess. And this is a truth the United States has recognized from its founding documents on. To be sure, as Moskos amply demonstrates, America's recognition of limited government has been often violated, particularly in the last century. Nevertheless, in its ideals, America continues to proclaim itself "the land of the free," not the "land of the center," and it is only as free citizens that Americans can begin to think about making their society virtuous and just.

<sup>5</sup> For a more detailed criticism of the DLC/Moskos program, see Doug Bandow, "National Service: The Enduring Panacea," Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 130, March 22, 1990.

## A VOLUNTEER RED ARMY?

by Robert Arnett and Mary FitzGerald

In the summer of 1988, a public debate surfaced in the Soviet Union about whether the armed forces should switch from a largely conscript army to an all-volunteer professional army. Throughout 1989, the Soviet military leadership orchestrated a massive campaign against the proposed transition. Public statements made in early 1990, however, suggest that the military leadership might be altering its position on whether to introduce an all-volunteer system of manning the Soviet armed forces.

### Reform Proposals

Since 1988, proposals for the creation of an all-volunteer professional army have received a great deal of attention, both positive and negative. The proponents of such an army are a diverse group of individuals, including junior military officers, newspaper commentators, academics, and members of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Podziruk, for example, advocated the introduction of a professional army in his platform as a candidate in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989. Podziruk's opponent was army general Boris Snetkov, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Snetkov defended the current type of armed forces and opposed the volunteer army concept. Significantly, the reform-minded junior officer defeated Snetkov in the elections and was subsequently elected a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.<sup>1</sup>

The notion of an all-volunteer professional army has received support during meetings of both the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. It is noteworthy that a key individual in the Supreme Soviet made favorable comments about the concept. V. L. Lapygin, chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security, stated in June 1989 that a professional army would be stronger than the current one. He disagreed with "those who say that the idea of a professional army should be discarded point-blank simply because it is not to the taste of certain military leaders."<sup>2</sup> He also stated that the cost of such should be subjected to extensive analysis and discussion. It should be noted, however, that in October 1989, Lapygin's position seemed to change. When asked whether he was a proponent of a professional army, he replied:

<sup>1</sup> *The Washington Post*, March 24, 1989.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with V.L. Lapygin, *Izvestia*, June 27, 1989.

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This report, originally titled, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an All-Volunteer Army?" has been reprinted with permission from *Report on the USSR*, RL 145/90, March 30, 1990, pp. 3-5.

I am for professionalism, without which we cannot get by in certain branches of arms: the nuclear submarine fleet, strategic aviation, strategic missile forces. This principle is not appropriate for the entire army.<sup>3</sup>

Lapygin went on to say that a professional army would seriously reduce the nation's mobilization capacity and would be too expensive.

Despite Lapygin's apparent change of mind, support for the professional army concept continued throughout 1989. In August, for example, a lieutenant colonel noted that, "despite the fact that we are still unprepared for the transition to a professional army, it is high time to elaborate its concepts, since we shall arrive at it sooner or later."<sup>4</sup> In November 1989, a reserve officer, V. Yashchenko, charged that serious damage was being done to the nation by the military leadership's opposition to the proposal. He argued that a volunteer professional army was advantageous because (1) it would aid in the disarmament process and would dispel suspicions about the Soviet Union; (2) it would destroy the negative vestiges (mismanagement, bullying, etc.) of the current army system; and (3) it would strengthen the Soviet military defense capability. On the latter point, Yashchenko stated:

Modern war is a technological and scientific war and not simply a question of "cannon fodder." The armed conflicts of recent years have shown that today we need not numerous ground forces but highly skilled specialists able to handle modern technology and military hardware. Such specialists can only be highly educated servicemen — draft soldiers, yesterday's schoolboys, are not up to the task.<sup>5</sup>

### Military Opposition

In April 1989, USSR minister of defense Dmitrii Yazov published a lengthy article in *Krasnaya zvezda* that defended the current mixed professional/conscript army and detailed the errors of the reform proposals.<sup>6</sup>

General Yazov argued that the current type of army is superior politically, economically, and militarily to the types proposed by the advocates of reform. Politically, he maintained, the current army "is the most democratic system and accords with the principles of social justice." From the economic perspective, it "ensures the most economical, rational utilization of society's resources allocated for defense needs." From the military viewpoint, this type of army "is not inferior to a professional army, and in terms of a number of parameters is actually superior to it."

<sup>3</sup>Interview with V.L. Lapygin, *Sovetsky voin*, No. 19, 1989.

<sup>4</sup>"Letters to the Editor: On Aleksey Arbatov's Article 'How Much Defense is Sufficient?'" *International Affairs*, No. 8, 1989.

<sup>5</sup>*Komsomol'skaya pravda*, November 18, 1989.

<sup>6</sup>*Krasnaya zvezda*, April 13, 1989.

In addition, Yazov stressed that the current army system, through the test of time and trials of the Civil War and World War II, had proved its incontestable advantages over both the militia and professional types of armies.

Yazov then severely criticized the notion of a volunteer army. He argued that such an army would lose touch with the people, become a caste with its own specific interests, be very expensive, and be “incapable of waging protracted military operations, especially in defense of territory spread over a considerable area.”<sup>7</sup>

Throughout 1989, Yazov’s strong antireform stand apparently enjoyed the unanimous support of senior military officers. They publicly joined him in extolling the virtues of the current system and criticizing the volunteer army proposal.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, former chief of the General Staff and currently a military adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, stated that a professional army was not a viable option. He argued that the threat to the Soviet Union could only be countered by the current military system, because a professional army would not provide the trained reserve force that was required. Akhromeev contended further that a professional army would be too expensive.<sup>8</sup>

### A Question of Timing?

Throughout 1989, however, Soviet military leaders displayed a degree of ambivalence regarding a possible switch to an all-volunteer system in the future. On the one hand, such arguments as “the volunteer principle is a violation of social justice,”<sup>9</sup> “history testifies to the unreliability of [hired soldiers],”<sup>10</sup> “such an army is unacceptable to our society,”<sup>11</sup> and “a hired professional army contradicts the main principles of military development of the Socialist state”<sup>12</sup> all suggested that they believed that such an army would never be appropriate for the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, some Soviet military leaders qualified their criticism of the concept with such statements as “it is unrealistic to talk about it now,”<sup>13</sup> “at the moment we simply cannot afford a professional army,”<sup>14</sup> and “switching now . . . is not possible.”<sup>15</sup> Military spokesmen offered two reasons why a change could not be made immediately — the

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Marshal Akhromeev, *Central Television*, October 9, 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Marshal Akhromeev, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 14, 1989.

<sup>10</sup> *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 7, 1989.

<sup>11</sup> *Central Television*, May 7, 1989.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with army general Moiseev, *TASS*, May 3, 1989.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Marshal Akhromeev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, October 6, 1989.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Colonel General Gromov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 15, 1989.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with army general Moiseev, *Sovetsky patriot*, No. 1, 1990.

inability of the Soviet economy to fund such an army, and the existence of a continuing threat to the Soviet Union. Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Moiseev stated that “switching now to the principle of army manpower acquisition on a hired basis is not possible.” According to Moiseev, the main reason was that the danger of war still existed and that “under these conditions, we need a ready body of military reservists.” He also cited prohibitive costs as another factor.<sup>16</sup>

Soviet military leaders thus admitted that future changes in the structure and manning of the armed forces were possible. Marshal Akhromeev, for example, seemed to suggest in October 1989, that such a change would be possible at some time in the future if the circumstances were right.<sup>17</sup> He stated that “if this is resolved [apparently referring to bilateral conventional arms reductions], and we radically cut the armed forces, then the principle of remanning may change.” In addition, Admiral Chernavin indicated that he saw virtue at least in having a larger percentage of professionals in the Soviet Navy.<sup>18</sup>

### The Changing Case for Change in 1990

On February 6, 1990, an article in the USSR Ministry of Defense newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* provided a definite indication that the possibility of moving to an all-volunteer army was under consideration. The author, Colonel N. Karasev, examined the conclusions of a document prepared by a joint group of military and civilian experts. Karasev stated:

No one advocated an immediate and complete switch to a professional army. Instead it was said that there should be a careful study of this problem and the implementation of the idea in stages in light of the distinctive features of the branches of the armed forces, while retaining on the whole a hybrid means of manpower acquisition for the Army and Navy — through the draft and volunteers.<sup>19</sup>

Even more significant are statements made by Yazov and Moiseev in February 1990, that seem to suggest a change in their position on this issue. Both argued that a transition to an all-volunteer professional army was not possible at this time, citing primarily their calculations of the high cost of such an army. Yet, both made additional important points. Yazov was asked whether the very idea of manning the army on a volunteer basis was unacceptable. “No,” he responded, “it would hardly be correct to reject the idea. For our army used to be created precisely along volunteer lines. Today, on its birthday, it is appropriate to remember this.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Marshal Akhromeev, *Central Television*, October 9, 1989.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Admiral Chernavin, *Pravda*, October 19, 1989.

<sup>19</sup> *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 6, 1990.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with army general Yazov, *Pravda*, February 23, 1990.

Moiseev's comments are remarkable because he noted the many advantages of an all-volunteer professional army. He stated:

Cadre officers and generals would only stand to gain. . . . The solution of socioconsumer and other problems would improve. It would become simpler to work with subordinates . . . . We would no longer collect men but select them. And of course not those we have but the very best.<sup>21</sup>

Moiseev went on to say that "we are studying this problem [the expediency of a professional army] attentively, and as soon as the international, economic, material, and spiritual prerequisites are ripe for such a transition, we shall be ready for it."<sup>22</sup>

These new comments by Yazov and Moiseev seem to signal a shift in the top leadership's view of the future viability of an all-volunteer professional army.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with army general Moiseev, *Izvestia*, February 23, 1990.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

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# Review Essay

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## AN INFANTRYMAN'S HALF-CENTURY OBSESSION

by Robert A. Riesman

### **Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War.**

By Paul Fussell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 330 pp. \$19.95.

Paul Fussell, a decorated and wounded infantry platoon leader in World War II, and now holder of the Donald T. Regan Chair of English Literature at the University of Pennsylvania, makes his goal clear right in the preface to *Wartime*: "For the past fifty years, the Allied war has been sanitized and romanticized almost beyond recognition by the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant and the bloodthirsty. I have tried to balance the scales." At another point in the book, he declares: "There has been so much talk about 'The Good War,' the Justified War, the Necessary War, and the like, that the young and the innocent could get the impression that it was really not such a bad thing after all. It's thus necessary to observe that it was a war and nothing else, and thus stupid and sadistic."

This spirit animates Fussell to tell in harrowing detail about the "stupidity and barbarism and ignobility and poltroonery and filth" of World War II. In his account, everything about the Allied soldiers was inferior to that of the Germans, including their weapons, equipment, tanks, and fighting qualities. The Allied high command wasted lives in blunder after blunder, American and British officers were either fools or knaves, and the simple soldier was "buggered about" in pointless exercises and inspections. How, then, did the Allies win? "It was only wealth that tipped the scales."

As for the home front, he says, politicians and the Pentagon concocted myths of precision bombing and minimal American casualties, conspired with dishonest advertising agencies, and co-opted eminent writers and poets all to induce the parents of fighting men to acquiesce in the maiming or slaughter of their sons. After the war, the legend of the "Good War," prettified beyond recognition, was perpetuated by works like the *Time-Life* series on World War II, a particular target of Fussell's wrath.

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Unfortunately, *Wartime* could have been a classic like the author's incomparable World War I study, *The Great War and Modern Memory*.<sup>1</sup> There Fussell successfully applied his erudition and insight to describing how the Great War, which relied on inherited myth, generated new myth that became part of the fiber of our lives. His 1975 book illuminated for my generation, as he wrote in the book's preface, "the way the dynamics and iconography of the Great War have proved crucial political, rhetorical, and artistic determinants on subsequent life." For that reason, it also gave us understanding of the myths we carried into World War II.

Had Fussell confined himself to interpretation and personal experiences, abstaining as he did in his earlier book from military history, he could have similarly illuminated World War II and its mythic consequences for my generation and for succeeding ones. The author has assembled an extraordinary range of perceptions from a host of Allied fighting men, then focused these with a literary and scholarly brilliance informed by the personal experience of a combat infantryman. From the threads of memoirs, fiction, poetry, films, popular songs, and advertisements of the era, he weaves a tapestry that gives a personal meaning to the conflict, both for the participant and for today's audience. The final chapters of the book, appraising British and American wartime writings and idioms, are required reading in the cultural and literary history of the period. I know of no one better qualified for this task, and, besides, Fussell appears incapable of writing a dull sentence.

But in his eagerness to go beyond personal knowledge and experience, and to establish the incompetence of Allied leaders and the diligence of their public relations officers in covering up blunders, Fussell stumbles. Moreover, he apparently cannot accept his angry view as anything but the objective truth, for he characterizes those who challenge him as "bellicose noncombatants."<sup>2</sup> That is the vocabulary of temper tantrum, but it does suggest that this reviewer should submit his credentials.

In *Wartime*, Fussell notes that "In North Africa alone, the 1st Infantry Division spent more time in mortal contact with the enemy than all the time it spent — forming up, marching, drawing equipment, lining up at the mess hall, training, bitching — in all of the First World War." Well, I joined the 1st Division upon graduation from college in 1940, and served in it throughout the North African campaign in 1942-43, and on into Sicily in July 1943. There I received a wound that removed me from combat and landed me in the intelligence section of First Army headquarters, first in England, then in Normandy, Belgium, and Germany. I was present at all four major incidents Fussell cites for his charges of blunder and cover-up by the Allied leadership in the European Theater.

<sup>1</sup> Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Foreign Policy Research Institute, *FPRI Inter-University Seminar Report*, December 8, 1989.

When these incidents took place, Fussell was still in the United States being trained. In a way, his version of these somber events reminds me of the story about two ladies leaving the cathedral. The mother of eight asked the mother of nine, "Now wasn't that a lovely sermon the monsignor preached on the joys of motherhood?" "It was that," sighed her friend, "and there are days when I wished I knew as little about the subject as he does."

### Kasserine

Throughout Fussell's writings about World War II, "Kasserine" serves as a code-word for the poor combat performance of the unmotivated and inept American soldier. In a 1981 essay in *The New Republic*, for example, he described Kasserine as a disaster that was "for the Army what Pearl Harbor was to the Navy."<sup>3</sup>

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**Fussell makes his case against the American performance as a trial lawyer or advocacy journalist would: often telling the truth, sometimes nothing but the truth, but rarely the whole truth.**

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What really happened was this. In February 1943, while fighting a rear-guard action in his westward retreat from Egypt, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel sent units of his veteran Afrika Korps and the 10th Panzer Division against the green American troops and their inexperienced commanders in Tunisia. The Americans were initially driven back in confusion through the Kasserine Pass, which they tried but failed to hold. The main German thrust was stopped by British armor and infantry, supported by American artillery. Meanwhile, the American infantry and tanks rallied, checked a diversionary attack by the Afrika Korps, and regained the pass, from which the Germans had withdrawn. Rommel, thwarted in his drive, recalled his troops to face the British Eighth Army advancing from Libya. In short, Kasserine, while initially a tactical defeat, was followed by an impressive American recovery.

But Fussell describes the Kasserine battle as a "panicky rout," without even mentioning the rapid American recovery. Indeed, his description of Kasserine as the army's Pearl Harbor seems to be based on journalistic accounts and ignores the impressive scholarship on this event. Kenneth Mackesy, a military historian, wrote in his highly-regarded account of the North African campaign: "Ever since Kasserine, the Press — on the American side of the Atlantic more than the British — had pur-

<sup>3</sup>Paul Fussell, "Sad Sack Springs Back," *The New Republic*, March 14, 1981, p. 27.

sued a witch-hunt of the American Army.” Mackesy tells how, at the end of that battle, my division, which had retreated to high ground, “suddenly broke cover from the hills and thrust fiercely into the plain, driving the German troops before them, and recapturing a quantity of their one-time equipment.” Mackesy states that the Kasserine battle, while hardly a victory, produced “a stable American Army with a future.”<sup>4</sup> Martin Blumenson, who wrote an entire book on Kasserine, agrees with this judgment.<sup>5</sup>

Fussell insists that “it was only their superiority in numbers, ordnance, and equipment that brought any victories to the Americans and the British as well.” Mackesy disagrees. At El Guettar, a month later, he notes that given “an opportunity to reverse their fortunes against the Germans in equal combat” the 1st Division stopped the 10th Panzer Division in its tracks.<sup>6</sup> At Djebel Tahent, shortly after, he writes, “here [the] 1st US Infantry Division, joined by the 34th, bled for five days in close combat with a German defense that retaliated, almost with incredulity, at American persistence. . . . And gradually the perseverance of the Americans found its reward in ground won by a display of guts and adaptability to varied conditions that confirmed them as veterans overnight.”<sup>7</sup>

In short, Fussell makes his case against the American performance as a trial lawyer or advocacy journalist would: often telling the truth, sometimes nothing but the truth, but rarely the whole truth.

## The Invasion of Sicily

Fussell’s next example of American blunders and cover-ups concerns an incident during the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, when Allied gunners shot down twenty-three of their own transport planes. The incident caused 229 casualties in the American 82nd Airborne Division: 82 dead, 131 wounded, and 16 missing-in-action.<sup>8</sup>

Again, some context is needed. When we hit the beach at Gela that first day of the invasion, July 10, elements of the Luftwaffe from bases in Sicily and the Italian mainland bombed and strafed the shore line, targeting both the troops ashore and the ships anchored a few hundred yards offshore, leaving some craft burning and some destroyed. The German planes returned at nightfall for another attack.

A drop of our paratroopers for reinforcement was scheduled for the following night. We had been warned that the transport planes would come in over our beach and that anti-aircraft fire was to be withheld by the troops ashore and by the navy. General Omar Bradley,

<sup>4</sup>Kenneth Mackesy, *Crucible of Power: The Fight for Tunisia 1942-1943* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 262, 174, 166.

<sup>5</sup>Martin Blumenson, *Kasserine Pass* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 311-315.

<sup>6</sup>Mackesy, *Crucible of Power*, p. 223.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>8</sup>Martin Blumenson, *Sicily: Whose Victory?* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 73.

commanding the invasion, gave an eyewitness account of what followed:

Again that evening shortly after darkness the Luftwaffe came in for its nightly raid. From our gloomy carabinieri headquarters, we watched the sputter of AA [anti-aircraft] fire arching into the sky. Hardly had the enemy jettisoned its bombs and those guns ceased their fire when the first flight of low-flying transports roared in over the Gulf [of Gela]. . . . Then suddenly somewhere in that vast darkness a lone gun fired into the sky. And while I looked on helplessly from Scoglitti [at the southeast end of the Gulf], the sky exploded in AA fire. Soon spent fragments of AA shells clattered on our tiled roof.”<sup>9</sup>

At my battalion’s command post, fragments whistling down around us, we cursed and wept to see our planes being riddled.

In his account, Fussell fails to mention either the Luftwaffe attacks or the fact that the transports flew over the fleet at night and thus were difficult for the navy to identify. He ascribes the tragedy to “simple fear” and insufficient aircraft recognition training for the “new and badly scared” troops. But Bradley quotes a British naval officer explaining to an indignant airborne staff that, up to the night of the attack, enemy air superiority in the Mediterranean “had made it difficult to impress upon all ‘light-fingered gentry’ that there were such things as friendly planes flying over our craft.”<sup>10</sup>

Fussell smells a cover-up. He asserts that the famous war correspondent Ernie Pyle “either chose not to mention [this incident] or was forbidden to. It is still insufficiently known.” Fussell’s suspicions are aggravated by the failure of his *bête-noire*, the *Time-Life* series, to mention it. But it is a cover-up only to someone ignorant of the literature. The disaster has often been dealt with, most notably in the vivid account by General James Gavin, one of whose parachute regiments was the target of the flak:

It must have been ten o’clock at night when all hell broke loose in the direction of the beaches. Anti-aircraft fire was exploding like fireworks on the Fourth of July, tracers were whipping through the sky. . . . suddenly at about 600 feet the silhouettes of American C-47s appeared against the sky — our own parachute transports! . . . [F]rom the damaged planes some troopers jumped or fell, and at daylight we found some of them dead in front of our positions. . . . [T]here had been German air attacks on our Navy, so when the parachute transports showed up, our ships fired at them. . . .<sup>11</sup>

## Slapton Sands

Fussell thinks he found another cover-up in the events surrounding a major landing exercise that took place on an English beach in April

<sup>9</sup> Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier’s Story* (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 133.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>11</sup> General James Gavin, *On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1946* (New York: Viking, 1978), p. 42.

1944. What he dubs the Great Slapton Sands Disaster, and describes as “one of the most melodramatic blunders of the war,” is supposed to have been “virtually a secret for forty years except among participants and observers.”

The failure to guard the exercise against an attack by German E-boats (the equivalent of American PT craft) was indeed a blunder. When German torpedo boats sank two of our large landing craft and damaged another, it cost the lives of 749 American soldiers and sailors. It also raised the dread possibility that the actual location of the Normandy beach, which these troops were to assault on D-Day, might be compromised.

But the “cover-up” of Slapton Sands lasted for three months, not forty years. As historian Charles MacDonald states, “orders went out imposing the strictest secrecy on all who knew or might learn of the tragedy, including doctors and nurses who treated the survivors. There was no point in letting the enemy know what he had accomplished, least of all in affording any clue that might link Slapton Sands to Utah Beach,”<sup>12</sup> a vital landing point for the Normandy invasion.

In July 1944, however, a month after D-Day, Eisenhower’s headquarters issued a press release about the Slapton Sands tragedy. It was picked up and reprinted in *Stars & Stripes*, the soldiers’ newspaper, among other places. The incident is recounted in the official histories of both the U.S. Army<sup>13</sup> and the U.S. Navy.<sup>14</sup>

With his uncertain grasp of historical sourcing, Fussell adds the macabre detail that “the 749 bodies were secretly bulldozed into a common grave on the Devon farm of Mr. Nolan Tope.” MacDonald traced a similar report to a rumor started by a local resident “that as a young woman she had witnessed the burial of ‘hundreds’ of Americans in a mass grave” (she subsequently changed the story to individual graves), and that the bodies were still there. The owner of the farm stated in a 1987 interview on BBC television that he had owned and lived on that land all his life, and no one was ever buried there. MacDonald concluded that the farmer’s account “tallies with U.S. Army records that show that . . . soon after the tragedy hundreds of the dead were interred temporarily in a World War I U.S. military cemetery” in England.<sup>15</sup> After the war, at the request of next of kin, they were either moved to another American cemetery in Europe or shipped to the United States.

<sup>12</sup> Charles B. MacDonald, “Slapton Sands: The ‘Cover-Up’ That Never Was,” *ARMY*, June 1988, pp. 66. Incidentally, Fussell quotes approvingly elsewhere in *Wartime* from MacDonald’s World War II memoir, *Company Commander*.

<sup>13</sup> Gordon A. Harrison, “Cross-Channel Attack,” in *The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1951), p. 270.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Invasions of France and Germany 1944-1945*, vol. XI of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1957), pp. 65-66.

<sup>15</sup> Macdonald, “Slapton Sands,” p. 67.

## Operation COBRA

What Fussell calls “the scandal of COBRA” gives him another opportunity to disregard historical fact in order to discredit American undertakings.

Launched late in July 1944, Operation COBRA was designed to enable the American forces, unexpectedly bottled up in Normandy since D-Day, to break out across France. An immense bombing operation was planned to destroy German defenses in preparation for the American attack. Tragically, whatever could go wrong did: communications problems on timing; drifting of the smoke marking the American bomb line; a fatal change in the flight plan that took the bombers across instead of parallel to front lines.<sup>16</sup> Over 130 American soldiers were killed and over 500 wounded by their own bombers.

Fussell writes that a dejected Eisenhower told Bradley that “he was determined never again to risk heavy bombing to assist ground attacks.” Bradley confirms this, quoting Eisenhower at the time, “I gave them the green light this time. But I promise you it’s the last.” However, Fussell stops short of Bradley’s wry addendum, “It was to be the last until we required another in the winter battles.”<sup>17</sup>

Worse, Fussell fails to mention that in the end COBRA turned out to be a stunning success. “For although COBRA might have looked like a failure on the evening of July 25, it struck a more deadly blow than any of us dared imagine,” wrote Bradley.<sup>18</sup> The bombing attack did everything to the Germans that it was intended to do. Indeed, so deep were German soldiers in shock from the massive bombardment, it was hard to find German prisoners who could respond to our interrogation. As a result of COBRA, the way was cleared for the encirclement and killing or capture of some seventy thousand German troops in the so-called Falaise Pocket and the subsequent American advance into Germany.

## Art as History

Bernard Lewis has remarked that “The temptation is often overwhelmingly strong to tell it, not as it really was, but as we would wish it to have been.”<sup>19</sup> The irony of *Wartime* is that Fussell would fully agree with this assessment — it is, after all, his reason for writing the book. Yet he too has succumbed to temptation.

He has produced a written version of that new genre, the television docudrama. Fred W. Friendly rightly calls docudrama an “oxymoronic term” and characterizes it as follows: “The names are real and the

<sup>16</sup> Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 346-348.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 349.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Bernard Lewis, *History — Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 72.

plot is drawn from real-life events, but some of the scenes and much of the dialogue comes out of the imagination of the docudramatist. The producers of these fictionalized nonfiction scenarios defend their work as being based more in truth than in fact. Whatever that means.”<sup>20</sup>

In the case of *Wartime*, it means the reader must continually remind himself that the author has drawn the account he presents as history from works that are utterly unreliable, or even fictional. For example, Fussell’s information on the bumbling inefficiency and low morale of the British Army draws heavily on the British novelist Evelyn Waugh, to the point that the index cites Waugh more frequently than any other name. Fussell thinks Waugh is a great military reporter, which he is not, but he does concede that Waugh was a wretched military officer. Actually, Waugh’s shortcomings as a military figure undermine Fussell’s search for fact.

Waugh — following his departure from the Royal Marines, after failing to control a platoon that refused to obey orders — was passed on to the commandos by an influential friend. Lord Lovat, the legendary commando leader who became Waugh’s commanding officer, has given us a first-hand view of Waugh’s credibility. Lovat’s memoir is generous to colleagues and subordinates; but “while I admired his literary genius,” he says, he found in Waugh “a malignant element — it was worse than spite— that I had not previously encountered in a grown man.” Finally, after Waugh’s protector had departed, Lovat sacked Waugh and the dismissal was upheld on appeal. When Waugh’s diaries were published in 1976, Lovat found Waugh’s account of matters with which he was familiar to be spiteful and untrue.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, in *Wartime*, Waugh’s novels and diaries are run together, so that the reader has a hard time sorting out memoir and fiction. To be sure, the subtitle of *Wartime* promises that it deals with “understanding and behavior in the Second World War.” And the fiction of war is essential to understanding how participants understood the conflict. But behavior is verifiable fact, and much in Fussell’s account is simply at variance with reliable memoirs and authoritative histories.

### **“Nothing Can Be Worth This!”**

In the end, we are left with the question of why Fussell — a scholar of high intelligence, a literary and cultural critic, but no military historian — ranged so far afield to write inauthentic military history. Was it really to protect “the young and the innocent”? Surely Fussell cannot think that, without his caveat, a generation brought up on films about the American experience in Vietnam and schooled by academics inspired by the 1960s would otherwise innocently rush off to war?

<sup>20</sup> “Was Trust Betrayed?” *The New York Times Book Review*, February 25, 1990, p. 42.

<sup>21</sup> Lord Lovat, *March Past* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1978), pp. 233-236.

Fussell's ostensible concern here for the "young and innocent" is merely an excuse to isolate World War II from any historical context. In *Wartime*, the conflict had no beginning, no cause; it had no end, no consequences. This is not just another revisionist reading of World War II; it is a denial of the need for victory and the cost of defeat. The consequences of the Allies not resisting and not finally defeating the Axis powers are ignored.

Some critics claim to be outraged at Fussell's assertion that the war had "no human meaning," implying that it was unjustified, or even unnecessary.<sup>22</sup> Before going that far, however, we should understand that the author is articulating an obsession he has been nursing for half a century. *Wartime* is Fussell's version of the *cri de coeur* that the protagonist of Jules Romains's novel, *Verdun*, utters from the trenches of the First World War: "Nothing can be worth this!"<sup>23</sup>

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**Fussell's private, bitter obsession with the war makes it clear that, by the end of *Wartime*, we are outside history.**

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Fussell, the editor of *Siegfried Sassoon's Long Journey*,<sup>24</sup> tells us that twenty years after the First World War, Sassoon — poet and author, a decorated and twice-wounded British infantry officer in the First World War, converted by fighting in the trenches into a war protestor and pacifist — was still having dreams about it, dreaming that "the war is still going on and I have got to return to the Front. I complain bitterly to myself because it hasn't stopped yet."<sup>25</sup> Fussell says that he, too, had such dreams, "and mine persisted until about 1960, when I was thirty-six, past re-call age."<sup>26</sup>

For Sassoon, the war continued even while awake. We have the report of a Cambridge University student who tells of an evening in 1954 when, over drinks with a group of undergraduates, Sassoon started talking about the Western Front in the present tense. "The worst thing is the mud. It's terrible out there. . . . It eats men. . . . It was cold and they are dying in the mud. . . . That's what the front is." In the student's view, "he was in the armchair and I was completely convinced that this sixty-seven-year-old man in front of me was telling me about the front as it was at that moment."<sup>27</sup> What has come to be known as post-traumatic stress disorder did not originate with the Vietnam War.

<sup>22</sup> Richard Bernstein, "War as Abomination, and a Debate on Evil," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1989.

<sup>23</sup> Jules Romains, *Verdun* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 146.

<sup>24</sup> Paul Fussell, ed., *Siegfried Sassoon's Long Journey* (New York: Giniger, published in association with Oxford University Press, 1983).

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Paul Fussell, "My War," *Harper's*, January 1982, p. 28.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Richard C. Wald, "Some Talk of Passchendaele," *The Reporter*, November 30, 1967, pp. 36-37.

Nor has the war yet ended for Fussell. Using the third person in a 1982 essay prefiguring *Wartime*, he accurately identified himself at age fifty-eight as “really a pissed-off infantryman, disguised as a literary and cultural commentator. He is embittered that the Air Corps had beds to sleep in, that Patton’s Third Army got all the credit, that non-combatants of the Medical Administrative and Quartermaster Corps wore the same battle-stars as he.” Later, “My war is virtually synonymous with my life. I entered the war when I was nineteen, and I have been in it ever since.”<sup>28</sup>

Fussell’s private, bitter obsession with the war makes it clear that, by the end of *Wartime*, we are outside history. The polemics are outrageous, to be sure, but they do leave the hope that, his personal demons exorcised by writing *Wartime*, Fussell may yet clear away the docudrama and inauthentic history to produce the World War II counterpart to his World War I classic, *The Great War and Modern Memory*.

<sup>28</sup> Fussell, “My War,” p. 40.

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# Documentation

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## HOW I SELL CAPITALISM TO THE LEFT

An Interview with Hernando de Soto

*Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian businessman and economist, is president of the Instituto Libertad y Democracia, a non-profit, non-partisan research and advocacy institute in Lima, Peru.*

*De Soto, who is forty-eight years old, received a master's degree in international law and economics from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva in 1966. He subsequently served as economic affairs officer of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), president of the executive committee of the Council of Copper Exporting Countries in Paris, and managing director of the Universal Engineering Corporation in Geneva. Returning to Peru in 1979 to manage a mining business (of which he is now chairman), he was struck by his country's growing social and economic problems. That same year he organized a symposium in Peru on "Democracy and the Market Economy" to discuss solutions to these problems. The symposium was attended by Peruvian and foreign intellectuals, including Friedrich von Hayek and Jean-François Revel — as well as some twenty street vendors. Who better understands the workings of the market than street vendors, he asked himself.*

*This interest in the informal economy marked the beginning of his second career in institutional reform. In an effort to come to grips with the reasons for and the nature of the informal sector in Peru, de Soto founded the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Institute for Liberty and Democracy — ILD) in 1980. In 1987, de Soto published ILD's findings as *El otro sendero* (The Other Path). The book quickly became a best seller in Peru and throughout Latin America. The subsequent English translation made de Soto and the work of ILD widely hailed in the United States as well.<sup>1</sup>*

*De Soto is best known for his research into what he calls the "informal sector," which he defines as enterprises that use illegal means to pursue legal objectives. Most of these are very small businesses operated outside the law by the poor. ILD research indicates that the informal sector accounts for nearly two-thirds of the man-hours worked in Peru. De*

<sup>1</sup> Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World*, trans. June Abbot (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

*Soto attributes the existence of the informal sector largely to inadequate legal institutions, characterized by excessive red tape and favoritism, which force the poor outside the formal economy. De Soto notes that while the informal sector does allow the poor to survive, it also results in serious economic losses. He believes that by defending the objective interests of this informal entrepreneurial class — access to property rights, credit, and secure contracts — the informal sector can be mobilized to push for a democratic transition to a modern, market-oriented economy.*

*The following interview was conducted in English for ORBIS in January 1990 by Michael Radu, resident scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and contributing editor of ORBIS. — The Editors*

### **Democratic Rule Making**

*De Soto begins by discussing his program for the economic and political enfranchisement of the poor. He concentrates particularly on the idea that any economic solutions must reflect a consensus among Peruvians, rather than being imposed from the top down. To achieve consensus, a democratic process of rule making must be followed, in which the people have a voice in decisions.*

**De Soto:** Our principal project now is one we call “Democratic Decision Making in Government.” This draft law is intended to achieve an accountable, transparent Peruvian state in which decision making takes into account the needs of the majority in our country and not just those of a privileged elite.

We have found that by building consensus on proposed legislation, based on feedback from the people and on their real needs, we are able to depoliticize traditionally sensitive issues.

For example, if you try to solve the question of public versus private property at the level of political leaders, you reach total paralysis — which is the predicament this country has been in for the last ten years. The reason President [Alan] García was not able to nationalize the banks was not because he did not have popular support; it was because he did not have enough of it. If somebody wants to privatize the banks, they, too, will have a lot of problems until people are convinced that this privatization is not just going to mean a transfer from a small public-sector elite to a small private-sector elite.

But we at ILD have taken politically sensitive issues like private property and deregulation and have made them law with the help of the Left in Peru. Which means — as I often repeat — that you must prove that what you’re doing serves the interests of the majority.

**ORBIS:** How do you prove it?

**De Soto:** We never propose a law that is designed in an ivory tower. We draft a preliminary law. Then we go out to find what extra-legal norms are in place — what the common law is — in order to incorporate these aspects into the proposed legislation.

Next, we hold hearings throughout Lima and Peru to discuss the draft law with the people and leaders of the informal sector. This process is continued until the law in fact reflects the public will. The other evening we held a three-hour public hearing with leaders from all sectors on “Democratic Decision Making in Government.” We thought our proposed law was perfect — we’ve been working on it for three years — yet we came out of that meeting with sixty major modifications.

Finally, we publish the revised draft of the law in newspapers and ask for expressions of support, in the form of signatures or letters. The first law we did this on, we obtained 360,000 signatures. This evidence of support, plus the favorable editorials in the press, convinced our politicians of the level of popular support. The law passed without opposition.

Our proposed law on democratic decision making will require that all laws be submitted for public approval, using the same mechanisms that exist in most Western countries: comment and notice periods, public hearings, etc. These mechanisms force politicians to justify laws in the interest of the majority. And, contrary to what everyone may think, the majority, even a majority that is constituted by the poor, knows exactly where its interests lie.

**ORBIS:** Let me ask you two things. First, what you say sounds very much like plebiscitary democracy, which is something Peru has not had; it would take time to put down roots. Second, and most important, the next government will have very little time to do drastic things. Do you think the next government will be able to spend three years on hearings for every important law they want to pass?

**De Soto:** First, this is not plebiscitary democracy. When I talk about comment and notice periods, I’m not talking about direct democracy. I’m just talking about feedback. The important thing is that there are channels between the people and government.

Second, it’s not that Peruvians do not know about plebiscites. All the rules in the informal sector, which is more than 60 percent of our population, are made in a democratic fashion. Let me give you an example. Between 1968 and 1980, when Peru was ruled by military dictatorship, without any elections, the informal sector was electing its leaders democratically every two years. When there is no army and no police, the only way to reach agreement with your neighbor is through democracy.

What you have got to do is remove the existing mercantilists (or crony capitalists), who believe that truth comes from elites and not from the bottom up, and replace them with what is basically already there,

within the informal sector. Now, it's just a few white people at the top, many of whom are in Fredemo [Frente Democrático — Democratic Front: the political alliance formed when Mario Vargas Llosa's libertarian Movimiento Libertad (Freedom Movement) joined Peru's two main conservative parties Acción Popular and Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Action and the Popular Christian Party)], and some of whom are on the Left, and don't like consulting with people because basically they don't trust the masses.

Third, as concerns the time involved, the reason it took us three years to develop our law is that in its early days, ILD had five employees and no money. We had to go from one small town to another to consult with people. In contrast, the Peruvian government has 500,000 employees and state television and radio stations. By using these channels, feedback from the public could be obtained more rapidly, in a matter of days or weeks.

### **Privatization and Democracy**

**ORBIS:** Another common problem throughout Latin America is the question of state ownership of property. Not just the role of the state in managing (or mismanaging) the economy, but also in simply owning huge chunks of the economy. That, it seems, is not compatible with what you have in mind.

**De Soto:** Obviously. You've got to move toward some form of privatization, but this will not be easy. I think if you are going to do it, you must open up to foreign capital. There are fears: nationalism is a strong ideology in Latin America, probably the strongest ideology in the developing world. What is needed are institutions and regulations on privatization that both protect the foreign investors' interests and meet the legitimate fear of the Left that foreign investors might acquire political power.

There is an interesting analogy between the reason for the Soviets' inability to privatize and the reason why Fredemo might have trouble with its policies.

In the case of the Soviets, they obviously realize the system doesn't work. In Peru the traditional Right also realizes that the system doesn't work. They both say: How do we change? In both cases, they think they can develop solutions within the context of an elite. This elite is willing to accept some change, provided it does not lose political power. Of course, the Soviets have never thought of obtaining the solution to their problems from the bottom up because in this event the elite would lose power. That is why they cook up systems in laboratories that preserve their power but do not really call for any change.

Peru and its Right think they are going to solve problems exclusively by past measures: reducing inflation and reforming fiscal

and monetary policy. This has nothing to do with access to property, access to justice, access to credit, access to political decision making. This model will have some impact on the situation, like it did in Bolivia, but it will not produce growth. In Bolivia this model produced stability — but a stability of about \$750 per capita in GNP. Obviously, something else is needed.

Unless you include democracy in both these models as a guide to policy decisions — that is, unless you let the market work its way into decision making — there is very little chance of substantial change.

The privatization process must be an open one and one in which it is made clear how, by privatizing and encouraging competition, the lower 80 percent of the population will be let in on the benefits.

### **Providing Legal Title to Land**

*In the phenomenon of “invasions,” many poor Peruvians have built homes on state-owned land: in cities, on the outskirts of cities, and in the countryside. As a result, these people now live and work on property to which they have no legal right. As de Soto explains below, another key ILD project is the “Property Registry” — giving people legally recognized rights to the property they occupy in a way that builds on existing extra-legal norms in the informal sector settlements.*

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**The traffic laws for Lima are exactly the same as those for the city of Zurich. You may have noticed that they work very differently.**

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**ORBIS:** The state is going to formalize the informal sector?

**De Soto:** The informal sector should not be brought into the existing formal sector. A new formality must be created. We no longer wish to copy, as traditionally happens in Latin America, the latest French legislation. The traffic laws for Lima are exactly the same as those for the city of Zurich. You may have noticed that they work very differently.

What we do is find out what people need and want — and in fact what they practice through their extra-legal norms in the *pueblos jóvenes* (shantytowns). Their practices constitute the scaffolding for our draft laws. We then study modern institutional solutions adopted in developed countries to identify those that most closely reflect the extra-legal norms of the informals. For example, our property registry system uses a modern, computerized system, but in fact it is based on recognizing the registry system which already existed informally. This system was a common law registry, inscribed in simple notebooks, but was recognized as law.

So we are not changing the way people have decided to live. And the way the informal sector has decided to live is a market economy and a democratic system. For example, even within the state cooperatives set up during [General Juan] Velasco's rule, we found that land has been divided into private plots. The same applies to the land held by indigenous farmers' cooperatives since the time of the Conquest, which had been traditionally considered communal. There are communal aspects — they have their community leaders, public facilities, and public services, just like anyone else, but the system is one of private property.

Our objective now is to set up a system to title all these property holders and to have the titles registered. By building on the informals' registry system and simply computerizing it, we don't think that they will feel alienated. The new system is only faster and more reliable than the old. On the other hand, if Fredemo imposes economic solutions without building consensus, you risk alienation. It may be that Fredemo's program needs a Pinochet to put it over.

Our approach to a market economy is one which convinces even the Left because it is so close to what they promote. Don't forget that most of the informal "invasions" were promoted by the Left. If these invasions have now resulted in private property, then the Left must accept that, whether they like it or not.

### **Support from the Left**

*The Left in Peru covers a wide spectrum, including potent violent revolutionary movements such as the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amará.*

**ORBIS:** What is the connection between the subversion of Sendero and the situation of the informal sector? Is it an obstacle or an opportunity for Sendero penetration?

**De Soto:** It's both. First of all, informality is an alternative to Sendero because it provides an escape mechanism. It allows people to do things on their own when the formal system does not provide employment opportunities or opportunities for entrepreneurship. It also makes the positive contribution of a system of common law, enforced by the community, that is based on private property and is essentially market-oriented.

However, the negative side of informality is that it creates a disrespect for the law. This side provides an opportunity for Sendero penetration.

It is important, of course, to emphasize the positive aspects of informality. Rather than saying that it is a rebellion against society, we say it's a rebellion against the status quo, but one that seeks peace.

**ORBIS:** So far, has Sendero reacted to your program? I ask because everything you say seems to work against Sendero's goals.

**De Soto:** My book *El otro sendero* is dedicated to the Left. It starts by saying: we agree that society is unjust and that an alternative is needed. But through systems that do not involve violence. That's why the book is called "the other path" [in contrast to the violent path of Sendero].

**ORBIS:** But your premise is the opposite of the Left's. The Left thinks the system is wrong because it's capitalist. You think it's wrong because it's not truly capitalist.

**De Soto:** That's where things are beginning to change. All of our proposed laws on private property, deregulation, democratic rule making — all of which are directed towards creating what we call a social market economy — have been passed in Parliament with the support of the Left, the Center [an allusion to Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana — APRA, President García's party], and the Right.

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**When we produced a system based on market economics, directed at empowering and enfranchising the poor, and began to speak of it in terms of homes and land and red tape, we found that the majority of the Left is in fact non-ideological.**

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We have found that the Left supports our proposals when they are presented with concrete alternatives — not those couched in ideological terms, but alternatives born of popular desire. None of the laws I'm talking about — major laws which will change the country's economic infrastructure — have received one negative vote from the Left.

For years those who were unhappy with the system joined the Left because it provided the only intellectual framework to fight the status quo. But when we produced a system based on market economics, directed at empowering and enfranchising the poor, and began to speak of it in terms of homes and land and red tape, we found that the majority of the Left is in fact non-ideological.

**ORBIS:** But you are talking about private property, which does not fit with the Left at all, the intellectual Left, the Marxist-Leninist Left.

**De Soto:** "Private property" and "capitalism" have been used in this country to benefit a small minority, which ILD calls the "mercantilist minority."

**ORBIS:** You're saying that the system is not, and never was, capitalist.

**De Soto:** That's right. So we introduce the concept of "mercantilism" to show that it's not capitalism that failed. Capitalism never had a chance. But we don't fight over words. We fight for what people want. Most of the parliamentary Left believes in democracy, in giving the poor a voice. Therefore, when we proposed our land titling programs for private property and obtained massive support from the poor, everyone forgot ideology. Maybe the Shining Path hasn't, but generally everyone has acknowledged the need for private property.

### **Half of a Country**

**ORBIS:** My next question relates to the insurgency problem. The state doesn't have a presence in huge parts of the Peruvian territory. To what extent does that inhibit what you intend to do?

**De Soto:** We first want to prove that democracy and a market economy can work even in part of the country. If we had begun before the Shining Path and MRTA came along, we would have proven it all over the country. Now we will have to prove our case in only part of the country.

**ORBIS:** That means mostly Lima?

**De Soto:** No, that means Lima and the provincial capitals — probably more than half the population. Of course, it means that we cannot get into the countryside. But at least we will have shown that there is a peaceful alternative.

**ORBIS:** How would you see the system expanding throughout the rest of the country, where the state is not present?

**De Soto:** You're asking what to do about subversion. I am not a specialist on subversion, but I am sure that there are strategies on how to deal with subversion intelligently.

**ORBIS:** But there is no counter-insurgency strategy in the world that can function in a country where the majority of the population is alienated from the system, and where the state is not present in significant areas of the country.

**De Soto:** We are trying to fight alienation by bringing in property rights and democratic rule making.

Marx wrote extensively on the alienation of the proletariat, but most Peruvians are not dependent proletarians. Only 7.5 percent of

Peruvians are trade-unionized proletarians who are alienated in the sense that they depend on people who, according to the surplus theory of value, seize wealth from their labors.

So much for Marx's relevance to Peru. Most Peruvians work away from large firms. Their problem is that they don't own their property and have no access to credit, so they do not get the full benefit of their labor. Their alienation is one of being excluded from the opportunities available to the formal sector to get ahead and create wealth. Our programs for legal property rights and access to credit can resolve this alienation. Once property titles are available, transactions can occur and improvements in land and buildings can take place.

**ORBIS:** How?

**De Soto:** Through mortgages. Titled property can be used as collateral. Our calculations show that in the United States around 70 percent of all loans that go to people starting up new businesses are acquired by putting up collateral. If only 4 percent of urban Peruvians and only 10 percent of rural Peruvians hold property titles, that means that over 85 percent of Peruvians don't have access to loans. We hope in five years to title all Peru so that property can be transferred and people can access credit.

Once property rights are legally recognized, people feel secure. This produces an effect that we were able to measure quantitatively. We found that once a property title is formally registered, the value of that home doubles that same day. It's quite simple: if I want to sell this building to you, but I have no title, you're going to pay a lot less for it than if I do have a title.

We also found that after ten years, the value of titled property increased nine times, as compared to untitled property. Because people felt secure, they invested in their property to improve it.

With our property registry system, we are beginning now to title all Peruvians. With secure titles, they can get access to credit. With credit they can build their businesses. This is what we mean by a peaceful and deliberate revolution.

### **Can Bureaucracy Be Reduced?**

**ORBIS:** If this works, somebody will lose.

**De Soto:** The losers will be, in effect, the intermediating classes. In some cases these are the public bureaucracies, in others the private bureaucracies.

**ORBIS:** The state bureaucracies are a privileged group, representing half a million bureaucrats or more. Judging from the statements of Vargas Llosa, a large number will lose their jobs if Fredemo wins.

**De Soto:** The issue is not how many bureaucrats should be done away with, which is the way Fredemo has presented it, but rather what you have to do in each area to make it modern. In some cases, very few reductions would be required. The objective is not to arbitrarily cut people's heads off, but to make government efficient. There will be those qualified people in each bureaucracy who know they can at last do a good job and who will be fighting to keep their position.

But if you begin by stating that the bureaucracy will be cut by at least 500,000 persons, you will find that a disparate bunch of people with very different talents — who could have taken different positions vis-à-vis the policy measures — becomes one big anti-Right coalition. If you tell them they will all be kicked out, a new class will form around an objective interest. What is needed is to emphasize, just as when you're selling a product, the good side instead of the bad side.

### Consensus Politics

*One of de Soto's most striking ideas concerns the incompatibility of capitalism and democracy. He argues that capitalism cannot flourish in democracies as they commonly exist, that is, with a wide range of ideologically disparate parties. This would seem to imply that capitalism requires a system of two parties, both fundamentally capitalist, and serving merely as the ins and the outs (to guard against corruption), perhaps with one party inclined to caution (the conservatives) and the other inclined to take risks (the progressives).*

**ORBIS:** To what extent, if any, are you either interested in or likely to work in one capacity or another with Fredemo?

**De Soto:** We at ILD are dedicated to working for long-term change. We have found that there are reasonable people everywhere. Today everything looks like it's going for Fredemo. But the Peruvian pendulum moves. If we in Peru wish to create a lasting, modern, market-oriented economy, we cannot concentrate that desire on only one party.

Suppose in the United States you had two parties, and only one believed in private property and the market economy. And that one got elected for one presidential term and then the other got elected the next presidential term. You wouldn't have a market economy at all. Because you can't invest and go private for only four years, then be expropriated the next four years. That doesn't work. That paralyzes you.

That's why you cannot in this country simply concentrate the desire to create a modern society on Fredemo. If you do that, you're sunk. It will last only as long as that party is in power — in fact, only as long as it's in power and it's popular and it's not a lame-duck government.

In that sense, I think Fredemo, by polarizing everything, has done the country a disservice with its election campaign. It may change.

But we at the Institute will never work with just one political party because once this happens, our message would lose its universal appeal.

What we seek is to develop consensus on means of achieving a peaceful change in Peru. This means pursuing consensus along the entire political spectrum and especially among the majority of the population, the class constituted by the informal sector, which is, we believe, the force that will move society towards the institutions of a modern market democracy.

So, we would work on a contractual basis with Fredemo, like I'm working now with Mr. García, like I've just worked with President Jaime Paz Zamora in Bolivia, and I've agreed to work with President Alfredo Cristiani in El Salvador, and President Ranasinghe Premadasa in Sri Lanka.

However, I wonder if Fredemo would call us in, because my assumption is that the basic control of Fredemo is conservative, and doesn't actually like the universalization of political language. I may be wrong. I'd love to be pleasantly surprised. I've got no prejudices in that sense. As a matter of fact, I can tell you that all my friends, and nearly all my ex-girlfriends vote Fredemo. My mother is Fredemo, my old man is Fredemo. This house is Fredemo. (Laughter)

**ORBIS:** You are a minority of one.

**De Soto:** I tend to be more critical of the people politically close to me, for practical concerns among other reasons. I want to make sure that we're not confused with Fredemo. That's the big thing. We've been called the Instituto Libertad y Democracia since 1980, and these s.o.b.'s [Llosa's Movimiento Libertad] have come around in just the last three years. And suddenly I'm very conscious of the difference. When I go through customs, inspectors refuse to open my bags because they think I'm going to run the next government. They think that Libertad y Democracia is actually the same thing as Fredemo. So I tend to separate myself more from my misguided brothers than from my traditional enemies.

*On June 10, 1990, Vargas Llosa lost the Peruvian presidential election by a wide margin to Alberto Fujimori. A political novice who last year formed his own party, Fujimori was formerly an agricultural engineer and college president. His views on politics and economics are largely unknown as we go to press.*

— The Editors.

## THE ROAD BACK FROM SERFDOM

An Interview with Nikolai Petrakov

*On December 17, 1989, Nikolai Petrakov was summoned to a meeting with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Although he had spoken on occasions when Gorbachev was in the audience, he had not held private discussions with Gorbachev before the December summons. Understandably, therefore, Petrakov was surprised to be offered the post of Gorbachev's personal economic adviser. He assumed his new duties on January 2 of this year, and Western analysts believe that, over the last six months, he has become one of Gorbachev's closest advisors.*

*Petrakov's career had been a quiet one before last December's meeting. Starting in the 1960s, he worked at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, a center for liberal economic thinking, becoming deputy director in 1969. Intellectually, however, Petrakov's career was rather bold. As he told an interviewer: "I was professionally working on market structures even at the time when such work was being persecuted."<sup>1</sup> His 1974 book *Cybernetic Problems of Managing the Economy* was greeted with vehement criticisms.*

*Since the coming of the Gorbachev reforms, of course, the world has turned upside down for market-oriented economists in the USSR. "Over the last twelve to eighteen months," Petrakov told the same interviewer, "I have studied very intensively the way other countries have extricated themselves from economic crisis situations." With those lessons in mind, according to The New York Times, Petrakov is urging Gorbachev to use his presidential powers to establish free markets by decree rather than by persuading the Supreme Soviet to enact the necessary legislation.<sup>2</sup> Petrakov is also extremely critical of the economic program announced by the Soviet government of Nikolai Ryzhkov, and has ridiculed the proposal (since withdrawn) to hold a referendum on economic reform.*

*One of the striking aspects of the following interview is that Petrakov makes no references to Marxist economics. His reasoning is about supply and demand, not social classes.*

*This interview was conducted in Moscow by Bernard Guetta, correspondent for Le Monde, and was published in the March 24, 1990, edition of that paper.<sup>3</sup> It is reprinted here with permission.*

*— The Editors*

**Guetta:** Will the "radicalization" announced by Mr. Gorbachev become a reality?

<sup>1</sup> *Rabochaya Tribuna*, April 24, 1990; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, April 26, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, June 10, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> This translation is adapted from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, March 28, 1990.

**Petrakov:** I think so. I would like it to, because it is important to understand that this concerns the economic system itself — the transition to a market economy. The question is no longer what to do but how to do it.

For seventy years, we have destroyed the market and now we must move from the absence of a market to a market economy. In the past, there were many ideological barriers: the socialist system, as you know, was designed to be the opposite of the market. The barriers have now been removed. The president has said it is necessary to move forward, without fear or complexes. But I am an economist, not a politician. I see the need for the market, but at the same time, I see the problems. . . .

**Guetta:** Have decisions been made? Will they soon be announced?

**Petrakov:** There is a government program comprising a number of measures aimed at strengthening the financial system, extending autonomy, and reorganizing the banking system. We have been thinking about all that for a long time, but we are moving too slowly. Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that our current problems stem from the fact that we are between two systems, the bureaucratic system and the market. We must move from the first to the second. We have already started the journey but we are still in flight. We must land.

**Guetta:** And what will be the landing procedure?

**Petrakov:** If we are really to move toward the market, we must resort to very serious measures. In this connection, many [Soviet] economists are very impressed by the reforms introduced in Poland, by Mr. Mazowiecki's shock treatment. Consequently, they think that prices must be unrestricted, enterprises be given greater freedom, and that that will be enough to ensure that the market brings us happiness.

I think that is very naïve, because the first thing to do before unrestricting prices is to create the right conditions for competition, without which there can be no price freedom. One of the first measures to be taken, therefore, is to demonopolize our economy, which is the most highly monopolized in the world. In addition to technological monopolies, there are organizational monopolies — the ministries and very big enterprises, such as Intourist and Aeroflot. However, to split Aeroflot into several companies all we need is the political will. It is very easy to break organizational monopolies.

The ministries [that run branches of industry] exist only because there is no market. If enterprises could obtain supplies on the market, they would not need [ministries] and they understand that. We must therefore change from a system with ministries to a system of joint stock

companies. All enterprises should be turned into joint stock companies, with shares freely bought and sold, and available to individuals, enterprises, and banks, including foreign banks.

**Guetta:** Will that happen?

**Petrakov:** I would like it to.

**Guetta:** Would you buy shares in Soviet enterprises?

**Petrakov:** [Joking] If it is a mixed company [with foreign participation], yes, why not? [Becoming serious again] You know, it depends on the dividends, whether or not they are higher than the interest rates.

**Guetta:** But the Soviet people do not even know what a share is!

**Petrakov:** We will have to explain it to them.

**Guetta:** How could all this be done in practical terms?

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**As regards education and health care, the state should provide a free service only up to a general level. Anything more than that must be paid for or funded by trade unions or other movements.**

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**Petrakov:** Very simply. The legal provisions are very easy to imagine. I do not see any problem. But if you are really asking me “Is this possible?” I would answer that many things seemed impossible five years ago — for instance, a multiparty system.

**Guetta:** How will you go about it? Will you put everything on sale and wait for retired people to get their roubles out from under their mattresses?

**Petrakov:** We can envisage some enterprises being transferred to individual ownership. But, forgive me, you are talking like a Westerner. It would be difficult for me to imagine how an individual could become the owner of an enterprise’s capital, simply taking a majority holding, when it takes him five years to buy a car.

People will be able to buy shares, but we are thinking of something much more serious. Let us take the simple example of Aeroflot and take the situation in which that company needs money to buy new planes. At present, it turns to the State Planning Committee [Gosplan] to ask for roubles or foreign currency.

The Gosplan officials meet, study this request along with others put forward by other sectors, and make their decision. . . usually a bad decision. If instead we have joint stock companies, Aeroflot will have only two sources of finance aside from its profits — the sale of shares or a bank loan.

There will be no state intervention, absolutely no state intervention, to help enterprises to invest; the main obstacle on the road to the market is this excessive monopolization of the investment process. If shares are issued, we will have [to use] accumulated capital and start an investment process corresponding to the laws of the market.

**Guetta:** And to open this road to the market, you therefore want to get rid of state investment? Is that the key principle?

**Petrakov:** Yes, absolutely. The creation of a fairly balanced market for products is not a difficult thing in itself. We know the prices that would make it possible to put meat on the shelves. If you go to the peasant markets, there are supplies and their prices are known.

However, such a balancing of supply and demand for products would not create a market mechanism. Under a market mechanism, if your sales are large, you can develop rapidly, because capital goes where profits are highest. In our country, all profit returns to the state and is redistributed according to administratively defined priorities. Consequently, there is no growth in production.

**Guetta:** So, will there be no state investment at all?

**Petrakov:** I did not say that. We must start by reducing state investment but maintaining it in spheres like space, education, health care, defense, and aid to orphans, the handicapped, and all the weakest members of society. But we must stop all other state investment and, as regards education and health care, the state should provide a free service only up to a general level. Anything more than that must be paid for or funded by trade unions or other movements.

**Guetta:** So, once you have started to demonopolize, what is the second step?

**Petrakov:** This raises the question of inflation, the accumulated inflation stemming from decades of a dogma according to which the real struggle against inflation was conducted with rigid price control. This control was exercised, but without any control on incomes which increased very rapidly, because the state was stimulating them with grandiose and unproductive projects.

In a normal economy, [such artificially stimulated increases in income] would have led to an increase in prices. But, because our economy is not normal, the money supply simply increased [in the form of] “pretend money” with which people could do nothing, which they could not use.

Other countries have experienced the same phenomenon, and in the USSR we have 165 billion roubles in savings, a good half of which is simply enforced savings — not [savings in] preparation for investment but mere accumulation dictated by the impossibility of buying or investing.

In Eastern Europe, as soon as prices were unrestricted, those enforced savings flooded into the stores, and prices [soared]. We must take account of this experience, and preventively divert this money supply to new spheres of investment — apartments, country houses, industrial shares, and savings with [legitimate rates of] interest. With this in mind, interest rates must be increased from the current 2 percent to 8 or 10 percent.

People must be given the chance to use their money for the development of individual production. This must all be done before lifting restrictions on prices. The only other exceptions to the lifting of price restrictions should be a few strategic or essential products — at most twenty or thirty products.

**Guetta:** So, to absorb this money, there will be no monetary reform, no reissue of banknotes. . . .

**Petrakov:** Some people maintain that we should do that, because this money is the product of the shadow economy, the black market, and mafia activities. My analysis is entirely different. The people in the black market have known for longer than the economists that [Soviet] money is worth nothing. So, they have not kept it. They have bought antiques, foreign currency, pictures, and this money has therefore been dispersed throughout all sections of the population, among perfectly honest people. If the state seized it overnight, that would be unfair.

**Guetta:** To sum up, there are three stages: an end to state monopolies; the diversification of individual investment opportunities; and an end to restrictions on prices. Is that the case?

**Petrakov:** You are forgetting an important point: breaking up the monopoly enterprises, which should give rise to several competing companies. For years we believed that big enterprises were better than small companies — “the bigger the better” was a premise of investment policy — and we must now create competition because where there is none we will have to maintain price control.

**Guetta:** Lifting restrictions on prices will mean a major drop in living standards. Will there be compensation?

**Petrakov:** We have thought about that, of course. For the poorest people, incomes will be indexed to prices. That is very important. We must defend the poorest people. But this will be very difficult because, until the economy has [revived], our ability to channel money into social spending will be limited.

In any case, we will encounter a psychological problem because people are not accustomed to the harshness of market laws, to competition, and to differences in incomes. Even before the revolution, there was a tradition of egalitarianism in Russia, which has obviously been strengthened during the Soviet period.

This is why the cooperatives, which were an initial step toward the market, were not accepted by a large section of the population, and why, under pressure from those people, the government was forced to limit the cooperatives' activities.

**Guetta:** So, how can we hope that the measures proposed will be accepted?

**Petrakov:** It will be much easier to have [these new measures] accepted. For one thing, people will continue to work in the same enterprises, without even realizing that those companies have become joint stock companies. The employees will receive wages as before, and the market will affect them only later. Some will receive more, some less, others will experience unemployment but, psychologically, it will be more acceptable. . . .

**Guetta:** When will the rouble be convertible?

**Petrakov:** On this subject, I have a view which the bankers do not share. I think our economy should be open. Although we have shown for years that we could develop in a closed system, we have also shown that the results were not [ideal]. We must now join the world market and take part in the international division of labor. Everybody would gain from that. . . . But the obstacle to this integration is nonconvertibility. Therefore, we should normalize our monetary system. Everybody agrees, but some people think that it can only be done after we have an efficient economy.

I think that we will not achieve an efficient economy without a convertible currency. After all, it is only with the aid of Western technology and Western capital that we will be able to improve the situation. But if our market is to be very attractive, it must look like a market. The problem for Western enterprises is to know what to do with the roubles earned here. We now need a special convertible rouble for joint enterprises and Soviet enterprises which are capable of responding to competition.

We must tackle this immediately and organize a foreign currency market within the country, enabling us to buy and sell currency freely. We have a relatively large amount of foreign currency, around \$15 billion per year — the fruit of our exports. We have hitherto invested in a centralized way. Enterprises must be able to buy [foreign currency] to invest as they see fit.

**Guetta:** It takes years, or at least months to introduce such changes. . . .

**Petrakov:** We must change the budget and the fiscal system.

**Guetta:** So, it will take a long time. . . .

**Petrakov:** Why are you so cautious? Let us try to have a little imagination. We are deciding to change the method of redistributing profits, of no longer taking what we took from enterprises. If we do not alter the budget and the tax system, the state will have no revenue. But why not change the whole thing at the same time, let us say tomorrow, at the end of the month, or on the fifteenth of next month? After all, the starting date of a budget period is only a convention. We have hitherto thought in five-year periods.

**Guetta:** Indeed, but such changes require either parliamentary decisions — one year's debate at least — or presidential decrees, which would be risky. . . .

**Petrakov:** You should work in Gosplan!

The aim of the economic reform is to introduce democracy into the economy. I like the market because it is a democratic system. And what is democracy in our country if not the state handing over the job of management and hence responsibility to the actual producers?

**Guetta:** Why not say: "I no longer want to lead you?" If Mr. Gorbachev did everything you are advising him to do overnight and by presidential decree, he would be taking personal responsibility, before the whole USSR and for at least ten years, for the running of the whole economy. That is difficult. Is he prepared to do it?

**Petrakov:** I do not know. But if I were him, I would be prepared to do it. Is there any alternative?

**Guetta:** Precisely.

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# Correspondence

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## LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

To the Editor:

In his essay “Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pentagon’s Foible” (Winter 1990), Bernard F. McMahon echoes a recurring critique of the U.S. government’s current stance towards low-intensity conflict (LIC — confrontations short of full-scale war but beyond the limits of peaceful political competition). He argues that while these situations are less catastrophic than a great-power war in Europe, they are more likely to occur, especially as the cold war subsides, and therefore should be given far more attention by the United States.

This line of reasoning confuses two largely unrelated subjects: the probability of low-intensity conflicts and the necessity of U.S. involvement in them. No one doubts the continued occurrence around the world of myriad low-intensity conflicts between ethnic groups, parties, governments, and so forth, fighting over status, spoils and other issues. However, the relevance of these low-intensity conflicts to the interests of the United States is less evident. And the argument that they will take on greater importance as the cold war subsides is exactly wrong; they are likely to become less important to America’s activities, welfare, and prestige in the world in a post-cold war environment.

*LIC and the cold war.* During the forty years after World War II, the United States, the USSR, and their respective allies were locked in a global struggle. In this environment, the outcome of every brushfire conflict around the world was of interest to the great powers for both political and military reasons. In the political arena, every Third World state that placed itself in one camp or the other was seen as casting a vote of confidence for either the capitalist-democratic or communist-authoritarian way of life. Both Washington and Moscow believed that faring well in this referendum lent momentum to the ascendance of one system over the other. In addition, if either great power lost to the other in the courtship of a Third World state, it was believed that this loss would signal a lack of resolve or capability that would then produce a ripple effect of defections by other small states requiring patronage. In the military realm, it was assumed that a cold war could turn hot, and in a global fight, every ally, client, staging base, and choke point could contribute to the outcome. For these reasons, Washington and Moscow

were highly attentive to every outbreak of low-intensity conflict, especially as it might affect a country's politico-economic system.

*LIC today.* These conditions have now changed. As regards the military balance, East Germany will probably soon cease to exist as a separate state, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have served eviction notices to Soviet troops on their soil, and all Warsaw Pact states have cut their force structure and defense spending. Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski has recently stated that the Warsaw Pact and COMECON are finished.<sup>1</sup>

Politically, the communist ideology, which lent a transcendent quality to the East-West struggle during the cold war, is now widely perceived as bankrupt. In the USSR, the command economy no longer seems capable of sustaining a system to rival the West's, and it has been discredited as well in almost every European, Asian, African, and Latin American country in which it has been instituted.

For these reasons, Moscow has had to opt out of the geostrategic competition with Washington, at least for the foreseeable future, and this retrenchment makes obsolete the former U.S. policy of lining up far-flung supporters for an impending East-West confrontation. The United States no longer has a direct stake in the outcome of every Third World dispute. Moreover, the current preoccupation of the USSR with domestic troubles has restricted the amount of Soviet support extended to friendly states. The USSR has put most of its Third World clients on alert that the days are over for liberal aid, a toleration of economic irrationality, support for every domestic and cross-border use of force, and encouragement to ignore or alienate influential moderate regional powers. These changes have in turn lessened the importance of many low-intensity conflicts for the United States.

The easing of the cold war may even diminish the impact of terrorism on Americans. After all, it was the traditional conduct of the cold war that placed so many Americans in geographical settings where they were exposed to terrorism. The countries with the highest numbers of terrorist incidents are South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, West Germany, France, Spain, Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador<sup>2</sup> — almost all of which have some form of American military involvement. Of course, the U.S. military presence is not causally responsible for terrorism (although anti-Americanism is often an aggravating element). The point is that American military forces are in these countries primarily as a forward-deployed force for the contingency of war with the USSR, and secondarily to bolster the anticommunist regimes. With the USSR mired down by problems that threaten its existence as a multinational empire, with its former allies

<sup>1</sup> Briefing by Polish foreign minister Skubiszewski, to NATO permanent representatives, Brussels, Belgium, March 21, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1989), p. 85.

and clients either breaking free or being set free, the U.S. forward stance and levels of presence in terrorism-prone countries might be characterized as excessive. If this presence were to be eliminated or trimmed in size, U.S. exposure in these states would diminish, and so would American concern over fighting terrorism.

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**During the cold war, when the United States faced an adventurist and expansionist Soviet enemy, an anticommunist policy on insurgencies was understandable. Today, facing a fragmented and impoverished Soviet Union, the importance of most of these insurgency problems should diminish to the levels merited by their direct impact on American security and welfare.**

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An examination of U.S. involvement in insurgency and counterinsurgency reflects a similar pattern. If one of the parties conducting or resisting a Third World insurgency is pro-Soviet, avowedly Marxist, or both, chances were it could look for extensive U.S. support for counterinsurgency efforts. The presence of a communist regime in Cambodia and a communist insurgent group in the Philippines enhanced the importance of these conflicts in American eyes; the absence of an ideological element in the violent disputes in Sri Lanka and Burma relegated these conflicts to secondary status. In the Middle East, the revolt against the communist regime in Afghanistan has been a front-page issue, while the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq rarely makes news at all. In Africa, insurgencies in the communist states of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have been part of the broader East-West contest; those in the noncommunist states of Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan are almost neglected. A pro-Soviet regime in Nicaragua and a Marxist insurgency in El Salvador attracts considerable American attention to the outcomes in these countries; but in Guatemala, the URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca — Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) insurgent group, while Cuban-linked and anti-American, cannot be characterized as pro-Soviet or Marxist; as a result, the Guatemalan problem has not been a prominent American concern.

During the cold war, when the United States faced an adventurist and expansionist Soviet enemy, this anticommunist policy on insurgencies was understandable. Today, facing a fragmented and impoverished Soviet Union, the importance of most of these insurgency problems should diminish to levels merited by their direct impact on American security and welfare.

*Other drawbacks to LIC.* There are other reasons why LIC fails to warrant a flood of new resources. When McMahon asserts that weaponry procured with World War III in mind is inappropriate and ineffective in a low-intensity conflict, he seems to misread the equipment needs of LIC. High-technology weaponry, designed for World War III scenarios, is probably ideal for limited, short-duration strikes against lesser adversaries; witness the use of F-117A stealth fighters in the recent U.S. invasion of Panama.

One problem with such a dual-use approach is said to be that large formations of specialized armored vehicles, planes, or ships are interdependent, and cannot be disassembled without causing grave vulnerabilities to the formation. McMahon writes that “the deployment of less than a full carrier battle group (CVBG) presents risks to the parts outside the whole. Aircraft carriers are vulnerable to submarine attacks.” But potential LIC enemies do not have the expensive and sophisticated weaponry to exploit such vulnerabilities. Narco-traffickers, terrorists, and guerrillas do not have attack submarines. They may obtain them in the future, but then conflicts with them can no longer be classified as low-intensity.

Indeed, the problems of proliferation may mean that low-intensity conflicts are a passing phase, and that armed clashes will increase in intensity. William Webster, director of central intelligence, recently stated that

ballistic missiles are being developed or acquired by a growing number of countries, including some that support terrorism. This is a particularly alarming prospect because many of them are also in the advanced stages of developing nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads that could turn ballistic missiles into weapons of mass destruction.<sup>3</sup>

By now, eighteen Third World countries either possess or are on the verge of possessing ballistic missiles.<sup>4</sup>

The international arms market usually makes even the most highly sophisticated weaponry available to those willing to pay. Thus, if the U.S. government adopted the policies of LIC advocates, it might soon find itself spending a good share of its defense-procurement budget on such LIC equipment as brown water/riverine naval vessels and tactical radio gear, only to discover that most Third World states and perhaps even nonstate actors are outfitted with surface-to-surface missiles, helicopter gunships, multiple rocket launchers, SAMs, smart munitions, etc.

Inevitably, problems of jurisdiction would arise if LIC were elevated to priority status in American military planning and procurement. Antiterrorist steps are most effective when focused on

<sup>3</sup> William Webster, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 23, 1990.

<sup>4</sup> James T. Hackett, “The Ballistic Missile Epidemic,” *Global Affairs*, Winter 1990, p. 39.

safety, security, and other preventive measures. Narcotics problems fall most appropriately under the jurisdiction of the Drug Enforcement Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard (all without diluting the war-fighting skills of our general purpose forces). Also, turning soldiers into policemen (chasing terrorists, guarding U.S. embassies and property abroad, busting narco-traffickers, etc.) runs the risk of creating widespread morale problems. A young potential volunteer watching recruiting commercials which show servicemen firing a tank, providing battlefield intelligence to a maneuvering brigade, navigating a nuclear-powered submarine, or vectoring fighters onto an aircraft carrier flight deck assumes that he will be trained as a highly-skilled professional soldier, not as a constable.

Authors advocating a greater emphasis on LIC may conclude that "limited wars are in,"<sup>5</sup> and they may be right, but the real question is: Are they "in" for the U.S. armed forces? The United States can never be totally inattentive to Third World conflict. A senseless bloodletting there might compel a military intervention on humanitarian grounds. But with the decreasing presence of American troops abroad and the waning of the cold war, our exposure to and interest in such incidents will diminish as well.

Perhaps the most unfortunate result of exaggerating the significance of LIC to the United States is that it distracts planners from a scenario that is both plausible and highly destructive: an emerging, well-armed regional power that challenges the status quo (including the United States) in a bid for greater prestige and wider control.

Paul F. Herman, Jr.  
Washington, D.C.

## IS RUSSIA REFORMABLE?

To the Editor:

I dislike dragging out a controversy about a book review. However, your reviewer of *Is Russia Reformable?* Nicolai Petro, has in his response to my letter (Spring 1990) moved from a selective critique of my views to a direct misrepresentation of them, and I must set the record straight.

I have in no way attributed "spontaneous citizens' initiatives exclusively to a coterie of intellectuals allied with Gorbachev." Intellectuals who are critical of Gorbachev are in the forefront of every kind of movement

<sup>5</sup> Colonel D. Dennison Lane and Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Weisenbloom, "Low-Intensity Conflict: In Search of a Paradigm," *International Defense Review*, November 1990, p. 35.

from “Democratic Platform” to “Pamyat,” as well as the various “ecological and cultural self-preservation societies” that Petro refers to, not to mention the national minority movements. The 1989 and 1990 elections have given Soviet intellectuals (of all philosophical persuasions) the greatest political role they have ever had. On the other hand, distinctly anti-intellectual, worker-oriented movements are appearing as gambits supported by the conservative Communist apparatus.

Petro most egregiously misrepresents my reference to “the unfulfilled legacy of the revolution” by inserting the bracketed “October 17” and overlooking everything I say about the democratic hopes of the months before October.

Robert V. Daniels  
University of Vermont

### **The Author Responds:**

The contrast between what Robert V. Daniels calls “the pure essence of old Russian political culture distinguished by secretiveness, authoritarianism, nativism and anti-intellectualism,” and the westernized intelligentsia is a central theme of his book. He clearly credits the intelligentsia with an exclusively important role in shaping the current reforms when he says “it was the creative intelligentsia alone of all the elements of Soviet society which had the interest and the awareness to press for fundamental change.” I do not quarrel with Daniels’s view that today’s Russian intelligentsia is vital to reform, but only with his assertion that it represents an antithesis to traditional Russian political culture. Most participants in today’s reform movement (intellectuals and nonintellectuals) see their actions not in contrast to Russian political heritage but as fulfilling another expression of it.

Nor should “intellectuals” be contrasted too sharply to “workers.” While some workers’ movements support Party conservatives, others vehemently oppose them. In Donbass and Vorkuta, for example, independent workers’ organizations openly supported Boris Yeltsin in his bid to head the Russian republic’s Supreme Soviet.

On the matter of revolutionary heritage, Daniels says little about the pre-October democratic legacy in his book. Indeed, nonsocialist alternatives receive very little attention in his book. He does, however, refer often to the “genuine inspiration of 1917 and its socialism with a human face.” The reader is left to guess which legacy he has in mind, the October coup d’état orchestrated by Lenin in the name of socialism, or February’s transfer of power from the Tsar to the Provisional Government.

Throughout his book, Daniels links Gorbachev’s perestroika to the “unfulfilled legacy of the revolution itself.” He must also be aware,

however, that Gorbachev has at every occasion embraced Lenin's coup of October 1917, while rejecting calls in society for a fundamental re-evaluation of that event. By linking the legacy of the revolution specifically to Gorbachev's vision of perestroika, Daniels would thus appear to be identifying that legacy with October 1917, and not with the democratic efforts that preceded the Bolshevik takeover.

Nicolai N. Petro

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## WORLD POLITICS

by Adam M. Garfinkle

**The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems.** By Emerson M.S. Niu et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 357 pp. \$54.50.

Using game theory to model international politics is a dangerous path; those who follow it frequently stumble into abstraction, simplification, and fantasy. Fortunately, Niu and his co-authors know this and have striven mightily to avoid such pitfalls. For the most part, they recognize the complexity of decision making, and acknowledge that their work is but a refinement and formalization. Best of all, rather than merely positing how the world works (as too many do), they draw on history for their empirical base. Broadly, the theory presented here abstracts from the formation of great power alliances between 1871 and 1914, with special attention given to the Near Eastern crises of 1875-78 and 1885-88, and the July 1914 crisis that led to World War I. Through all of this, the authors demonstrate admirable caution.

Then, just when one thinks Niu et al. understand the dangers of over-simplification, they define international stability as coming in two, and only two, varieties: system stability and resource stability. This is a suggestive dichotomy, but a reductionist one nonetheless. There are other problems as well. The authors believe, quite mistakenly, that natural and human sciences differ only in complexity. The historical sections, though welcome, are not tightly integrated with the rest of the book. And the prose is simply horrible.

On balance, though, if one is interested in the possibility of formalizing political theory, *The Balance of Power* is not a bad book. For those who prefer political analyses carried out with more traditional concepts, however, a better bet is Ian Clark's *The Hierarchy of States*, reviewed below.

**The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order.** By Ian Clark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 253 pp. \$44.50 (\$12.95, paper).

After every major war since 1800, demands have been heard to revamp the international system, and yet the system seems little

changed. Is that conclusion accurate? Or is it overly pessimistic? Clark puts the problem as a dispute between Whigs (who believe fundamental political progress is a fact) and Tories (who believe it is an illusion). To be sure, Tories concede that different groups may get more or less of the pie at different times, but (they say) the basic rules of pie making and pie getting do not change.

After examining the history of the international system since 1800, Clark sides with the Whigs: the world is getting better. His explanation lies in his analysis, which leads him to identify two key variables of international order: concert and balance of power. International systems that have both are the most stable; systems that have one are more precarious; those with neither collapse into war. Clark thinks concert and balance are both waxing, and have been for two centuries. Each major historical era since 1815, he says, has led to a style of "international relations that differed appreciably from that which had existed before." And the direction of change has been toward the development of international organization and the "construction of an institutional framework within which independent sovereign states might interact" in a more orderly fashion.

This is an erudite, well-written work, more subtle than John Mueller's *Doomsday in Retreat* and clearer than Evan Luard's *The Blunted Sword*. It is also a surprising one in that its simple dichotomies which at first seem so facile — Whig and Tory, concert and balance — actually work.

**Political Loyalty and Public Service in West Germany: The 1972 Decree against Radicals and Its Consequences.** By Gerard Braunthal. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990. 240 pp. \$27.50.

During the upsurge of radicalism in the late 1960s, West German student leader Rudi Dutschke called on his followers to "march through the institutions" of the state in order to change it from within. In response to this and other perceived threats to the security of the democratic order, the West German government issued its *Radikalenerlass* in January 1972. This decree required all those in public service to be loyal to the constitutional system of government, and cast doubt on the loyalty of members of organizations deemed to be opposed to the constitution. The same decree was subsequently extended to the German *Länder* (roughly equivalent to American states).

Braunthal examines the consequences of the *Radikalenerlass* and its impact on civil liberties in the German Federal Republic. He also compares it with the practice of other European democracies and of the United States. His treatment is generally balanced, though some of his sources are of doubtful reliability: West Germany has no Freedom of Information Act, and it is difficult to obtain accurate figures even on the number of individuals affected by the decree.

Unfortunately, the conclusion Braunthal reaches is contradictory. On the one hand, he argues, a democratic state should exclude from public service only those found guilty of sabotage, conspiracy, espionage, or terrorism. On the other hand, he agrees that extremists may be kept out of sensitive positions even in the absence of a conviction for an overt act. The latter view appears to make more sense.

Guenther Lewy

**Political Theory and the Modern State.** By David Held. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989. 265 pp. \$35.00 (\$12.95, paper).

Up until the twentieth century, economics, sociology, and political science were customarily integrated in a way that made it easy to encompass them within an overall normative political philosophy — an ideology, such as natural-law theory or Marxism. Today, though, many leading scholars in those three fields shun such unity, making their disciplines less amenable to an overarching normative framework.

Held opposes this trend. He wants to reassemble the economic, social, and political stands of political theory, and to suggest a new political philosophy that will encompass them. He means to create this theoretical synthesis by critiquing the modern-day inheritors of natural law and orthodox Marxist theories, which he calls the New Right and the New Left. Held has only modest respect for right-of-center theories — such as the democratic pluralism of Robert Dahl, Harold Laswell, and D.B. Truman — and consequently exercises little energy in attacking them. But he expends a great deal of energy attacking Jürgen Habermas and others, and this provides the best elements in his volume. Least interesting is Held's futile attempt to find a democratic "Third Way" between capitalism and Marxism. He ends up advocating something called "democratic autonomy," which sounds good but on closer inspection appears to be a rationalization for a version of the ultimate in confused muddling — contemporary British social democracy.

**A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam.** By Malise Ruthven. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990. 184 pp. \$14.95.

Ruthven, a free-lancer specializing in religious fundamentalism, Islamic and Christian alike, reviews the British story of *The Satanic Verses* incident in a lively and thoughtful manner. He offers several provocative theories about the Muslim campaign against Rushdie in the United Kingdom: that it had a great deal to do with inter-communal problems between Muslims and Hindus brought over from India; that it began as a legitimate cry of despair by offended pietists but was subsequently taken over by the fundamentalist ideologues in an effort to control Muslim life in Great Britain; and that the protest had

more to do with offended honor than with matters of faith. Ruthven also argues, persuasively, that from the point of view of community relations, Ayatollah Khomeini's edict was "a disaster for the Muslims in Britain."

Though skillfully written, *A Satanic Affair* has a parochial quality, a tendency to see no farther than Little England. World events tend to be viewed in terms of their impact on opinion in the United Kingdom. There are other peculiarities too: for example, the role of oral culture in Muslim life receives far more attention than the motives behind Khomeini's actions. We learn in detail the views of obscure British Muslims, but almost nothing of *The Satanic Verses's* career in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, and the Americas. D.P.

**The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.** By Jürgen Habermas. Translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1989. 301 pp. \$35.00.

In 1962, when *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* first came out, Habermas was just beginning his journey from neo-Marxism to his current eclecticism. To be getting an English translation now, as Marxism collapses into utter disrepute, is somewhat ironic, but the volume is welcome nonetheless. However problematical his views, Habermas is one of the few people currently writing political philosophy at the highest level.

Habermas argues that the rise of the middle class in the eighteenth century created a civil society that defined a general "public interest" rising above that of the state and the political factions of late feudal times — guilds, towns, nobles. Inevitably, being a Marxist, Habermas finds that capitalism's good work in destroying feudalism soon turned bad. As capitalism progressed, it generated inequities, leading to demands for regulation. These regulations, never adequate, stimulated ever more demands for intervention, forcing the state to become more unwieldy, making its actions less rational, and finally undermining public confidence in it. This legitimacy crisis then required the state to change, or to repress the demands on it by authoritarian means, leading to revolutionary agitation.

What is eerie about Habermas's analysis is how closely it resembles right-wing, anti-statist social theory. The Right, too, sees an escalation of state intervention in the economy, and an insatiable acceleration of demands by interest groups. The difference lies in the prescription: Habermas believes the state can escape overthrow through progressive adaptation; the Right sees hope only in reversing the process by conventional politics. Judging from the failure of the Reagan administration to reverse decisively American big government, conservatives might have more to learn from Habermas than they think.

## WAR STUDIES

by Bruce Berkowitz

**The ANZUS Crisis: Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence.** By Michael C. Pugh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 285 pp. \$44.50.

In 1984, New Zealand's newly elected prime minister, David Lange, pledged to ban from his country's ports all vessels believed to be carrying nuclear weapons or to be powered by nuclear energy. Washington, bound to New Zealand by the ANZUS military pact, announced in 1986 that those obligations were being formally suspended pending "adequate corrective measures" regarding New Zealand's policy. *The ANZUS Crisis* takes an in-depth look at this contretemps, and assesses whether the ANZUS Pact has a future.

Pugh downplays the strategic importance of the South Pacific, and asserts that "postulating potential military threats to New Zealand is an invitation to enter the realm of the absurd." Therefore, he believes, the ANZUS Treaty fell victim to the "strategic fundamentalists" in the Reagan administration, who refused to compromise on Washington's policy to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons aboard American warships.

Lost in the discussion of New Zealand's global relevance, however, is the fact that the ANZUS Treaty is a military pact. If a major conflict erupted in the Pacific, and a U.S. warship were obliged to bypass a New Zealand port, of what use would the treaty be? Mention also needs to be made of Pugh's speculations that the CIA helped engineer a coup in Fiji because the government there was planning to follow New Zealand's lead. His evidence consists entirely of hearsay and innuendo, inevitably so, since the Department of State has traced this rumor to an *Izvestiya*-initiated disinformation campaign (to which Cambridge University Press has now lent its considerable prestige). In sum, Pugh has but muddied the waters of the ANZUS controversy.

Michael Antonucci

**Earth Data and New Weapons.** By Jay L. Larson and George A. Pelletiere. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. 133 pp. \$3.75 (paper).

Larson and Pelletiere set out to make public a problem inherent in many modern weapon systems but generally not known to nonspecialists. Simply put, most missiles, aircraft, ships, and precision munitions are guided by systems that rely on extensive geographical data — in effect, maps. Unfortunately, to produce such mapping data is expensive and time consuming; worse, no reliable procedure exists to guarantee that, after the system has been built, the needed information will be available.

As a result, multi-million dollar weapons are rendered useless against many targets. For example, the U.S. air force lacked the data to target cruise missiles against Tripoli, Libya, in April 1986. It thus had to use manned bombers in the strike, one of which was lost along with its two-man crew. As the authors note, "the problem affects a surprisingly large number of new weapons and millions, maybe billions of the taxpayers' dollars." The authors suggest measures for changing the defense acquisition process so as to avoid such failures in the future: explicitly documenting earth data requirements for each weapon as it is developed; consolidating data requirements for all weapons; and creating an office within each service responsible for overseeing earth data requirements during acquisition.

NDU Press may be somewhat obscure and the authors little known outside their immediate field, but this important book should be read by every member of the Defense Acquisition Board and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

**Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending.** By William W. Kaufmann. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990. 80 pp. \$8.95 (paper).

The vultures are circling the U.S. defense budget these days, and one of them is named Bill Kaufmann. In this slim study, Kaufmann argues that the collapse of the Soviet threat in Europe makes possible massive cuts in U.S. defense spending. He analyzes Soviet policies and the prospects for arms control, then recommends reducing defense outlays by about three percent each year through 1994. By the turn of the century, if Kaufmann gets his way, the United States will have a defense budget less than half its current size.

*Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending* hardly deserves the heavy publicity it received on publication. Kaufmann has been recommending defense cuts for more than twenty years. If *perestroika* had never happened, he would have found some other rationale for them. Moreover, tying cuts to perestroika is a major error on Kaufmann's part, for it suggests that a European war is the primary justification for U.S. forces. In fact, low-intensity conflict in the Third World has long been a more likely threat, and until Americans decide how to deal with that, they cannot sensibly decide how big or how small the defense budget should be.

**Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine.** Edited by William C. Green and Theodore Karasik. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. 239 pp. \$24.95 (paper).

For decades, Western analyses of Soviet writings about military doctrine were the twentieth-century equivalent of auguring from chicken entrails: the analysis was messy and the conclusions were driven more

by preconceptions than by science. Today Soviet military writings, though tedious as ever, are worth a read. As Green and Karasik show, glasnost permits real debate in Soviet journals, and significant differences can be found between the old-line generals and the new civilian leadership.

The contributors to *Gorbachev and His Generals* are Soviet specialists from a variety of American government and academic affiliations. They examine Soviet attitudes toward both specific issues (for example, space defenses) and military-civilian relations in general. The contributors have a range of views, but three themes seem to be the mainstream position. First, Gorbachev seeks a smaller military, but also a more modern and efficient one. Second, while much of the military resists Gorbachev's efforts, he does have some support there. And third, Gorbachev wants civilians to have greater say in matters of military policy. As two of the book's contributors put it, "Gorbachev's trump card, of course, is the diffusion of power he is seeking by enlarging the circle of defense policymaking."

Valuable appendices provide the latest postings of top Soviet military officers and a chronology of military affairs under Gorbachev's regime. In all, *Gorbachev and His Generals* is a most useful reference work.

**Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations, A Critical Analysis.** Edited by William H. Burgess 3d. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990. 308 pp. \$24.95.

Just in time for the end of the cold war a book comes along that finally makes sense of Soviet special operations forces, or *spetsnaz*. In recent years, *spetsnaz* have been a hobby horse for Western military analysts; hardliners portrayed them as Soviet supermen planted behind NATO lines, who would strike at the outbreak of war, decisively turning the tide. The authors — who themselves could hardly be considered doves — try hard to offer some perspective through the novel technique of considering real evidence.

Burgess and company (a mix of intelligence analysts and civilian Soviet specialists) provide a scholarly study of *spetsnaz*, drawing on public Soviet sources, military history, and memoirs. They show that *spetsnaz* are more like U.S. Rangers or Green Berets, filling a highly specialized and demanding, but limited role in Soviet ground operations. As in U.S. planning, these special forces are considered vital, but not decisive. Certainly Soviet leaders do not think that *spetsnaz* could bring the West to its knees. As with most histories of military units, the writing here is occasionally tedious, but at least the treatment of the subject is comprehensive and professional.

**Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of America's Espionage Empire.** By Ernest Volkman and Blaine Baggett. New York: Doubleday, 1989. 288 pp. \$19.95.

Far scarier than the watch America's espionage agencies allegedly keep on ordinary Americans is the watch ordinary Americans seem able to keep on America's espionage agencies. After all, these agencies are supposed to be secret, and if hostile journalists can penetrate them, so can hostile agents. Of course, intelligence agencies are not immune to abuse of authority, and need appropriate governmental watchdogs. But the last decade has shown that an emasculated intelligence community can be even more harmful than a too-powerful one.

But this is not the viewpoint of *Secret Intelligence*, companion volume to the PBS series and the latest graduate from the "Big Brother is Watching You" school of exposé. Volkman and Baggett provide a whirlwind survey of U.S. intelligence history, pointing out with raised eyebrows such minions of "the espionage empire" as J. Edgar Hoover and Ollie North. Iran, Guatemala, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran again, and Nicaragua are all submitted as evidence of a CIA gone astray. Obviously, the authors never met a covert operation they liked. Domestic intelligence gets major play as well, and here the message is clear: Keep a close eye on the intelligence agencies, because they are keeping a close eye on you.

But the book's main weakness is that it covers familiar territory. If exposés are what you want, James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace* has set the standard. If you want the inside story, David Phillips's *The Night Watch* is the book to read. Pass this one by. Michael Antonucci

**The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance.** By Martin Van Creveld. New York: Free Press, 1990. 134 pp. \$19.95.

Forget the title. Van Creveld is actually concerned with only one aspect of officer training: the dose of mid-career education that officers receive at military institutions of higher learning, such as the National Defense University. Partly historical and partly comparative, Van Creveld's discussion explains how the British, French, German, Soviet, and U.S. military establishments developed their current methods for what is known as command school. The results skewer America's system.

For one thing, Van Creveld points out, mid-career training in the United States occurs too late; the typical student is thirty-eight years old, and so is more than three-quarters of the way through his career. The curriculum is so brief and unstructured that most students find their year at command school amounts to a vacation. The faculties are second-rate, with soon-to-be colonels taught by newly-minted colonels or by academics who could not succeed elsewhere. Van Creveld does not

think any country does a perfect job in training officers, but at least some — Israel and the Soviet Union, in particular — do it better than others.

Van Creveld offers a set of prescriptions: link performance in command college to selection for higher command, introduce competition for slots in school, hire first-rate professors, and teach subjects that prospective generals and admirals really need to know, such as politics, economics, and joint operations. Van Creveld's prescription makes sense. The U.S. military might have to rethink its career development to adopt it — but, then again, it probably should do that anyway.

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## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

by Patrick Clawson

**Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance. Volume 3, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey.** Edited by Jeffrey Sachs and Susan Collins. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press (for the National Bureau of Economic Research), 1990. 820 pp. \$85.00.

The gods of the grammar-school virtues will not be mocked, Rudyard Kipling warned, and Collins's introduction to this volume proves it is as true in economics as elsewhere. Success in recent decades was achieved by countries practicing the traditional macroeconomic virtues: small budget deficits, competitive and stable exchange rates, high savings and investment rates, and quick responses to external shocks (like higher oil prices).

The bulk of this massive volume shows why virtue works, with book-length studies of recent economic history in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey. Each account is full of important information and useful statistics, and is accessible to any reader who had a couple of economics courses in college. The contributors tell their stories in straightforward (though dry) prose, eschewing pseudo-scientific models and advanced statistical techniques.

Better still, this volume is but one of three from an ambitious study by the National Bureau of Economic Research on developing country debt and economic performance. A 1989 volume covered the international financial system; volume 2 (due out later this year) will include four more country studies. Together, these three tomes will be the definitive work on this issue for decades to come.

Still, something is missing. We are not told why some countries adopt good policies and some do not. The implicit argument seems to be that some countries get good advice and wise leaders, while others do not. But the evidence about what produces growth has been widely

known for years. A more plausible explanation for bad policies, therefore, is that they sometimes serve the interests of groups who wield political power.

**Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World.** By Giovanni Graziani. New York: Praeger Publishers (for the Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1990. 116 pp. \$34.95 (\$12.95, paper).

By all reports, Moscow is growing ever more skeptical of its past policies toward the Third World. In particular, as Graziani tells us, Soviet politicians and economists are increasingly critical of aid given to Third World basket cases that happen to have pro-Soviet ideologies. The Soviets, he says, would far rather improve commercial ties with the prosperous and rapidly expanding economies of Third World countries like Brazil and South Korea.

All this makes good sense. But Graziani, unfortunately, follows the current fashion of over-emphasizing what ties to the Third World (as a whole) cost the USSR, while minimizing the benefits. For example, he systematically overstates the extent of Soviet aid to its Third World clients, but notes only in passing that his data exclude arms sales. He buries (in a brief section near the back of the book) the illuminating statistic that in 1987 the USSR sold, often for hard currency, about \$9 billion worth of arms to the nonsocialist Third World — \$2 billion more than its civilian exports to those countries.

Graziani also makes outdated and implausible claims that the Third World benefits from its (completely misnamed) barter trade with the USSR. For example, under the USSR-India clearing agreement, by far the most important such agreement, the Soviet Union has imported more than it has exported — hardly evidence that this agreement has worked to India's advantage.

**The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics since 1944.** By Ethan B. Kapstein. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 257 pp. \$35.00.

Those who associate the term “energy crisis” only with the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 should read this account of the five major and several minor energy crises that have occurred since World War II. The coal shortage of 1946-47, the Iranian oil boycott in 1951-53, and the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956-57 were (like the crises of the 1970s) profound shocks to the world economy and threats to the West's security. Given this track record of five major crises in forty-five years, only a cockeyed optimist would expect the West's energy supplies to have an untroubled future.

To analyze these crises, Kapstein asks two useful questions. First, did U.S. and European interests differ or harmonize? Second, was the United States able to provide sufficient energy supplies to resolve

the crisis? Kapstein argues convincingly that, early in the postwar period, Western interests were harmonious, and America was able to provide the needed resources. Over time, however, Western interests began to diverge and the United States became less able to act as the West's supplier during a crisis. By 1979, the U.S. position was so weak that its interests had once again converged with the energy-importing European countries.

Kapstein's analysis has a fundamental flaw, however: he never hints that market forces played a role in ending the energy crises. Yet in most of them, if not all, fuel prices rose, which reduced demand, encouraged a shift from one fuel to others, and stimulated output. Regrettably, Kapstein's approach reflects the command-economy bias of the Paris-based International Energy Agency, which has a mandate to design Western policy for handling energy crises.

**Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business.** By Graham Hancock. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989. 234 pp. \$17.95.

Remember Point Four? That was President Truman's "bold new program" to make "the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." Opponents called it "Operation Rathole"; forty years later it is clear that they were optimistic! Hancock provides a wealth of anecdotes to show that pouring money into foreign aid is not merely a waste but positively pernicious. Some of his stories concern matters this reviewer witnessed in eight years in Africa; generally, Hancock understates the problem. Moreover, his impulses are excellent, for he lays much blame directly at the feet of First World bureaucrats and Third World elites. A particular object of his scorn is the well-paid employees of aid agencies whom he dubs the lords of poverty.

By now, however, Hancock's criticisms are widely shared in the field, and the common response is: What else can be done? The answer, never hinted at here, is to stop hindering those who are toiling to carry their own loads. For example, barriers to sugar, textiles, shoes, and other Third World products need to be taken down. Countries that have escaped poverty — like South Korea, which in 1960 had one-third the per person income of Ghana — have done so through trade, not aid. Hancock makes no mention of this; indeed, he repeats the canard that there are no success stories.

He seems to think the international aid system should be a network of hair-shirt-wearing do-gooders, like the Nicaraguan example he cites approvingly. But these people are fully as condescending and obnoxious as the arrogant and self-serving aid workers he rails against. Hancock's account is useful primarily for demonstrating that reasoned dislike of foreign aid can be found on the Left as well as the Right.

**U.S. Protectionism and the World Debt Crisis.** Edward John Ray. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1989. 245 pp. \$45.00.

Progress toward free trade generally takes one of two forms: broad international agreements (usually arrived at under the GATT Treaty) or narrower treaties between states or groups of states. His title notwithstanding, Ray's topic is the comparative merits of these approaches. The focus of his argument is on the General System of Preferences (GSP), adopted unilaterally by the United States in 1975 to provide developing countries with easy access to the U.S. market.

Ray's first-rate account shows the GSP actually hurt developing countries in two ways. By opening the door only to commodities whose producers had little political clout in the United States — such as tropical agricultural produce — the GSP encouraged Third World countries to produce those goods even if their comparative advantage lay elsewhere. Second, the GSP nurtured an illusion among Third World leaders that economic success could be attained only through special deals cut with individual industrial nations for political reasons. That in turn reduced the leaders' concern with their countries' economic performance and led them to underestimate the value of free trade.

As for the discussion of world debt promised by the title, only Chapter Four delivers. The basic argument is sound: developing countries cannot repay debts unless they run a trade surplus; to do that, they need access to markets in advanced industrial states. But this thesis is hardly novel, nor is it argued here with any new evidence or incisive analysis.

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## THE UNITED STATES

by Adam M. Garfinkle

**Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.** By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 307 pp. \$19.95.

If the Democrats get back into the White House within the next twenty years or so, Joseph Nye (a professor of government at Harvard) is likely to have a cabinet position in that administration, perhaps secretary of state. Moreover, Nye knows this, making *Bound to Lead* a more than usually coy title.

Nye's prescription for leading is to appeal to Americans' basic optimism, which he does by proclaiming that America is not in decline. That appeal also sets Nye up for a Harvard-Yale match against the Elis' Paul Kennedy, author of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Nye's point of disagreement with Kennedy, however, concerns only the baseline from which Kennedy measures American decline, namely, the utter pre-

eminence that the United States enjoyed in the immediate postwar world. Using such a standard, Nye believes, is to measure decline against an irregularity, not a norm.

Nevertheless, Nye accepts the heart of Kennedy's argument: that economics lies at the base of national power. Indeed, Nye goes on to argue that military power is becoming ever less important than economic clout, a position that allows Democrats to continue their devotion to the maximum feasible dose of arms control, arms cuts, and isolationism. This is not to say *Bound to Lead* is merely calculated pre-convention platform material. It is a serious book by a sober and reasonably balanced observer; the Democrats could do worse than to feature Nye as a major spokesman. But the book's political suitability is probably a little less than pure coincidence.

**Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes.** By Richard Haass. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990. 172 pp. \$22.50.

In a slim, fast-paced, and elegant account, Haass (at the time of writing a lecturer in public policy at the Kennedy School, Harvard University; presently the National Security Council's senior specialist on the Middle East and South Asia) offers the U.S. government an approach to regional conflicts that is as compelling as it is un-American. Americans believe in solutions, and get impatient with "conflicts unending." Haass dismisses this as unhelpful innocence and counsels Washington to "lower its sights and work to build confidence between the parties" in a conflict.

This means testing to see if a conflict is ripe for resolution. Indeed, ripeness is the book's central notion. "Whether negotiation will succeed or fail will hinge on [four elements:] the shared perception by the disputants that an accord is desirable, the existence of leadership on all sides that is either sufficiently strong to sustain a compromise or so weak that a compromise cannot be avoided, a formula involving some benefits for all participants, and a commonly accepted diplomatic process." Lacking ripeness, Haass suggests that efforts should be limited to encouraging ripeness through education, pressures on recalcitrant leaders, confidence-building measures, and the like.

In a tour de force, Haass then applies "ripeness" to five conflicts — the Arab-Israeli; Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; India and Pakistan; South Africa; and Northern Ireland — persuasively showing why they are at times susceptible to diplomacy and at times not. D.P.

**Encyclopedia of the American Left.** Edited by Mari Jo Buhle et al. New York: Garland Publishing, 1990. 928 pp. \$95.00.

Have you ever noticed that the Left never announces a rally? It's always a mass rally. Thinking big seems to go with the territory, and

this mammoth book is no exception. For about \$100, you can get nearly one thousand pages concerning the sinistral fringe of the American political spectrum. More than three hundred contributors have linked arms to produce this tome, and they are, seemingly without exception, devotees of various leftist and adversary-culture causes. They have picked their heroes, and (some more blatantly than others) put together mini-hagiographies of those worthies. It is a pity so many of the authors are inadequate researchers and writers.

It is also a pity that the current agenda of the Left demands overrepresentation for ethnic and minority personalities and activities. One would like to know what the Left has been, not what today's Left wishes it had been. The careful reader may also discern a slight favoring of socialists and communists at the expense of anarchists — note the idealistic pie-in-the-sky tone of the articles on Joe Hill, the Wobblies, Emma Goldman, and Paul Goodman. And of course any former radical who abandoned the cause — for example, Sidney Hook — brings forth tendentiousness without mercy.

Nonetheless, this encyclopedia is a treasure for both scholars and the merely curious. (Want to know how Lucille Ball behaved before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1951? It's here.) Use it with circumspection and other sources, for example *The Biographical Dictionary of the American Left*, published by Greenwood in 1986.

**The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat.**

By Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 346 pp. \$22.95. D.P.

In a way, this book was inevitable. It was only a matter of time before antinuclear advocates, searching for ever more effective ways to terrify their audiences, would compare U.S. national security policy with Nazism. That is the thesis of *The Genocidal Mentality*: the same psychological dispositions and devices — dissociation, doubling, psychic numbing — that allowed Nazis to murder millions are characteristic of what Lifton and Markusen call “nuclearism.” Reaching new heights of moral equivalence, the authors are unable to distinguish between Nazis, whose avowed aim was genocide, and U.S. defense planners, whose intentions have always been to see that no one gets killed.

Of course, it is true Defense Department personnel abstract from the individual human beings affected by their work and decisions. But all military and political leaders have had to do that, including the Allied leaders who conquered Nazism. So, for that matter, have doctors. And even if we admit that saving lives with ICBMs is different from saving lives with tanks or scalpels, it does not follow that there is a moral difference between the people who perform those activities, that the former think like Nazis, the latter not.

Yet so totally uncompromising are the authors in their opposition to all things nuclear that they take to ridiculing those with whom they disagree, stigmatizing them as immoral and irrational. Odd, is it not, that the way Lifton and Markusen portray their adversaries' psychologies — through stereotyping, caricaturing, and attacks on their rationality — is exactly the way they see Nazis portraying their enemies?

**History and Progress: In Search of the European and American Mind.** By Margarita Mathiopoulos. New York: Praeger, 1989. 442 pp. \$49.95.

De Tocqueville's remarkable work notwithstanding, Americans sometimes forget how much it is to their advantage that Europeans take an interest in "the American mind," as compared to "the European mind." *History and Progress*, originally published in German in 1986, is a work of that genre, though far from being a great one.

According to Mathiopoulos, one of the most enduring characteristics of the American mind lies in its conception of progress. She therefore begins by tracing the evolution of that idea from antiquity to modern Europe, and from there to America. Then, using "progress" as her central theme, Mathiopoulos recapitulates the essentials of American constitutionalism, and finally shows specific manifestations of the idea in domestic and foreign policy. The result should be of interest to Americans if only because it looks at the basics of American political culture and history from a new angle.

There are some problems with the book, however. Two early chapters on European intellectual history are so convoluted as to render them almost unreadable. Also, at times, the narrative becomes little more than a compilation of quotations. Finally, and most important, *History and Progress* is "old-fashioned" intellectual history in that ideas are only occasionally connected to the economic and social realms. One need not be a Marxist to think such history risks missing some part of the impulses that give rise to ideas. In this regard, however, Mathiopoulos is guilty not of a felony, but rather a misdemeanor.

**The Rockets' Red Glare: When America Goes to War, The Presidents and the People.** By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 476 pp. \$24.95.

So many Leftists have surrendered in recent years, it is quaintly picturesque of Barnet to hold out for radicalism on that remote intellectual island — the Institute of Policy Studies. He still believes that U.S. officials peddle "comfortable simplifications of the official truth" to a good-hearted but ignorant public, serving the interests of those elites profiting from "the American Empire." In *The Rockets' Red Glare*, he takes the reader from George Washington's time to our own, waving the banner of direct democracy, condemning what Walter Lippmann termed

“the manufacture of consent.” Barnet never misses a chance to feature some official’s disdain for public opinion. (Dean Acheson is a favorite target.) He ends by exhorting the reader to educate himself about foreign affairs, then to get involved in foreign-policy issues.

In the matter of education, who could object? But the question of involvement is not so simple. Direct democracy has never been an American ideal. Instead, the Founding Fathers specifically noted the virtues of representative democracy, under which an intelligent electorate chooses virtuous leaders on the basis of political principles and then empowers them to figure out the specific positions that follow from those principles. It is a fascinating, complex subject and deserves better than Barnet’s subtly distorted treatment.

**The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam.** By Patrick Lloyd Hatcher. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. 429 pp. \$35.00.

*The Suicide of an Elite* concentrates on the 1963-65 period, an early stage when the U.S. role in Vietnam was evolving from advisory to combat, because Hatcher believes those are the critical years when errors that lost the war were made. What errors? One was that the National Security Council managed the war. Another was the attempt to intervene across the board — in the military, economic, and political spheres — on a low budget and an unrealistic schedule. Taken together, Hatcher argues, these were fatal. The NSC was too small, and its members (the elite American internationalists of the title) were too inexperienced and hubristic to accomplish such ambitious tasks.

This is a plausible and a novel argument. And Hatcher makes it more plausible by switching his focus back and forth between Washington and Saigon, communicating a vivid sense of the policy disjunctions and ad hoc tinkering that went on throughout the war. Indeed, Hatcher probably communicates this sense better than any other author to date.

Still, there are problems. It is true that U.S. policy was never properly coordinated, and that some aspects of policy tripped over others, but Hatcher’s division between military aspects (run by the Pentagon), economic aspects (run by AID), and political aspects (run by the CIA) is too neat. It suggests near equal weight for the Pentagon and AID, which is nonsense. For another, it downplays the role of the president to an uncomfortable degree. Still, on balance, this is an intriguing and novel approach to the decision-making process that created the greatest catastrophe of postwar U.S. foreign policy; an approach that brings us closer to a basic understanding of how and why that disaster happened. It’s not the answer, but it gets us closer to an answer.

**To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism.**

By Jerome L. Himmelstein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 290 pp. \$25.00.

The five Democratic presidential terms between 1933 and 1953 transformed American conservatism. While retaining a core of social traditionalism, it remodeled itself in two basic ways: an essentially seigniorial outlook in economics gave way to libertarianism, and isolationism gave way to interventionism (of the anti-communist variety). A further oddity was added when the conservatives' champion, Senator Robert A. Taft, lost the 1952 GOP nomination to General Eisenhower, who had also been considered for nomination by the Democrats: lacking a political home, the conservatives began crusading as the voice crying in the wilderness, even though their causes were widely perceived as elitist.

It was, according to Himmelstein, this combination of diverse policy strands and a paradoxical outsider/elite image that ultimately contributed to conservatism's triumph in the Reagan era. But it also took more, he says. In particular, conservatives improved their political and organizational skills through the years; there was a political realignment among certain elites; and there was a demographic shift to the Sun Belt states.

Unfortunately, when explaining the triumph of conservatism, Himmelstein seems to neglect the important role played by the failures of liberalism: the Vietnam War, the war on poverty, the economy of the late 1970s, and the Soviet expansionism that culminated with the invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, *To the Right* is an edifying, analytically sophisticated, tightly-written, and well-reasoned volume. Precisely because it is not written by a conservative, conservatives who look ahead should read it.

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**THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE**

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

**Against the Grain: An Autobiography.** By Boris Yeltsin. New York: Summit Books, 1990. 263 pp. \$19.95.

From 1986 to 1988, Yeltsin was a candidate member of the ruling Soviet Politburo. Then he broke with most of communism's dogmas, and this event gives his book its interest. Other prominent Soviets have gone further in rejecting communism, but none of them had risen so high under it.

Yeltsin traces his career from the youthful stage of romantic illusions, through a growing disenchantment with the Stalinist system,

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and then to his search for reform. The final part of his story provides an informative and even wry look at the rigid Soviet *apparatus*. For example, when Yeltsin was Moscow Party chief and went among the citizenry to learn their problems, the Politburo accused him of trying to gain cheap popularity. He remarks: "As for the smear about cheap popularity, no one but myself seemed to want to earn it! If it was so easy to achieve with just a hop on a bus, why didn't all politicians do it?" But the most exciting part of Yeltsin's story, naturally, concerns his intimate look at Gorbachev, whom he here accuses of inconsistent and half-hearted reformism. Yeltsin is still sympathetic to Gorbachev, however, portraying him as wrestling with the insuperable contradictions of the Soviet system. To succeed, Yeltsin believes, Gorbachev must now abandon Bolshevik dogma, create an essentially new party, and lead the struggle against the *apparatus*. Whether Gorbachev will do this, we will know soon enough: this summer's 28th Party Congress is when he must act.

**The Awakening of the Soviet Union.** By Geoffrey Hosking. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. 182 pp. \$19.95.

In the avalanche of books focused on Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize the Soviet system, Hosking's stands out as one that does not concentrate on personalities and on struggles within the bureaucracy, to the exclusion of all else. Of course, he recognizes the impact of traditional institutions like the Communist Party, the KGB, and the military-industrial complex, but he sees them increasingly weakened by the rise of civil society and by the development of new, parallel structures.

Such recently established institutions as the Congress of People's Deputies, Hosking believes, permit an unprecedented and often turbulent self-emancipation of civil society. Indeed, he considers the Inter-Regional Group (IRG) within the Congress an embryonic political opposition with plans to topple the Communist Party's domination. But to what end? Within the IRG, Hosking detects at least three major directions: the anarchists, the social democrats, and the liberals.

Working-class and ethnic activism will also intensify, he believes, and thereby put more pressure on the inert bureaucratic system. Thus, while acknowledging the obstacles to political and economic pluralism, he senses the presence of "real political forces in play, both at the centre and in the republics, ready and able to challenge the party's lingering monopoly." Overall, this is a refreshingly insightful view of "the awakening of the Soviet Union" by a man who knows his subject thoroughly and has limited the use of meaningless jargon in favor of an inimitably clear and cogent analysis.

**Between East and West. Writings from *Kultura*.** Edited by Robert Kostrzewa. New York: Hill and Wang, 1990. 273 pp. \$30.00.

Totalitarian regimes have tried to raise high walls between exiled intellectuals and their peers still held prisoner within the country. The intellectuals, for their part, have tried to communicate through, over, and around those walls. *Kultura* — the influential Polish-language emigré journal founded after World War II and based in Paris — was one such attempt to maintain communication. Initially it served as a mouthpiece for the liberal Polish intelligentsia; following the success of Solidarity, it has continued to influence the quality and orientation of political debates in Poland, serving as an opening to West European culture.

The principal goal of the essays reprinted here is to debunk the fallacies of both communism and nationalist chauvinism. The anti-communist essays include Mikhail Heller's pathbreaking essay "Homo Sovieticus" — a diagnosis of the assault that communist utopias launch against human nature — and Czeslaw Milosz's "Dostoevsky and the Western Intellectuals," which focuses on the ethical abdications of the Western radical intellectuals in this century. Jan Josef Lipski, one of the founders of the Committee for Defense of Workers in 1976, offers in "Two Fatherlands, Two Patriotisms" a scathing rejection of such tribalistic instincts and emotions as chauvinism and xenophobia, what he calls "national 'patriotic' stupidity." This is not to say that *Kultura* demeans the expression of national values. On the contrary, here, as always, it defends them by emphasizing that true patriotism means coming to terms with and lucidly assessing one's national past.

**Gorbachev and Perestroika.** Edited by Ronald J. Hill and Jan Ake Dellenbrant. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1989. 234 pp. \$42.95.

Although the essays offered here are slightly dated, stopping with the 19th CPSU Conference in the early summer of 1988, they do present an intriguing European perspective on Gorbachev and his reforms. For example, American analysts tend to distinguish the early years of Gorbachev's regime, seeing them as largely disciplinarian and in the Andropov mold. In contrast, Hill and Dellenbrant stress the revolutionary nature of the whole Gorbachev era; they believe that Gorbachev's goals, right from the start, went far beyond tinkering and addressed such fundamental problems of the system as the bureaucratic resistance to change, the absence of a democratic tradition, and the fears of chaos.

The essays themselves range over a wide spectrum of topics, including glasnost, perestroika, and foreign policy. Jyrki Iivonen provides a solid analysis of Gorbachev's personnel policies over the first three years of his tenure, showing how Gorbachev weeded out old party hacks through a "revolution from above and from below," employing ordinary party members and citizens to strip the conservative bureaucrats of their power.

The collection ends with an upbeat assessment of the 19th Party Conference, but with the caveat that the Soviet people and polity will have to make “drastic reassessments” in the process of adjusting to the new realities that Gorbachev is bringing about. This collection is useful, therefore, not only due to the comprehensiveness, but also because it serves as a European counterpoint to the analyses of American Sovietologists on the Gorbachev phenomenon.

**Parting With Illusions.** By Vladimir Pozner. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990. 324 pp. \$19.95.

What is one to think of someone who admits he always lies? Philosophers call it the Liar’s Paradox: if the person is telling the truth, then he’s lying. *Parting With Illusions* makes one want to call it Pozner’s Paradox, for in this memoir, the star of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine admits his job has never been to tell the truth but to defend the party line as charmingly and with as much seeming candor as possible. Let it be said that this memoir is charming and seemingly candid.

Born in France in 1934 to a Russian emigré family that had fled communism in 1922, Pozner was brought to the United States in 1939 just before the outbreak of war. His father, who had earlier found work at MGM, was quite prosperous, and Vladimir grew up and became Americanized among the well-to-do of New York City. In 1948, however, the family left the United States for Berlin, and then in 1953 returned to the USSR. (His father, only twelve years old when the family fled Soviet Russia, had illusions about Stalinism.) Pozner began his journalistic career in 1961 at *Soviet Life*, a slick photo-journalist magazine designed for export, and thus for propaganda. Later, he moved to *Sputnik*, a kind of *Soviet Reader’s Digest* (also for export), and then to Radio Moscow’s North American Service. Finally, his bosses realized that his intelligence, impeccable American accent, and loyalty to communism qualified him to appear on American television shows as an advocate for Soviet policies.

Through it all, Pozner claims, he has worshipped the “ideals of humane socialism” and suffered within when the Soviets were trampling human rights underfoot. But what does this prove? If he is telling the truth about his anguish, then he is a cynical, obsequious opportunist. And if he is lying — then he is still Vladimir Pozner.

**Perestroika Annual: Volume Two.** Edited by Abel G. Aganbegyan. Washington D.C: Brassey’s, 1989. 312 pp. \$23.95.

In the first volume of this series, Gorbachev’s inner circle provided the West with its earliest understanding of how the strategists of restructuring saw their leader’s policies. This second volume offers an update on their perspective. Inevitably, though, it is less exhilarating in its promises and more sober in its assessments. Thus Academi-

cian Roald D. Sagdeev's reflects soberly on "where [Soviet science] lost momentum" owing to bureaucratic bottlenecks and "progress by fiat." And Valentin Rasputin laments the magnitude of the ecological disaster in the USSR.

Yet according to the legal scholar Vladimir Kudryavstev, there is one great source of hope arising from the first stage of reform (1985-89), and that is the understanding that perestroika is not a blueprint for reforms but an ideology of reforming, evolving its shape from practical experience. Apparently, that is supposed to explain the constant policy shifts of the leadership. At any rate, it seems to be the slant of most of the selections in this volume. However, one cannot get rid of the nagging feeling that this is a facile rationalization for repeated crises precipitated by a lack of clear ideological and management guidelines. What, after all, distinguishes such an "ideology of reform" from a runaway enterprise, in which ostensibly deliberate and calculated changes produce results that increasingly overtake the most radical intentions of their initiators and assume a vibrant, dangerous life of their own?

Joydeep Bhattacharya

## THE MIDDLE EAST

by Daniel Pipes

**Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War against Israel and the United States.** By Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy. New York: William Morrow, 1990. 336 pp. \$19.95.

Livingstone and Halevy, both journalists, make any number of sensational assertions. One chapter, for example, provides a blow-by-blow account of the April 1988 execution of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), the PLO military chief. The authors finger the Israelis and tell a story that reads like a thriller: "[The] A Team assembled momentarily outside the door to Abu Jihad's bedroom. Alerted by the muffled sounds coming from downstairs, he groggily raised his head from the pillow. But it was too late. In a split second the commandos were in the bedroom." And so forth.

Another example concerns PLO finances. The authors hold that Lufthansa, the West German airline, paid protection money to the PLO between 1972 and 1977 and that the PLO owns an (unnamed) American motel chain. They total up the organization's assets and arrive at a sum of no less than \$8 to \$14 billion. Its annual revenues, they reckon, exceed the gross national product of some Third World countries.

In the absence of references, what is one to do with such information? Sometimes they leave enough of a trail so that a knowl-

edgeable reviewer can expose their work; Shaul Bakhash did this in an exemplary review in *The New Republic*. It comes down to two things: the authors' reputation and the reliability of known information. *Inside the PLO* fails on both counts. The authors both have a reputation for unreliability: In the Spring 1990 issue of ORBIS, Steven Emerson wrote that Livingstone's recent book, *The Cult of Counterterrorism*, contains "serious errors, errors which render the whole work suspect." The other co-author, David Halevy, was the *Time* reporter who provoked Ariel Sharon's libel case against *Time* in 1985. The verdict, as read by the jury's foreman, was that Halevy "acted negligently and carelessly in both reporting and verifying . . . information." As for the text, it is filled with egregious errors. No matter how tempting the contents may be, this is a book to ignore.

**Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary.** Edited by Bernard Reich. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1990. 557 pp. \$79.95.

It is surprising to note how little biographical information on political leaders is available, aside from the odd newspaper or magazine article. This makes Reich's book on the subject a truly original reference work as well as a very useful one.

The parameters are broad, extending in time from World War II to the present and in space from Morocco to Iran, Turkey to the Sudan. Israel has nine entries, the most, followed by Egypt and Turkey with five each. At the other end, Bahrain and Qatar have only one entry each. Seventy individuals are included. All are males; the oldest (Chaim Weizmann) was born in 1874 and the youngest (Walid Jumblatt) in 1949. Sixty-three biographees are Muslims; of them, 57 are Sunnis, 4 Shi'is, and 2 Ibadis. Of the non-Muslims, 9 are Jewish (and Israeli), 5 Christian, 2 Druze, and 1 'Alawi.

The editor has adopted the policy, probably wise, of finding biographers generally sympathetic to the figure they are covering, though this can lead to some odd assertions. Mary-Jane Deeb commits herself to no more than describing Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi as "rather controversial." According to Helena Cobban, Yasir 'Arafat is "a man of his word." For the most part, however, the accounts are factual, reliable, and useful. Outstanding entries include those on Saddam Husayn (by Amatzia Baram) and on the late shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi (by Marvin Zonis).

**Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya.** By Brian L. Davis. New York: Praeger, 1990. 202 pp. \$42.95.

Starting from the premise that the U.S. military attack against Libya on April 15, 1986, was "probably the most controversial discrete foreign policy action undertaken by the Reagan administration," Davis

offers a solid and very detailed analysis of this incident. In addition to the heroic research effort that went into his account, what makes it especially valuable is that it, unlike the majority of book-length treatments of Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi, contains not the slightest taint of apologetics for the “mad dog of the Middle East” (as President Reagan once described him).

Davis reviews the consequences of the raid on Tripoli, the opinions current in the United States at the time (such as that fighting against Libya “could easily rival Vietnam as one of America’s longest and most painful military involvements”) and comes up with a noteworthy conclusion. While accepting the limited utility of military force, especially when deployed episodically, Davis argues that the raid won real benefits. “Over against the rigid assertion that military force cannot possibly accomplish anything against terrorism, and in fact will only create a cycle of worse violence, it appears that the U.S. attack may have helped break the cycle of accelerating Middle Eastern terrorism dating from 1983.” He is right; in hindsight, it appears that 1986 marked the apogee of Middle East-based terrorism against Westerners, and that the American raid was a critical element in the subsequent reduction in incidents.

**Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850.** By Abbas Amanat. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. 461 pp. \$39.50.

Late in May 1844, two men met in the outskirts of the southern Iranian city of Shiraz. One of them, Mulla Husayn, was a religious leader of high standing; the other, Sayyid ‘Ali Muhammad, was a twenty-four-year-old merchant with notions of himself as the *bab* (gate) who would usher in a new cycle of prophecy, and maybe even the end of the world. So convinced was Mullah Husayn by the young man that he became his first disciple. Things moved fast from that moment on. The Bab won thousands of followers and in 1848 they proclaimed their total break with Islam. By July 1850, when the Bab was executed by a government firing squad, a new religion had been born. Before long, the Babis themselves split, with the majority going on to become Baha’is.

The outlines of this six-year period has long been known but Amanat, a historian at Yale University, capably fills it in with details. This is a formidable task, given the lacunae and the biases of the sources, but Amanat weaves his account with a sure, even masterful hand. The author’s erudition is great, and he tells a story well.

He also shows the significance of the Babi movement in Iranian history. In his estimation, the forward-looking doctrines espoused by the Bab offered “perhaps the last chance for an indigenous reform movement before [Iranian] society became truly affected by the consequences of the Western predominance.” The author implies that

Khomeini's efforts to impose a "tragically anachronistic solution" on Iran follows from the Iranians' vehement rejection of the Bab.

**Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought.** By Issa J. Boullata. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1990. 219 pp. \$44.50 (\$14.95, paper).

Beginning from the premise that "most — if not all — Arab thinkers are unhappy with the present conditions in the Arab world," Boullata surveys recent thinking on four major topics: the Arab heritage, Islam, cultural dependence, and the role of women. In the process, he provides a useful and well-organized summary of such contemporary thinkers as Mohammed Arkoun, Hasan Hanafi, Muhammad an-Nuwayhi, and Fu'ad Zakariya.

There are two problems with Boullata's study. By limiting himself to books and virtually ignoring the lively newspaper and magazine debates, he ignores a critical source of forward-looking ideas. Most thinking on such subjects as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, for example, has taken place not in books but in just such short pieces.

Second, Boullata (who teaches Arabic literature and language at McGill University) only too predictably confirms the old saw about Marxism having become the opiate of English and comparative literature departments. His study is replete with "discourse analysis," dependency theory, and Michel Foucault — underbrush which repeatedly trips up what otherwise would be a readable and reliable account. Would someone inform the professoriate that, at a time when Marxist institutes are closing all over Eastern Europe, the day has come to abandon the intricacies of neo-Marxist thought, and return to the real world of politics and culture?

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## AFRICA

by Michael Radu

**Agenda for Action: African-Soviet-U.S. Cooperation.** Edited by Anatoly A. Gromyko and C.S. Whitaker. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990. 290 pp. \$15.95 (paper).

The Gromykos are survivors, no doubt about it. Andrei Gromyko served every Soviet leader from Stalin to Gorbachev, and the secret of that success was revealed by Khrushchev when he informed the world press: "If I tell him to pull down his pants and sit on a block of ice, he'll do it." In the most amusing chapter of this volume, his son Anatoly

Gromyko does the intellectual equivalent, presumably at the behest of Gorbachev and perestroika. After all, in his pre-Gorbachev days, Gromyko praised African socialism, fervently supported pidgin Leninism from Addis Ababa to Brazzaville, and blasted imperialism as the only cause of Africa's problems. Suddenly, in keeping with the views of his new master, Gromyko admits that Africans have had something to do with their own awful plight, and that the United States has something to offer them (although in cooperation with the Soviet Union, of course). Savoring such ironies is the main reason for reading this book.

Nevertheless, one Soviet author, Gleb Smirnov, does have a point worth making when he writes that Africa's food shortages result in part from the West's food aid. Such aid was and is a subsidy to Western farmers and a source of bankruptcy for African farmers.

But the only truly interesting chapter in the book is Michael Lofchie's study of food shortages in Africa. He describes well how Africa's regimes have been consistently hostile to the rural sector and how they have relentlessly exploited it.

**Christianity amidst Apartheid.** Edited by Martin Prozesky. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 244 pp. \$35.00.

The role of the Christian churches in the political events of South Africa is enormous. The Dutch Reformed church — the dominant sect among Afrikaners and Coloureds, which recently declared apartheid a sin — played a decisive role in President F.W. de Klerk's accommodating attitude toward anti-apartheid activists. With churches exercising such influence, it would be useful to have an overview of their attitudes and actions toward apartheid.

Unfortunately, that is not what Prozesky offers. Rather, *Christianity amidst Apartheid* deals at greatest length with the leaders of less important churches — such as the Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist. The independent "Ethiopian" and "Zionist" denominations, which together represent as many as six million (more than one-third) of South Africa's Blacks, receive exactly two pages of painfully superficial analysis; their leaders are not mentioned in the index. Nor is there serious discussion of the Catholic Opus Dei organization, the conservative Calvinists, or other politically active religious groups.

On a reflective level — well, there is no serious reflective level. Apartheid is a sin, and for decent folk, presumably, everything else is irrelevant, including fears for oneself, one's family, one's people, even one's faith under an ANC-Communist Party regime. In short, this volume is far better at articulating and justifying the opinions of the elite clergy in South Africa than it is at describing Christianity as it is actually being lived there.

**Higher than Hope: The Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela.** By Fatima Meer. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. 429 pp. \$ 19.95.

An authorized biography is usually the book-length equivalent of the fan magazine: starry-eyed concerning its subject's virtues and blind concerning its subject's faults. Since Nelson Mandela has many fans in the United States, Meer's hagiography should sell well.

But scholars beware: Meer shamelessly selects what is useful to her portrait, ignoring what is not. Concerning the 1964 Rivonia trial, which resulted in Mandela's life sentence, she presents extensive quotations from Mandela's testimony, in which he rejects accusations of communism, and expresses admiration for British and American democracies. But there is no mention of Mandela's 1950s tract, "How to be a Good Communist." Similarly, Meer hides Mandela's persistent beliefs in nationalization, redistribution of wealth, and collectivism.

The analysis becomes laughable when it turns to Winnie Mandela, Nelson's wife. In 1988, young thugs living in Mrs. Mandela's house killed another member of their gang, and she was condemned by Bishop Tutu and the ANC leadership. Against all evidence, Meer denies even the fact of the killing, let alone Winnie Mandela's personal responsibility.

In sum, like the typical fan magazine, this volume has nothing of value to offer beyond a few anecdotes. Unfortunately, Mandela is more important than most cinematic and pop-music stars, and a serious study of his career, beliefs, and symbolic importance is sorely needed — never more so than now, when he is involved in discussions over the future of South Africa.

**The Mau Mau War in Perspective.** By Frank Furedi. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press/Swallow Press, 1989. 239 pp. \$15.95 (paper).

Most laymen have heard of the Mau Mau, a secret organization that did something dramatic in Kenya during the 1950s. But beyond that, the story tends to become obscure, and this book takes advantage of the fact. It is confusing, misleading, and pernicious.

Were the Mau Mau involved in a war of national liberation, as Furedi seems to imply? Nonsense. He himself admits that the organization was "largely a Kikuyu affair," and that the tribe had no sense of being one nation with the Luo. Moreover, what Furedi terms a "war" was a loosely organized revolt, geographically and ethnically limited, and racially rather than ideologically motivated. As for his claim that the Mau Mau revolt expressed the "rural radicalism" of Kikuyu peasants who opposed what he calls the "Kikuyu Establishment": then how does one explain Jomo Kenyatta — the quintessential establishment figure, according to Furedi himself — as one of the most prominent Mau Mau leaders?

In fact, the Mau Mau revolt was an African *jacquerie*, an uncontrolled uprising against all things foreign. The destruction of

plantations, burning of schools, and killing of whites did not result in massive popular support for the rebels. On the contrary, the natural expression of the individualist and entrepreneurial Kikuyu mentality was represented by those who, like Kenyatta himself, soon cut their ties with the Mau Mau.

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## SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Ashley J. Tellis

**Economic Reform in Three Giants: U.S. Foreign Policy and the USSR, China, and India.** Edited by Richard E. Feinberg et al. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1990. 247 pp. \$24.95 (\$15.95, paper).

Not only are the Soviet Union, China, and India “giant” countries, but their economic structures are surprisingly similar. Each of the three has a heterogeneous population, an administration with multiple layers, a closed trade regime, and global ambitions. More important, all three have embarked — somewhat concurrently, but each for different reasons — on a process of large-scale economic renewal which, if successful, promises a drastically altered distribution of global economic capabilities.

After providing excellent summaries of the questions facing the three giants, Feinberg and his contributors then go on to consider U.S. foreign policy. They agree that Washington should assist the reform processes by initiatives that support the reform factions within the three giants. Chief among these initiatives are a readiness to embark on arms reductions, an increase in foreign aid and private capital flows, support for increased activity by multilateral institutions, and encouragement of private cultural and educational exchanges.

The authors presume, without proof, that continued global peace and prosperity depends upon the success of the reformers. But why should increased economic gains by a country’s competitors make for enhanced stability and peace? Is it obvious that greater economic interdependence leads to greater peace? These points, so much assumed these days, need to be justified, not asserted.

**Indochinese Refugee Dilemma.** By Valerie O’Connor Sutter. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990. 256 pp. \$27.50.

In December 1989, fifty-one Vietnamese citizens living in Hong Kong refugee camps were forced by armed police back into a nightmare they thought they had escaped — Vietnam. Now British authorities are threatening to repatriate by force many more of the 38,000 refugees

threatening to repatriate by force many more of the 38,000 refugees residing in Hong Kong, and the alternatives for these refugees are quickly shrinking.

What has Washington done to help? Although the American melting pot has permanently accepted 884,000 refugees since the evacuations of Saigon and Phnom Penh, Sutter argues that this is not enough. Moreover, she maintains, U.S. officials are either hypocritical or impotent moralizers, because they last year signed the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese refugees, then violated its spirit by accepting only those who qualify as "political refugees." This, she writes, is similar to the 1956 Hungarian refugee situation when "the practical actions the government took to help the refugees fell short of expectations the U.S. had helped to foster by idealizing and symbolizing the refugees' plight as part of its cold war rhetoric."

Although Sutter provides a well-written survey of some issues involved in the refugee dilemma (for example, the conditions in and the policies of first asylum countries), her central argument remains weak. She says refugee expectations and actions are related to U.S. policy, citing "American propaganda" as one of the roots of the Vietnamese exodus, but she provides no direct testimony. As a result, the reader must accept her premises on faith.

James C. Carlson

**The Politics of India since Independence. Volume 1 of part IV of The New Cambridge History of India.** By Paul R. Brass. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 357 pp. \$34.50.

The New Cambridge History of India is a four-part, multi-volume project designed to integrate the mass of scholarship — indigenous and foreign — produced since the country gained independence in 1947. The fourth part of the project is "The Evolution of Contemporary South Asia," and *The Politics of India* is the first volume of that part. It surveys modern Indian political institutions and political life, and the interactions between these two. Such an investigation may seem overly ambitious, but Brass has masterfully integrated the multitude of details into a smooth narrative. The result is an excellent volume that illuminates the nature of Indian politics for both scholar and layman.

His conclusions are sobering: India's democracy has been progressively undermined, and recent events indicate that this is not just another passing phase in the nation's political development. The chief culprit is excessive centralization — the consequence of a statist economic strategy that aimed at transforming India into a modern industrial power. In the process, essential political institutions have been destroyed. Brass also claims that charismatic leadership has played a critical role in the making and unmaking of Indian democratic structures — an argument in sharp contrast to the hackneyed Marxism that uncritically blames "unequal structures" for India's political mis-asma.

**Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives.** Edited by Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 309 pp. \$36.00.

While Americans tend to ignore the impact of U.S. actions on India, Indians are only too keenly aware of the American presence in their region and of its significance for their country. The book edited by Harrison and Subrahmanyam may be the best introduction to these conflicting perspectives.

American policy makers know that India is the second most populous country in the world; that it has strong military forces; that it has used these forces coercively; and that it often opposes the principles and practice of American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Third World. But American analysts do not see these facts as explaining U.S. policies. Indian analysts do. They believe that U.S. regional security guarantees and naval policing practices are a thinly veiled attempt to contain a rising regional power — namely, India. Conversely, since Indian hegemony depends on clearing the Indian Ocean of extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, Americans anticipate that Indian analysts will argue that the American presence is counter-productive, perhaps even illegitimate. And indeed, they do.

What makes this work interesting, however, is that each position is stated with scholarly rigor rather than shrill polemics. And since the Indian sentiments are underscored by the large military expansion now underway, this book is essential reading — even if one disagrees with the editors' conclusions about the feasibility of American political withdrawal from South Asia.

**Vietnam since the Fall of Saigon, Updated Edition.** By William J. Duiker. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989. 383 pp. \$14.00 (paper).

Contrary to innumerable teach-ins and much anti-American propaganda, North and South Vietnam had quite different economies long before America arrived to fight the Vietnam War in 1964. Indeed, according to researchers at the Institute for Social Sciences at Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), when the French gained full control of the region in 1888, 25 percent of all land in the northern Red River Delta area was publicly owned, as compared to only 3 percent of the land in the South. But after 1975, Duiker points out, the Vietnamese rulers in Hanoi have overridden the South's history of economic liberalism in the name of expunging the "neo-colonialist garbage of the U.S. imperialists."

In order to instill socialism, Hanoi embarked on a number of costly economic and political campaigns. A brutal re-education campaign was implemented in 1976 for anyone formally connected with the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Duiker reports that as many as one-third of all families in the South had a family member sent to prison.

As for the economy, Duiker tells how Vietnam, once a major rice exporter, was led into famine when the government discouraged farmers from selling rice and gave incentives to use it for animal feed. As a result, in 1977 as much as 600,000 tons of paddy rice, about 5 percent of total grain production in that year, was kept off the market.

Duiker's account of Vietnam ends in 1988, before the country's reform program had time to make any progress. With luck, he will have to update his book once again when the reforms take hold.

James C. Carlson

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### EAST ASIA

by Arthur N. Waldron

**China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns.** By Carol Lee Hamrin. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1990. 268 pp. \$26.50.

Because China was the first major communist country to institute real reforms to a Marxist-Leninist economy (and also the one most firmly to apply the brakes to reform) its experience has great significance in an age of communist upheavals. Hamrin, a State Department research specialist on China, has supplemented the published sources by conducting extensive interviews with Chinese involved in the PRC's reform process of 1985, 1986, and 1987. The result is a survey of Deng Xiaoping's reforms that is both full of specific information and analytically sophisticated. A chronology, extensive glossary, and comprehensive index render this authoritative work particularly useful.

Hamrin believes that changes in Communist China arrive in waves, and that their timing, speed, and magnitude are determined by the interaction of economics and politics. She identifies the sources of the reform impulse in both China's own poverty and the unsettling example of rapid growth in its smaller neighbors. She traces the flows and ebbs of this impulse in disagreements among the leadership in Peking. One such surge of economic discontent came early in the 1980s, another in the mid-80s, and a third, in 1988-89, brought on a systemic crisis that spread beyond the economy to the entire society.

**Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972.** By Gordon H. Chang. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. 392 pp. \$25.00.

Legend now has it that, until Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger came along, the United States was oblivious to the possibility of taking advantage of discord between Peking and Moscow. Chang has

combed the relevant American archives, and concludes that the strategy of splitting the Sino-Soviet bloc was accepted, though not applied with consistency, almost from the moment that bloc came into being. His documentation is impressive. For example, when he describes the 1960s disagreement between Donald Zagoria and George Kennan over whether to attempt to engage China, he not only gives their opinions — Zagoria basically for and Kennan against — but uses extracts from Kennan's letters to suggest that Kennan was temperamentally distrustful of China and more sympathetic to Russia.

Naturally, a book based almost entirely on English sources is bound to have some gaps. Thus, the treatment of Chinese and Soviet contributions to political developments is sketchy compared with the commanding account of American policy making. Also, one wishes Chang had said more about the Korean war and about the Chinese policy toward the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Nevertheless, the strengths of *Friends and Enemies* are compelling, and it adds much to an understanding of the early three-way relationship. Chang clearly understands both Western and Chinese approaches to strategy, as well as the difference between the sometimes noisy rhetoric of politics and the subtler business of practical foreign policy.

**The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949.** By Linda Benson. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990. 265 pp. \$45.00.

The Ili Rebellion consisted of an attempt by Turkic Muslims in a small region of Xinjiang province, in the far northwest of China, to create an independent Muslim state. The rebels intended that their East Turkestan Republic would control the whole of Xinjiang, after which they would expel the Han Chinese. The rebellion began in November 1944 and resisted efforts to suppress it by the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek; it collapsed only on October 20, 1949, just nineteen days after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Peking.

Benson, an assistant professor at Oakland College in Rochester, Michigan, has done a superb job of piecing together information on this consequential but obscure incident. Her research in the British, American, and Republic of China archives was supplemented by readings in Russian and Turkic materials, as well as by a host of interviews. In addition to constructing a narrative of the five-year episode, she shows how the rebellion incubated in the hostility Turks felt toward their alien rulers; that (Chinese suspicions to the contrary) Stalin was not responsible for instigating the rebellion, though he helped it along; and that the short-lived East Turkestan Republic greatly heightened the sense of Turkic nationalism. Benson portrays the incident as

ultimately “a part of the post-World War II pattern of breakdown in the old colonialist and imperialist system.” D.P.

**Japan's Unequal Trade.** By Edward J. Lincoln. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1990. 290 pp. \$26.95.

Americans scarcely use the word “imported” to describe goods any longer. With so much produced abroad — from paper-clips on up to computers — the term is no longer of much descriptive use. The Japanese are far different. One of the most amusing passages in this fine book describes the typical department-store display in Japan, with “the foreign goods often prominently displayed with little flags showing the country of origin.” And the products are usually luxury goods (Burberry raincoats or Louis Vuitton bags); if not (General Electric refrigerators), they are marked up to luxury levels (from a U.S. price of \$1,340 to \$5,446 in Japan).

Why is Japan like this? The problem preoccupies a whole sub-industry of political economists, analysts, and pundits. Lincoln belongs to the more reputable and optimistic branches of the tribe; he finds the causes for Japan's unequal trade neither in the mists of the past nor in the deepest recesses of the Japanese psyche, but rather in the particular exigencies and strategies of development. And since the conditions that led to policies of protectionism are now changing, he foresees gradual amelioration and argues against managed trade. His statistics and graphs are thorough and impressive and his prescriptions are judicious and sensible. But this reviewer is more skeptical. After all, it will take much more than Tokyo's recent halting steps toward free trade for those little flags to disappear from the department store windows and for the GE refrigerators to become affordable.

**Legacies: A Chinese Mosaic.** By Bette Bao Lord. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. 245 pp. \$19.95.

Everyone seems to be looking forward to a post-Deng China. But what will such a China offer? Lord's answer brings together depressing information, both historical and journalistic.

Only two leaders of the last two centuries are widely considered “virtuous” by today's Chinese: Sun Yat-Sen and Zhou Enlai. (Writing mostly about post-1949 China, Lord mentions only Zhou.) Had these two had the chance to exercise supreme control, they might have kept China in pace with Japan. But power in China has ultimately been in the hands of despotic leaders with strong ties to the military, such as Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping. If history is any indication, virtue and diplomacy will remain subordinated by Chinese leaders into the twenty-first century.

Confirmation of this grim prognosis comes as the author searches to build her book of oral histories. Among mid-level members of the CCP

cadre, she finds only one that is rumored to be politically virtuous — and he ends up supporting the government's recent crackdown. Other oral histories are even more disheartening: a self-criticizing former Red Guard-cum-journalist; the children of the Cultural Revolution who hated their parents and teachers; a dedicated surgeon whose thumb was broken by the hospital staff for reading Western medical texts and taking pictures of his patients; and a trilingual scholar sentenced to "reeducation" in women's clothing.

Despite such bitter tales, Lord remains proud of her Shanghai origins, and mingles stories about her own clan, providing a beautifully written work on the ugliness of the PRC.

James C. Carlson

**Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms.** By Cal Clark. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989. 283 pp. \$45.00.

Taiwan is an overpopulated, semitropical island about the size of Maryland and Delaware. Why, then, does it generate so much interest? Partly because of the island's remarkable economic development, and partly because of the challenge that its experience poses to academics who profess to understand economic growth — especially those who advocate development and dependency theory.

Clark's book offers a judicious compendium of information and analysis. It includes both a narrative of Taiwan's economic development (drawing insightfully on the substantial English-language literature) and a theoretical analysis. Clark argues that the example of Taiwan neither confirms nor refutes any single model of economic development. Rather, it provides a mixture of results that highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the various interpretive approaches. On this point, the author's careful exposition and summary are extremely useful. In his conclusion, Clark goes even further and suggests that economic analysis of any type is too narrow to deal with the full range of causes, including cultural factors, behind the Taiwan experience. But granting the full complexity of that experience, one still wishes the author had addressed more directly the issue of transferring Taiwan's success to other states, especially those that are culturally different.

## LATIN AMERICA

by Michael Radu

**Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso.** By Carlos Ivan Degregori. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1990. 220 pp. 180,000 intis (paper).

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) is one of the largest and

bloodiest insurgent groups in the world. Since its violent campaign began a decade ago, it has caused the death of seventeen thousand Peruvians. Economic damage is estimated at more than the country's \$16 billion in foreign debt.

Degregori, author of previous studies on Sendero, now focuses on the least known but most important part of its history: its transformation from a Maoist sect into a force threatening the country's existence. His main point is that Sendero cannot be understood apart from its origins at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in the impoverished Andean city of Ayacucho.

Reopened in 1959 after being closed for seventy-five years, UNSCH was the focus of Ayacucho's social and intellectual life and the town's main employer; and soon it was controlled by a group of ultra-leftist professors. Led by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, a Kantian philosophy professor and personnel director, faculty and student leaders formed the Sendero Luminoso. Slowly but steadily, UNSCH students and graduates (particularly those of the Teachers' College and Nurses' School) spread their credo from the UNSCH to the city, then to surrounding areas, and then to neighboring departments. Meanwhile, at the UNSCH, Guzmán drove out other leftist groups by denying tenure to their leaders.

Despite the book's failings (for example, seeing poverty as the main explanation for the growth of Sendero), *Ayacucho 1969-1979* is a must read for students of communism.

**Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos. El radicalismo universitario de los años setenta.** By Nicolas Lynch. Lima: El Zorro de Abajo Ediciones, 1990. 125 pp. 120,000 intis (paper).

For about thirty years, most of Latin America's public universities have been under the control of the far Left, and none more so than the oldest university in the Americas: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima. Lynch, a participant in the student movements there during the 1970s and now a faculty member at San Marcos, offers the finest analysis of a radicalized university yet published. Moreover, the significance of his book is far wider than his topic, for what is true of San Marcos applies equally well to most similar institutions in Latin America, from Guatemala's San Carlos to Mexico's National Autonomous University.

According to Lynch, the typical student radical of San Marcos is a provincial from the lower middle class, of mixed racial background, and deeply ambitious. Once in the capital, such a student is both a sophisticate and a hick; part Indian, part white; from the mudsill yet entering the elite. He feels profoundly out of place. Confused and arrogant, the student picks up the nearest available intellectual crutch, which in this century has been dogmatic communism. In Lynch's

student days, “The University was a temple of Mao Zedong,” with Stalin and Albania’s Enver Hoxha serving as the two lesser deities.

Lynch’s analysis is profound and biting, but possesses a degree of empathy with its subjects as well. He understands that the rebellious student revolutionaries are not only the authors of foolish and destructive actions, but often the victims too.

**Nicaragua’s Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle.** By Michael Dodson and Laura Nuzzi O’Shaughnessy. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 279 pp. \$39.95

The conventional wisdom on the Catholic church in Central America holds that, before Vatican II, it was losing credibility and believers because of its alliance with the local oligarchies. To revive the Church’s presence, “liberation theology” was devised, and then institutionalized, following the 1968 episcopal conference in Medellín, Colombia.

This premise animates Dodson and O’Shaughnessy’s volume as well as the entire genre it typifies. For instance, the authors believe that the Nicaraguan church opposed the FSLN because of the latter’s anti-Somoza rhetoric and its nationalism. In fact, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, his bishops, and most Nicaraguan priests (except for the foreign-born ones) opposed the FSLN because they saw it was Marxist and anti-national.

The authors overlook the recent trend (noticeable in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru) whereby the Catholic church has been losing adherents — not to revolutionaries but to evangelical anticommunist Protestant sects. They also miss the growing reaction against the so-called popular (Marxoid) Church groups in countries like Nicaragua and Colombia. Both phenomena result from the Church’s tarnished image as a supporter of traditional values, including anticommunism. Both are linked to the efforts of liberation theologians, some of whom have taken arms against established democratic governments.

**Prospects for Democracy in Mexico.** Edited by George W. Grayson. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1990. 303 pp. \$34.95.

In 1982, when Mexico almost went bankrupt and failed to pay its foreign debt, American attention was drawn to that country, with near-panic. Grayson’s volume goes a long way to provide a level-headed and in some ways reassuring analysis of Mexico’s prospects.

Increasingly, Mexicans see that economic ties with the United States are inevitable and in their own interest, particularly as Mexico’s economic and political importance declines. The recent public statements by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari regarding Mexico’s intention to join the Canada-US free trade area would have been political

suicide only a few years ago. Still, serious structural problems remain, most notably in the overgrown nationalized industries, with their inefficiency, animosity to private initiative, huge deficits, and rejection of foreign capital. Grayson has assembled analysts to provide balanced consideration from the points of view of the Mexican government, international banking, private business, and an American analyst.

Roderic Camp's chapter on the military is of particular interest, in part because this feature of Mexican life is little studied. Although he stresses that the Mexican military is the most inward-looking in all of Latin America, he also notes elements of change. Modern weapons are being purchased from abroad and top officers are being trained abroad. The possibility of Mexico emerging as a southward-looking power bears consideration.

**Sandinista Communism and Rural Nicaragua.** By Janusz Bugajski. The Washington Papers, Center for Strategic and International Studies. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. 132 pp. \$34.95 (\$12.95, paper).

In Nicaragua's February 1990 elections, the opposition to the FSLN received its largest share of votes in rural areas of Nicaragua, and in the cattle- and coffee-producing northern regions in particular. Anyone puzzled should read this volume, for in it the author describes the FSLN's largely irrational agricultural policies.

Like other Marxist-Leninist regimes, the FSLN treated the Nicaraguan peasant as a resource for its urban constituency. It imposed production and delivery quotas at artificially fixed state prices, often below production costs. In the case of major individual landowners, the state also decided the level of employment, the cost of imported spare parts, the price of exportable products (coffee, cotton, cattle), and the level of interest rates, or even the availability of credits.

The FSLN rarely granted landless peasants titles to land. Instead, it conditioned the use of land upon restrictions related to inheritance, sale, government-imposed production and price quotas — a sure way of deterring small peasants from improving production. The FSLN also opposed the formation of independent rural groups, sometimes killing local leaders of producer associations. Instead, it promoted agricultural cooperatives with the goal of gaining control over the peasants.

Bugajski offers an important analysis of the inevitable agrarian failure of one Marxist-Leninist regime. It points to the need for parallel studies of other such regimes in the Third World and in Eastern Europe.

**Self-Portrait of the Other.** By Heberto Padilla. Translated by Alexander Coleman. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1990. 247 pp. \$18.95.

Padilla, a Cuban exile, is a poet, not a politician. Thus, much of his memoir concerns conversations with fellow writers, including Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Robert Lowell, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre. But Padilla cannot ignore how his country has been affected by politics. So, though seemingly reluctant to do so, he presents a damning indictment of the intellectual Left that failed to recognize the imposition of Stalinism on Cuba; and then, having recognized it, refused to condemn it.

Padilla's own case offers one example. In the early 1960s, he worked in the Cuban press agency; later, Ché Guevara appointed him to run cultural affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Commerce. Eventually, Padilla's distaste for obsequiousness got him imprisoned and beaten. After release, he was kept under virtual house arrest and forced to go through a charade of "self-criticism" in front of the Writers' Union. Understandably, Padilla wanted out, and in 1978, he sought help in getting out from the renowned Colombian writer, and radical, Gabriel García Márquez, who was visiting Cuba. "You are right in thinking that I can help you," García Márquez told him, "but I won't. Your leaving Cuba at this moment would harm the Revolution."

That was a despicable act, no doubt. But one wonders why Padilla took so long to denounce Castro's neo-Stalinism. In 1951, when Castro was running for the Cuban House of Representatives, he told Padilla, "The politician who gets the most votes is the worst. The assent of the majority is always spurious. Applause always brings compromise. New ideas get imposed by fists." What more did Padilla need to hear?

Alan Luxenberg

**U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s.** Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 323 pp. \$38.00 (\$15.95, paper).

Remember the U.S.-Soviet "student exchanges" of the Brezhnev days, when dour Soviet "students" in their mid-30s shoved the Party line at naïve and apologetic American teenagers visiting Moscow? The 1987 workshop in Havana from which this volume emerged wasn't quite that bad, but it was in the same tradition of nonsymmetrical exchanges. The results are predictable. The Americans try to examine issues somewhat even-handedly, while the Cubans score polemical points. Of course, the Cuban participants are not free to say what they think; that is why, as a scholarly endeavor, this book is fundamentally dishonest. Which does not mean the American co-editor, a top-ranking scholar of Cuban studies, is dishonest, just that he is morally confused.

In spite of it all, two chapters are worth reading. Gregory Treverton's essay emphasizes that improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations will be impossible so long as Cuba actively supports revolutionary movements in the Third World. Howard Wiarda's contribution de-

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scribes Cuba as “the odd man out” in Latin America, having lost its appeal as a model for others. Wiarda (in 1987, remember) also emphasizes the vulnerability of Castro’s regime, a view that is beginning to look remarkably prescient.

By contrast, the avowed purpose of the conference — to pave the way for greater understanding between Washington and a Communist regime in Havana — seems remarkably outdated. It now appears Washington’s best bet is to wait out the Ceausescu of the Caribbean, and look forward to renewing relations with a non-Communist Cuba.

Alan H. Luxenberg

# ERRATA

The Spring 1990 issue of ORBIS contained the following two errors:

In the article, "More Than Ever, Arms Control Demands Compliance," by Robin Ranger and Dov S. Zakheim, the last four words were omitted. The final paragraph should read:

The U.S. government must establish not only the verifiability of new arms control treaties but the possibility of enforcing compliance. Responses to violations should be made clear in advance, preferably with the agreement of the allies. Only in this manner can the Kremlin be convinced that its treaty violations will be taken seriously; only in this manner can the West be confident that arms control treaties will actually serve their intended purpose.

On page 296, in the review of Richard Stites's *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*, by Richard Pipes, the first paragraph should read:

The Russian Revolution and the regime that emerged from it can be treated as a quest for utopia or a quest for power. In Stites's treatment, they are almost exclusively the first. He romanticizes the Bolshevik experiment, ignoring the unprecedented level of personal tyranny established in Russia after 1917 by rulers whose motive was the desire to dominate and reshape their subjects rather than to create a utopia.

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
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
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When it comes to determining equitable military burdens within NATO, the Europeans are right: Rather than evaluate contributions by economic input [such as military expenditures as a percentage of GNP], the stress should be on military output. . . . Looking at output categories — such as the percentage of military expenditures spent on equipment, or the percentage of the population on active duty — shows that the United States has, until recently, ranked in the middle range of NATO.

Stanley K. Ridgley

“Can NATO Assess Dues Fairly?”

In Eastern Europe, a change in Soviet intentions has been matched by a change in Soviet military capabilities; in the USSR, it has not. Theoretically, the USSR remains as able to destroy 90 percent of the American ICBM force as it was a decade ago. In the meantime, the effort to reduce the vulnerability of the American ICBM force, which looked so promising just a year ago, has ground to a halt.

James J. Wirtz

“MX Rail Garrison: How Not to Pick a Weapon”

Suppose in the United States you had two parties, and only one believed in private property and the market economy. And that one got elected for one presidential term and then the other got elected the next presidential term. You wouldn't have a market economy at all. Because you can't invest and go private for only four years, then be expropriated the next four years. That doesn't work. That paralyzes you. That's why you cannot in this country [Peru] simply concentrate the desire to create a modern society on Fredemo.

Interview with Hernando de Soto

“How I Sell Capitalism to the Left”

Far scarier than the watch America's espionage agencies allegedly keep on ordinary Americans is the watch ordinary Americans seem able to keep on America's espionage agencies. After all, these agencies are supposed to be secret, and if hostile journalists can penetrate them, so can hostile agents.

Michael Antonucci

“Brief Reviews: *Secret Intelligence*”